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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Housing Authority disagrees with Snyder's statement of 
the issues in this case. Accordingly, the Housing Authority 
submits its own version of the issues presented on appeal, 
accompanied with the pertinent standard of review. 
1. WHETHER SNYDER PROPERLY PRESERVED THE ISSUES 
SURROUNDING THE SETTING OF A TRIAL DATE, AND IF SO, 
WHETHER SNYDER WAS ENTITLED TO A CONTINUANCE OF THE 
TRIAL DATE. 
Standard of Review: As a general matter, appellate courts 
will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. 
Snyder had an obligation to raise all of the issues that could 
have been raised at the trial level. Those issues not raised are 
waived and cannot be considered on appeal. Condas v. Condas, 618 
P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980). Even if Snyder had preserved 
this issue at the trial court, whether the trial court acted 
improperly in denying any request by Snyder for a continuance is 
within the discretion of the trial court and a trial court's 
decision in this regard can be reversed only if there is an abuse 
of discretion. Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988). 
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2. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT 
DETERMINED THAT SNYDER HAD COMMITTED AN ASSAULT. 
Standard of Review: Whether Snyder engaged in criminal 
behavior is a question of fact. Thus, this issue is reviewed 
under a "clearly erroneous" standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 935 (Utah 1994). To properly challenge the trial court!s 
factual findings, the appellant must marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings, then show that despite 
this evidence, and despite the reasonable inferences from the 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be inadequate. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
3. WHETHER SNYDER WAS EVICTED UNDER A VALID LEASE 
PROVISION. 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law. 
Because the issue is one of law, this Court may review the trial 
court's legal conclusions for correctness. Bailey-Allen Co., 
Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation 
omitted). However, this issue was not properly preserved at the 
trial court. Thus, this Court should not consider it as it is 
being raised for the first time on appeal. Condas v. Condas, 618 
P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980). 
4. WHETHER SNYDER WAS ENTITLED TO A GRIEVANCE HEARING 
BEFORE AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION COULD BE FILED. 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law 
and is therefore subject to a review of the trial court's legal 
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conclusion, if any, for correctness. Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. 
Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citation 
omitted). However, once again, Snyder failed to adequately 
preserve this issue at trial or elsewhere in the record, thus the 
issue is not properly before this Court. Condas v. Condas, 618 
P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of Utahfs Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Statute, UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 78-36-1 et seq. (1953), as amended, is 
both determinative and of central importance to the underlying 
appeal. Because the sections of the Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Statute, in toto are lengthy, a complete copy is attached hereto 
as part of the Appelleefs Addendum. In addition, the Appellee 
incorporates the relevant provisions of the Code of Federal 
Regulations at attached to Appellant's Brief as Attachment D. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake (the 
"Housing Authority" or "landlord") sued John Thomas Snyder (the 
"tenant" or "Snyder") for the unlawful detainer of the premises 
owned by it and known as 1966 South 200 East, #A506, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
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Course of Proceedings 
On or about March 6, 2000, the Housing Authority filed a 
complaint against Snyder for the unlawful detainer of premises 
owned by it and which were subject to a lease agreement between 
the parties. (R. 1-16). The trial court issued a Three Day 
Summons which was duly served on Snyder on March 9, 2000. (R. 21-
23). Snyder filed an answer to the Housing Authority's complaint 
on or about March 13, 2000. (R. 17-20). On or about March 20, 
2000, the Housing Authority filed a Certificate of Readiness for 
Trial indicating that the matter was ready to be set for a 
hearing or trial. (R. 29-30). That same day Snyder filed a Motion 
to Dismiss (R. 24-26) and an Objection to Certificate of 
Readiness for Trial (R. 27-28). On or about March 27, 2000, the 
trial court denied Snyder's motion to dismiss on the basis that 
it had not been properly submitted for decision and the trial 
court also denied Snyder's objection to trial. (R. 31). The 
Housing Authority filed a memorandum in opposition to Snyder's 
motion to dismiss. (R. 32-86). However, Snyder's motion to 
dismiss was never submitted for decision to the trial court. On 
or about April 6, 2000, the trial court set the matter for trial 
on May 8, 2000. (R. 87-88). Snyder filed several motions, two of 
which are relevant to the issues raised on appeal. On May 8, 
2000, the day of trial, Snyder filed a motion for continuance of 
the trial date. (R. 153-166). The Housing Authority duly filed a 
response to Snyder's motion for continuance on May 8, 2000. (R. 
205-217). On or about May 9, 2000, Snyder filed a motion for 
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summary judgment. (R. 229-248). The Housing Authority also 
filed a response to Snyderfs motion for summary judgment on or 
about May 8, 2000. However, the Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment does not 
appear in the record.1 A copy of Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is attached 
hereto as part of the Appellee's Addendum/ None of these 
motions were submitted for decision to the trial court pursuant 
to the provisions of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
See Rule 4-501, UTAH CODE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
On May 8, 2000 at 2:00 p.m., a bench trial was held whereby 
both parties were represented by counsel. Both parties presented 
opening and closing statements. The Court also heard the 
testimony of six witnesses. On June 13, 2000, the trial court 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and an order 
of judgment in favor of the Housing Authority. (R. 265-271 and R. 
295-99 respectively). Snyder filed his Notice of Appeal on or 
about June 21, 2000. 
This is also recognized and acknowledged by Snyder. See 
Brief of Appellant at page 11 n. 2. 
2
 While the Appellee argues herein that the issues raised 
in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment were not properly 
preserved in the trial court and thus not issues proper for 
consideration on appeal, the Housing Authority includes a copy 
for the Court's consideration if the Court of Appeals should find 
otherwise. 
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Disposition in the Court Below 
At a bench trial on the merits of the underlying case, the 
Honorable Michael K. Burton presiding, the Third District Court 
found in favor of the Housing Authority and against Mr. Snyder. 
At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the Court found 
that Snyder had violated the lease and that after being served 
with an appropriate notice to quit the premises, Snyder failed to 
surrender possession of the premises. Transcript at 100-103. A 
complete copy of the transcript of the Trial in this matter is 
attached hereto as part of the Appellee's addendum. The court 
duly entered its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and 
"Judgment(Unlawful Detainer)". (R. 265-71 and R. 295-99 
respectively). 
Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. On or about August 7, 1998, the Housing Authority and 
Snyder entered into a residential lease agreement for the 
premises known as 1966 South 200 East, #A506, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84115. A copy of the Lease Agreement is attached as Exhibit 
A to the Complaint filed in this action (R. 4-11) and was 
admitted at trial as Plaintifffs Exhibit 1. Transcript at 76. 
2. Among other terms and conditions, the Lease Agreement 
provides: 
(a) That the tenant shall have certain obligations, to wit: 
"Resident and household members, guests and visitors will act in 
a manner so as not to disturb any neighbors peaceful enjoyment of 
his/her accommodations and refrain from all illegal or criminal 
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activity on or near the Premises. Such illegal activity 
includes, but is not limited to, the use or sale of drugs by the 
Resident, household members, guests or visitors.11 Trial Exhibit 1 
at page 4, paragraph 11(1); (R. 8). 
(b) That the lease may be terminated: "Housing Authority 
will evict Resident for nonpayment of rent, nonpayment of other 
financial obligations due under the terms of the lease, making 
any false of misleading statements concerning information 
required by Housing Authority; criminal activity that threatens 
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment by other 
residents; drug related criminal activity at or near the 
Premises; repeated failure to comply with any other Resident's 
obligation under the lease; or for other good cause." Trial 
Exhibit at page 5 paragraph 17; (R. 9). 
(c) That ff[t]enancy shall not terminate until the time for 
Resident to request a grievance hearing has expired, if Resident 
is entitled to a grievance hearing. If Resident is entitled to a 
grievance hearing and requests such in a timely fashion, tenancy 
shall not terminate until the grievance process is completed." 
Trial Exhibit 1 at page 6; (R. 10). 
3. In addition to being bound by the terms and 
conditions of the lease agreement, the parties are bound by the 
policies of the Housing Authority as well as all applicable 
governmental regulations. Trial Exhibit 1 at page 4 at paragraph 
11D; (R. 8). Section XIII of the Housing Authorityfs policies 
sets forth the Housing Authority's "Grievance Procedure." The 
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Housing Authority's "Rental and Policy Statement" was admitted at 
trial as Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 3. (R. 70). As noted therein, 
at section 7, the provisions of the grievance procedure do not 
apply to the termination of a tenancy based upon a "tenant's 
creation or maintenance of the threat to the health or safety of 
other tenants or HA [Housing Authority] employees." Trial 
Exhibit 3, Section XIII(7). A copy of the Housing Authority's 
Grievance Procedure is attached hereto in Appellee's Addendum for 
the convenience of the Court. 
4. Sherrie Rico, an employee of the Housing Authority, 
is the manager of the apartment complex in which Snyder resided. 
Transcript at 11-12. 
5. The Housing Authority is both the owner and the 
landlord of the premises which are the subject of the underlying 
litigation. Transcript at 14. 
6. On or about February 23, 2000, Ms. Rico went to work 
at the subject premises. Transcript at 14. Ms. Rico went to her 
office and Julie Keyou, a volunteer worker, was already there. 
Transcript at 16. Ms. Keyou informed Ms. Rico that Snyder wanted 
to talk to her. Transcript at 16. Ms. Keyou and Ms. Rico called 
Snyder on the telephone to let him know that Ms. Rico was at the 
building. Transcript at 16-17. In response to the telephone 
call, Snyder stated that he would be right down. Transcript at 
17. Snyder did go to Ms. Rico's office. Transcript at 17. 
7. Upon his arrival in Ms. Ricofs office, Snyder "came 
into the office and walked in and closed the door[.]ff Transcript 
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at 17:19-20. Ms. Keyou was still in the room. Transcript at 17. 
Snyder initially sat down at the desk across from Ms. Rico and 
Ms. Keyou. Transcript at 17-18. Snyder threw a piece of paper on 
the desk and indicated to Ms. Rico that he displeased with a 
request made of him by the Housing Authority. Transcript at 
18:6-11. Snyder then proceeded to call Ms. Rico names and swear 
at her. According to Ms. Rico's testimony, Snyder stated 
l![y]ou!re God-damn right, you bitch, I'll call you what I want to 
call you" and then Snyder continued with name calling. 
Transcript at 18:18-21. Snyder then stated, "[y]ou know, you 
better pull up your fucking pantyhose you fucking bitch because 
I'm going to get you on this." Transcript at 18:19-21. Ms. Rico 
then inquired as to why he was so upset. Snyder then stood up 
and came around the desk to where Ms. Rico was positioned. 
Transcript at 18-19. As Snyder came around the desk toward Ms. 
Rico he was thrusting his finger in her face and he was calling 
Ms. Rico names as he was moving toward her. Transcript 18-20. 
Ms. Rico was frightened so she turned on her two-way radio to 
alert other Housing Authority employees of her situation. 
Transcript at 19-20. Snyder finally left the office. Transcript 
at 20. 
8. Following the incident with Snyder, Ms. Rico filed a 
police report with the Salt Lake City police department. 
Transcript at 22. 
9, Shortly thereafter, the Housing Authority served 
Snyder with a "3-Day Notice of Termination of Lease Agreement". 
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The "3-Day Notice of Termination of Lease Agreement" was received 
into evidence at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 2. Transcript at 
54. A copy of the termination notice is also attached as Exhibit 
B to the Plaintifffs complaint. (R. 12-16). 
10. Snyder failed to vacate the premises as demanded in 
the "3-Day Notice of Termination of Lease Agreement" and the 
underlying unlawful detainer action was initiated. Transcript at 
26. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In large part, Snyder has failed to preserve the issues 
raised in his appeal in the trial court below. Initially, Snyder 
contends that the trial court acted improperly when it scheduled 
the trial in this matter. However, Snyder did not request a 
continuance of the trial date until May 8, 2000, the date of the 
scheduled trial. Moreover, Snyder's motion for a continuance of 
the trial date was never submitted to the Court for decision 
pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, In any event, at such a late juncture, the trial 
court denied Snyder's oral motion to continue the trial date. In 
addition, Snyder now contends that he was not permitted to 
conduct discovery in this case. However, Snyder never submitted 
a request for discovery. The trial court acted properly in 
denying Snyder's oral motion to continue the trial given the fact 
that Snyder waited until the day of trial to ask the trial court 
for a continuance. The trial court acted within its sound 
discretion in setting the trial date in this case. Moreover, 
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Utah law does provide for an expedited proceeding in unlawful 
detainer actions. 
Snyder further claims that the evidence does not support a 
finding that he engaged in criminal activity. In short, Snyder 
claims that the trial court's finding of Snyder's criminal 
activity was not supported by the facts adduced at trial. 
However, Snyder has failed to satisfy his marshaling burden. 
Instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings, Snyder simply cites to examples in the record 
which support a conclusion opposite to that found by the trial 
court. The record clearly supports the trial court's finding that 
Snyder engaged in criminal activity on or near the leased 
premises. Snyder has not demonstrated that the trial court 
abused its discretion in finding that the actions of Snyder 
constituted assault. 
In addition, the lease agreement between the parties 
provides for the eviction of a tenant under the circumstances of 
the instant case. However, again, Snyder failed to adequately 
preserve this issue at trial. While Snyder did file a motion for 
summary judgment which raised some of the issues set forth in the 
Appellant's Brief, the motion was not submitted to the trial 
court for consideration and decision pursuant to the mandates of 
Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Finally, Snyder's contention that he was entitled to a 
grievance hearing was likewise not preserved before the trial 
court. Snyder did attempt to address this issue in his motion for 
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summary judgment, but again, the motion was never submitted for 
decision to the trial court. Even if Snyder had preserved the 
issue for appeal, the trial court did have subject matter 
jurisdiction. Thus, this Court should deny appellant's requested 
relief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT CANNOT CHALLENGE THE SETTING OF THE TRIAL 
DATE WITHOUT A POSSESSION BOND AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL 
TIME FOR DISCOVERY GIVEN HIS FAILURE TO PRESERVE THESE 
ISSUES FOR APPEAL. 
In his Brief of Appellant, the Appellant contends that the 
trial court committed error when it scheduled the trial date in 
this matter on two specific grounds. Initially, Snyder contends 
that the trial court committed error by setting the trial date 
without a possession bond being posted. Second, Snyder argues 
that the trial court committed error when it set this case for 
trial without allowing him to conduct discovery. 
In terms of Snyder's first argument, the issue was not 
preserved at the trial court level. Snyder did pose this 
argument in a Petition for Extraordinary Writ filed with this 
Court on or about April 19, 2000.3 However, the Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ should not be considered as part of the record 
in the matter before the trial court.4 Thus, this issue is not 
3
 This Court denied Snyder's Petition for Extraordinary 
Writ on or about May 4, 2000. 
4
 Snyder's counsel did file a copy of Snyder's Petition 
for Extraordinary Writ with the clerk of the trial court, see R. 
93-137, however, simply because the document was filed with the 
-12-
properly before this Court for review. See Section III infra. 
Also, it should be noted that this is the issue addressed by 
Amicus in its filing with this Court. This issue was not 
properly raised and preserved and should not be considered by 
this Court.5 
Even if Snyder had preserved the issue of the posting of a 
possession bond, the trial court nevertheless acted appropriately 
in this matter. The trial court has discretion and control over 
its trial calendar. Because the underlying action is an unlawful 
detainer action, the matter is entitled to an expedited trial 
setting. See UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 78-36-1 et seq. "The district 
courts shall provide by rule for the placing of actions upon the 
trial calendar (1) without request of the parties or (2) upon 
request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such 
other manner as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall 
be given to actions entitled thereto by statute." UTAH R. CIV. P. 
40(a) (emphasis added). 
The mandate of Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides guidance to this Court: 
Upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and 
clerk of the court does not mean that it is a part of the record 
duly considered by the trial court. Snyderfs action seeking 
mandamus against Judge Michael K. Burton was never raised at the 
trial court level and should not be considered as part of the 
record for purposes of appeal. 
5
 While a definitive ruling on this issue would be 
helpful, the posture of this case does not provide the basis for 
such a ruling. The issue was not preserved. 
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upon such terms as are just, including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or 
proceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is made 
upon the ground of the absence of evidence, such motion 
shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence 
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence 
has been used to procure it. The court may also require the 
party seeking the continuance to state, upon affidavit or 
under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if the 
adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be 
given, and that it may be considered as actually given on 
the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the trial 
shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 40(b). Snyder did not, at trial or before, allege 
any facts which satisfied the requirement of "good cause" for 
granting a continuance. In making a determination whether to 
grant a motion for continuance, the court is entitled to 
considerable discretion. Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1988) . 
In addition to the trial court's broad discretion to 
schedule matters as it deems appropriate, the unlawful detainer 
statute provides a basis for an expedited trial in this case. 
The underlying action is an eviction proceeding under Utahfs 
Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute. UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 78-36-1 et 
seq. As such, it is supposed to be summary in nature and 
expeditious in terms of the trial calendar. The unlawful 
detainer "statute grants the landlord a summary court proceeding 
to evict a tenant who has violated some express or implied 
provision of the lease." P.H. Investments v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 
1018, 1020 (Utah 1991) . In addition, "the purpose of the law is 
to provide a speedy resolution on the issue of possession." Id. 
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See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8 (the tenant is required to appear 
and defend the action in no less than 3 and no greater than 20 
days following the service of the summons); Landlord-Tenant Law: 
A Perspective on Reform in Utah, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 727, 744 (1981) 
("In an unlawful detainer action, the court must set a date for 
the summary proceeding for possession not less than three nor 
more than twenty days from the date of service of summons on the 
tenant."); and Paxton v. Fisher, 45 P.2d 903, 906 (1935). Thus, 
there is a basis for an expedited trial setting in this case. 
Snyder also relies an a memorandum from Mr. Brent Johnson of 
the Administrative Office of the Courts regarding eviction trial 
settings. While Mr. Johnson has issued his opinion to the clerks 
of the court, this does not mean that the opinion is absolute and 
controlling authority for the trial court. Moreover, the 
statutory provision regarding the posting of a possession bond is 
not mandatory. The landlord "may execute and file a possession 
bond." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5(1). The Housing Authority 
maintains that this provision provides for an even more expedited 
basis for having a tenant removed from the premises. This 
possession bond provision was not meant to undermine the 
landlord1s ability to move an unlawful detainer matter forward on 
an expedited basis and this provision should not be allowed to 
undermine the other provisions of the Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Statute as well as its underlying polices. For example, the 
Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute provides for "treble damages" 
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from the date the tenant wrongfully remains at the premises 
following the expiration of the notice to vacate." If Snyder and 
Amicus are right in their respective positions on this issue, 
damages would be accruing at a minimum of three times the daily 
rent while the eviction slowly toiled along on the regular court 
docket. Such a proposition is not reasonable for either of the 
parties in this case.7 
Second, Snyder maintains that he was prevented from 
discovery as a result of the trail courtfs setting of a trial 
date in this matter. However, Snyder never submitted a request 
for discovery to the Housing Authority. Had he done so, it is 
likely that the Housing Authority would have promptly replied. 
In addition, it was not until the day of trial that Snyder stated 
that he wanted to pursue discovery. 
Moreover, any contention by Snyder that he did not have 
adequate time to prepare a discovery request is incredulous at 
best. Snyder had ample time to file numerous motions, a petition 
for extraordinary writ and a federal class action lawsuit. Based 
upon the record before it, the trial court did not abuse its 
6
 On the other hand, tenants would then argue that it is 
unreasonable for treble damages to accrue while the case is put 
on the regular trial track and they would be justified in doing 
so. Imagine a year or more of damages accruing at the minimum of 
three times the daily rent amount. For instance, in this case 
the tenant's monthly rent is $188.00 which means that his daily 
treble damage amount is $18.80 per day. In one year alone, the 
tenant's treble damages would amount to $6,862.00! 
7
 The Court must also consider the ramifications that such 
a holding would have on all unlawful detainer actions. 
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discretion in denying Snyderfs request for a continuance. 
II THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT SNYDER HAD ENGAGED 
IN CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR. 
The facts presented at trial support the trial court's 
finding that Snyder had committed an assault under Utah law. 
Because trial courts are charged with the primary responsibility 
of making factual determinations, the reviewing court "must 
decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial courtfs 
determination." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994) 
(citations omitted). In order to demonstrate that the trial 
court abused its discretion in this regard, it is necessary for 
Snyder to marshal the relevant evidence. 
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil!s 
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from 
the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very 
findings the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inventory, Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) . Here, Snyder cannot point to a fatal flaw 
in the evidence. Snyder can only complain that the trial court 
found the Housing Authorityfs version of the relevant facts to be 
more credible. 
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The gist of Snyder's argument is that the Court gave more 
weight to the version of facts presented by Ms. Rico and those 
witnesses who heard the assault than it did to Snyder's version 
of the facts. Further, Snyder maintains that his action was not 
criminal, but merely offensive. These two arguments do not 
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in finding 
that Snyder had engaged in criminal activity. The standard for 
overturning the trial court's factual finding 
is highly deferential to the trial court because it is 
before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and 
the evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is 
therefore considered to be in the best position to assess 
the credibility of the witnesses and to derive a sense of 
the proceedings as a whole, something an appellate court 
cannot hope to garner from a cold record. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 (citation omitted). 
The facts adduced at trial showed that Snyder knowingly and 
deliberately placed a Housing Authority employee in genuine and 
reasonable fear of immediate violent harm through his overt 
threats punctuated with foul language. Ms. Rico testified that 
she was frightened by Snyder's actions. These facts support a 
finding by the trial court that Snyder engaged in criminal 
behavior,8 As stated by the Court: 
8
 Utah law defines an assault as follows: 
Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; ... 
II Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 ( 1 9 5 3 ) , as amended. 
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I also find that he [Snyder] failed to abide by the terms of 
this lease in that he engaged in criminal activity. I guess 
for the purpose of this hearing I think there is other good 
cause to have him removed. I think that it all revolves 
around this event, but we have Ms. Ricofs testimony that 
essentially he came into the room, he started pointing his 
finger and coming around the desk and essentially, I guess, 
the phrase that we use now days, "getting in her face." So 
I think he made a clear threat. He was loud, he was upset, 
he was angry, his choice of words was intimidating, it's 
clear it did intimidate her because as I noted from the 
demeanor of both witnesses today, its pretty clear to me Mr. 
Snyder could, if he had done what was described, intimidated 
and threatened in a manner that would, make a person believe 
there is a show of immediate force to carry out some kind of 
bodily injury. 
Transcript at 101:2-17. The Court further found that 
In response to just a couple of your arguments, Mr. Harris, 
in that answer - I mean I think you're right, if he [Snyder] 
were simply offensive there wouldn't be a problem, but I 
think he committed a crime. I think that's assaultive 
behavior to place his finger in the face of someone in the 
manner he did, given the context in which it was done, 
arising, moving around the table, getting closer to, made 
physical proximity with the tone of voice, and the language 
that he was using that day. And then you made another 
argument, which I think is a fair argument, but it doesn't 
apply to this case, what would happen if there were minor 
criminal events. Well, that's an argument, but it's not 
this case. This case is what I consider to be a serious 
criminal offense, that of assault. 
Transcript at 103:11-24. These findings as set forth by the 
trial court are supported by the evidence adduced at trial. Ms. 
Rico testified in detail about the assault. Ms. Poulton and Mr. 
Trowbridge, while neither actually saw the assault, both heard it 
and both were frightened for the safety of Ms. Rico. Transcript 
at 29-32; 37-38. 
The finding by the trial court that Snyder engaged in 
criminal activity is supported by the facts. Snyder has not 
demonstrated that the Court abused its discretion or acted 
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unreasonably in so finding. Therefore, the Housing Authority 
requests that this Court deny Snyder's requested relief. 
III. THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND ITS SUBJECT PROVISIONS ARE 
VALID, THUS SNYDER WAS PROPERLY EVICTED. 
The issue of the validity of the certain provisions was 
never fully raised and considered by the trial court.Q It is a 
well established principle of law that "a party must raise an 
objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its right to litigate 
the issue in subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Accord 
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1986); Condas v. 
Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980). The fact-finding 
tribunal is the "proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and 
probing analysis" of issues. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Indeed, failure to argue an issue and 
present pertinent evidence in that forum "denies the trial court 
"the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of 
law1 pertinent to the claimed error." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 
9
 In the Appellant's issue statement, he attempts to 
point to various parts of the record and transcript which he 
believes demonstrate that the issues surrounding the validity of 
the lease provisions were raised and considered. However, the 
citations do not support such a proposition. The Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment were never 
submitted to the Court for decision. In fact, the trial court 
specifically found that they were not timely. See Finding of Fact 
#1. (R. 266) . The citations to the Transcript are citations to 
argument by Snyder. However, there was no ruling per se on those 
arguments. 
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358, 360 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel 
Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 483 n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
The preservation principle has been examined at length by 
Utah's appellate courts. Particularly instructive are Condas v. 
Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980) and Barney v. Utah Dept. of 
Commerce, 885 P.2d 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) . At issue in Condas, 
was the testimony of certain witnesses that were deceased at the 
time of trial. On appeal, the party challenging the admission of 
the statements contended that there was not proof offered that 
the witnessed were unavailable at the trial. However, the party 
had failed to object to the admission of the statements at trial, 
and therefore had waived their right to challenge the issue on 
appeal. Id. at 495. 
In Barney, the petitioner appealed the decision of the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing to revoke his 
license to practice as a health facility administrator. On 
appeal, he argued that he was denied due process by various 
defects and irregularities in the hearing. In affirming the 
Division1s decision, the Utah Court of Appeals held that 
fl[c]ounsel did not timely object to the specific defects 
[petitioner] now raises on appeal. Moreover, counsel failed to 
make a motion for relief, denying the administrative law judge 
any opportunity to remedy the defects. Therefore, [the court 
was] unable to consider [petitioner's] due process claims." Id. 
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at 809. 
With these principles and cases in mind, this Court should 
not consider Snyderfs claims that the lease provisions under 
which he was evicted were invalid. Snyder's attempt to show that 
the issue was preserved in the record below, falls short of 
showing that the issue was raised, argued by both parties, 
considered by the trial court, and ruled upon. Furthermore, 
Snyder fails to state grounds for the consideration of an issue 
that has not been preserved. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a) (5) (B) . 
Even if the issue as to the validity of the subject lease 
provisions had been preserved in the trial court, the provisions 
nevertheless are valid under the law. Snyder seems to assert 
that regardless of the nature or severity of his assault upon Ms. 
Rico, it does not form the basis of an eviction under § 11(1) of 
the Lease Agreement, which prohibits "all illegal or criminal 
activity on or near the premises". In an attempt to support this 
position, Snyder points to HUD regulations set out at 24 C.F.R. 
§ 966.4 (f), and observes that, since that provision does not 
absolutely mandate the inclusion of the lease provision relied 
upon by the Housing Authority in this action, it therefore 
somehow prohibits such a provision being included in the lease. 
Thus, Snyder claims, this court may not enforce the terms of the 
Lease Agreement as it is written. Notably, Snyder cites not a 
single case, statute, regulation, or other legal declaration in 
support of this proposition. This is because there is no legal 
authority which supports such a proposition. 
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The Housing Authority does function as a "public housing 
agency" or "PHA" under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 
U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. This means that, as a PHA, the Housing 
Authority is charged with furnishing safe, sanitary, structurally 
sound and affordable rental housing for low-income individuals 
through the receipt and application of federal subsidy funding. 
The Housing Act begins with the following policy declaration 
in this regard: 
It is the policy of the United States to promote the 
general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds 
and credit, as provided in this chapter, to assist the 
several and their political subdivisions to remedy the 
unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute 
shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for 
families of lower income and, consistent with the 
objectives of this chapter, to vest in local public 
housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility 
in the administration of their housing programs. 
(Emphasis added). 
42 U.S.C. § 1437. This section further governs the creation of 
leases between a public housing agency and tenants of federally-
subsidized housing. The law specifies certain provisions which 
must be included in any such lease; it begins, however, with the 
observation that a public housing agency shall "utilize leases 
which ... do not contain unreasonable terms and conditions" Id. 
(emphasis added). In addition to those provisions mandated by 
law, public housing agencies are also implicitly empowered (in 
carrying out the policy objective vesting the agency with "the 
maximum amount of responsibility of the administration of [its] 
housing programs") to include additional terms and conditions in 
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their leases which are reasonable. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1). 
The regulations promulgated by HUD under the Housing Act 
expand upon and punctuate a public housing agency's discretion in 
this regard. For example, 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 details specific 
provisions which must be included in any lease between a PHA and 
its tenants, "[a] lease shall be entered into between the PHA and 
each tenant of a dwelling unit which shall contain the provisions 
described hereinafter." Id. (Emphasis added). Provisions which 
may not be contained in a lease between a public housing agency 
and its tenants are separately enumerated at 24 C.F.R. § 966.6: 
Lease clauses of the nature described below shall not 
be included in new leases between a PHA and a tenant 
and shall be deleted from existing leases either by 
amendment thereof or execution of a new lease .... 
Id. 
Again, by clear implication and consistent with the 
Congressional policy statement granting public housing agencies 
maximum authority in the administration of federally-subsidized 
housing programs under the Act, a public housing agency, 
including the Housing Authority, must be permitted to include, in 
any lease agreement, both the provisions mandated by 24 C.F.R. 
§ 966.4 and any other reasonable lease provisions necessary to 
carry out the purposes of the Housing Act, so long as they do not 
include any provisions prohibited by 24 C.F.R. § 966.6. The 
language of Section 11 (I) of the Lease Agreement in this case 
is not prohibited by 24 C.F.R. § 966.6. 
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Cases interpreting the scope and breadth of a public housing 
agency's authority in the administration of housing projects 
under the Act (including terms of lease agreements) have 
expressly upheld the agency's authority to include all reasonable 
provisions in its leases and regulations so long as such 
provisions are not expressly prohibited by law or regulation. 
For example, in Rivera v. Reading Housing Authority, 819 F. 
Supp. 1323 (E. D. Penn. 1993), a public housing agency imposed a 
policy requiring that minor applicants for housing obtain a 
judicial decree of emancipation in order to be eligible to rent 
publically-subsidized housing. The plaintiff (a minor applicant) 
challenged the enforceability of the policy in that it was not 
specifically set forth by applicable HUD regulations. The court 
rejected the challenge and upheld the requirement, citing the 
mandate of the Act that public housing agencies be vested with 
"the maximum amount of power and responsibility ... in order to 
promote efficient management of housing programs." Jd. at 329. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Rivera court stated the 
following with regard to the appropriate standard of judicial 
review of public housing agency practices under applicable HUD 
regulations: 
... [I]n assessing whether the [housing agency] has 
violated the Housing Act or HUD regulations, we must 
keep in mind that the Housing Act gives local housing 
authorities discretion to select applicants and to 
otherwise manage the day-to-day affairs of subsidized 
housing projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437. We also 
recognize that the administration of local housing 
authorities is a difficult task, and the concern for 
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efficient management is particularly important, because 
the number of applicants greatly exceeds the available 
housing. [Citations omitted]. Consequently, the scope 
of judicial review of a local Housing Authority's 
policies and practices is limited, and we will not view 
its actions as a violation of the Housing Act or HUD 
regulations so long as the Housing Authority's 
eligibility requirements are "consistent with [HUD] 
regulations and in harmony with the overall policies" 
of the Housing Act. 
Id. at 1329-1330 (citing Vandermark v. Housing Authority of York, 
663 F.2d 436 (3rd Cir. 1981)). 
In another case of interest, Greenville Housing Authority v. 
City of Greenville, 316 S.E.2d 718 (Ct. App. S. C. 1984), a 
tenant in a housing complex subsidized under the Housing Act 
challenged an eviction on the basis that the lease provisions 
applied in his case were inconsistent with the Housing Act and 
applicable regulations. Specifically, the evicted tenant 
challenged the propriety of a rent reduction provision in her 
lease as not being reflective of the content of HUD regulations. 
The court of appeals overturned a lower court finding against the 
housing authority, agreeing that the housing authority "had 
discretion to establish reasonable lease provisions" Id. at 720. 
Similarly, in Allegheny County Housing Authority v. 
Morrissey, 651 A.2d 362 (Cmnwlth Ct- Penn.1994), the public 
housing agency had a lease provision prohibiting ownership and 
maintenance of pets on the premises. A tenant challenged the 
provision as not being reflective of the United States Housing 
Act and applicable HUD regulations. The court rejected the 
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argument and observed: 
42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1)(2) ... mandates that each public 
housing agency shall utilize leases which obligate the 
public housing agency to maintain the project in a 
decent, safe and sanitary condition. Given that 
mandate, the [housing authority] has the authority to 
carry out that purpose by issuing lease agreements with 
policies that meet that requirement unless they are 
contrary to federal regulations. 
Id. at 634-635. 
The Housing Authority in this action acknowledges that 
Paragraph 11(1) prohibits more than the specific, narrow type of 
criminal conduct specifically described at 24 C.F.R. 
§ 966.4(f) (12). The provision in question, however, is not 
prohibited under 24 C.F.R. § 966.6. Nor can it seriously be 
argued that the provision is not rationally related to 
maintenance of the housing project in a decent, safe and sanitary 
condition, and otherwise furthering the purposes of the United 
States Housing Act. The Housing Authority would, in fact, be 
remiss in its obligations under the Act were it not to proscribe 
criminal activity by its tenants on or near the leased premises. 
Thus, as in the cases discussed above, the Housing Authority in 
this case is entitled to discretion in establishing its 
reasonable lease provisions. The Housing Authority is obligated 
to carry out the mandates of the Housing Act and the policies 
underlying the Housing Act. The provisions challenged by Snyder 
are reasonable and comport with the letter and spirit of the law. 
Snyder argues that, if literally interpreted, Paragraph 
11(1) of the Lease Agreement would make minor criminal 
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infractions near the housing project grounds for eviction. 
However, Snyder has no standing to raise such an objection -- the 
conduct giving rise to his eviction was a criminal assault, 
consisting of harsh and violent verbal threats of immediate 
physical harm to Ms. Rico. As such, Snyder1s criminal act falls 
well within even the narrowest reading of the lease provision, as 
well as the mandatory language of 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f) (12) (I). 
Moreover, Snyder cannot seriously argue that a Housing Authority 
managing federally-subsidized, low-income housing has no 
legitimate interest in prohibiting criminal activity, of whatever 
nature or severity, on or around the housing complex, including 
criminal activity relating to a Housing Authority employee. 
Certainly, a public housing agency operating under the mandates 
of the Housing Act has a vested interest in summarily ejecting 
tenants who accost management employees with threats of imminent 
physical harm. 
On the other hand, even if the lease provision complained of 
by Snyder were to be found to be invalid, Snyder's assault on Ms. 
Rico, an employee of the Housing Authority, certainly constitutes 
"good cause" for eviction. See Lease Agreement paragraph 17. 
Trial Exhibit 1 at 5; (R. 9). 
IV. SNYDER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A GRIEVANCE HEARING UNDER 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT OF UNDER THE LAW. 
Snyderfs last issue on appeal relates to his claim that he 
was entitled to a grievance hearing under the terms and 
conditions of the lease agreement between the parties. This issue 
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was not raised in the trial court below in any context other than 
in motions filed by Snyder which were never submitted for 
decision pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration.10 
The gravamen of Snyderfs complaint in this regard is that 
Snyder believes that fI[s]omeone other than the County Housing 
Authority must determine that Mr. Snyder engaged in substantial 
criminal or illegal conduct before plaintiff can deny his 
mandated due process rights under his HUD approved contract." 
Appellant!s Brief at 28-29. This is, in fact, exactly what 
happened in the proceedings below. The trial court, not the 
Housing Authority, made the determination that Snyder engaged in 
the requisite criminal activity. Moreover, contrary to the 
argument of Snyder, the Housing Authority did not unilaterally 
declare that Snyder was not entitled to a grievance hearing. On 
the contrary, governing federal law provides for the process that 
was followed in this case. 
The Housing Authority is required to have a grievance 
procedure in place. "Each PHA shall adopt a grievance procedure 
affording each tenant an opportunity for a hearing on a grievance 
as defined in §955.53 in accordance with the requirements, 
standards, and criteria contained in this subpart." 24 C.F.R. 
§966.52 (1999). The requirement of grievance procedures in the 
Also, Snyder did not ask the Court for an expedited 
briefing or decision schedule with regard to the pending motions 
as he was permitted to do under Rule 4-501(4) the Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
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administration of federally-subsidized housing also appears at 42 
U.S.C. § 1437d (k). This section calls upon HUD to implement 
regulations requiring public housing agencies receiving 
assistance under the Act to establish and implement 
administrative grievance procedures to be followed prior to the 
eviction of tenants. If further expressly provides as follows: 
For any grievance concerning an eviction or termination 
of tenancy that involves any criminal activity that 
threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or employees 
of the public housing agency ... the agency may (A) 
establish and expedite a grievance procedure as the 
secretary shall provide by rule ..., or (B) exclude 
from its grievance procedure any such grievance, in any 
jurisdiction, which requires that prior to eviction, a 
tenant be given a hearing in court which the secretary 
determines provides the basic elements of due process 
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k). The Housing Authority herein has opted for 
subsection (B) as it is allowed to do under the law and it does 
have a grievance procedure in place which fully comports with 
federal requirements. In this case, Snyder was not entitled to a 
grievance hearing. The grievance procedure 
(1) shall be applicable (except as provided in paragraph 
(a)(2) of this section) to all individual grievances as 
defined in §966.53 of this subpart between the tenant and 
the PHA. 
(2) the term due process determination means a 
determination by HUD that the law of the jurisdiction 
requires that the tenant must be given the opportunity 
for a hearing in court which provides the basic 
elements of due process ... before eviction from the 
dwelling unit. If HUD has issued a due process 
determination, a PHA may exclude from the PHA 
administrative grievance procedure under this subpart 
any grievance concerning a termination of tenancy or 
eviction that involves: 
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(A) any criminal activity that threatens the health, 
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises 
of other residents or employees of the PHA, or 
(B) any drug related criminal activity on or near such 
premises. 
(iv) If HUD has issued the due process determination, the 
PHA may evict the occupants of the dwelling unit 
through the judicial eviction procedures which are the 
subject of the determination. In this case, the PHA is 
not required to provide an opportunity for a hearing 
under the PHA!s administrative grievance procedure. 
24 C.F.R. § 966.50 (1999). 
By notice dated December 3, 1991, HUD has expressly 
determined that pre-eviction procedures available to tenants 
under Utah law satisfy these due process requirements. A copy 
of the Department of Housing and Urban Developments Due Process 
Determination for Utah appears in record as an attached Exhibit 
to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. 59-69). A copy is likewise included in Appellee1s Addendum. 
In this case, Snyder was evicted from criminal activity that 
threatened the health and safety of an employee of the Housing 
Authority. In accordance with HUDfs due process determination 
for the state of Utah, the Housing Authority has promulgated a 
grievance procedure to be used in conjunction with tenant 
evictions. As set forth in the grievance procedure, "the 
provisions of this grievance procedure are not applicable to any 
grievance concerning any eviction or termination tenancy based 
upon a tenant's creation or maintenance of the threat to the 
health or safety of other tenants or HA employees." Trial 
Exhibit 3 at Section XIII(7) attached as part of Appellee's 
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Addendum. Moreover, HUD has expressly found that Utah's unlawful 
detainer statute provides for the required due process. Thus, as 
provided for by federal law and the lease agreement between the 
parties, Snyder was not entitled to an administrative hearing 
through the Housing Authorityfs grievance process. 
The Housing Authority did comply with the requirements of 
state and federal law in seeking to evict Snyder. He was 
properly served with a notice to quit the premises. Trial 
Exhibit 2; (R. 54). In addition, Snyder was given the 
opportunity to dispute the charges in a trial court and under a 
statutory scheme that meets HUD's requirements for due process. 
Thus, the Housing Authority did comply with the requirements of 
federal law. In addition, there has been no argument, either at 
the trial court or here on appeal, that the Housing Authority 
failed to comply with the rigid requirements of Utahfs Forcible 
Entry and Detainer Statute. Thus, the trial court did have 
jurisdiction to hear the merits of this case and this Court 
should deny Appellant's requested relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Housing Authority respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court 
in this matter in its entirety. The Appellant failed to properly 
preserve the issues concerning the expedited trial without the 
posting of a possession bond as well as the issues concerning the 
validity of the provisions of the lease agreement. The trial 
court acted within its sound discretion in finding that the 
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Appellant had engaged in criminal conduct in violation of the 
lease agreement Fi nally, Snyder was not entitled to a grie vance 
hearing prior to the filing of an unlawful detainer action by the 
Hoi 1 s irig An thoi: :i ty 
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to attach signs to a monument on the property 
did not convey a leasehold interest in real 
property and the forcible entry statue did not 
apply to the tenants claim based on removal of 
the signs without his consent Keller v 
Southwood N Med Pavilion Inc 959 P2d 102 
(Utah 1998) 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANAI YSIS 
Detainer not found 
Ejectment 
Strict statutory compliance 
— Required 
Detainer not found 
Because a lessee was under no duty to re 
move a sign s foundation he was not guilty of an 
unlawful detainer U P C Inc v ROA Gen 
eral Inc 1999 UT App 303 990 P 2d 945 
Ejectment 
The unlawful detainer statute is not the 
exclusive remedy in Utah to evict a tenant 
since even if a landlord has failed to follow the 
statutes requirements he may still maintain a 
common law action in ejectment where the 
lease includes a forfeiture provision to provide 
the basis for the action Cache County v Beus 
1999 UT App 134 978 P2d 1043 
Strict statutory compliance 
—Required 
The unlawful detainer statute requires strict 
compliance with its terms before landlords are 
entitled to utilize its severe remedies and a 
landlord who did not provide the tenant with 
clear written notice that he or she had a chance 
to either bring the rent current or quit the 
property failed to meet the statutory require 
ments Cache County v Beus 1999 UT App 
134 978 P 2d 1043 
78-36-6. Definitions — Notice to quit — How served. 
(1) For purposes of this section 
(a) "Commercial tenant" means any tenant who may be a body politic 
and corporate, partnership, association, or company 
(b) "Tenant" means any natural person and any individual other than a 
commercial tenant 
(2) The notices required by Title 78, Chapter 36, Forcible Entry and 
Detainer, may be served 
(a) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally or, if the tenant is a 
commercial tenant, by delivering a copy to the commercial tenant's usual 
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place of business by leaving a copy of the notice with a person of suitable 
age and discretion 
(b) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to 
the tenant at his place of residence or, if the tenant is a commercial tenant, 
by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to the 
commercial tenant's usual place of business, 
(c) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual place of 
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at 
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of 
residence or place of business, 
(d) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place 
of residence, then by affixing a copy m a conspicuous place on the leased 
property, or 
(e) if an order of abatement by eviction of the nuisance is issued by the 
court as provided in Section 78 38-11, when issued, the parties present 
shall be on notice that the abatement by eviction order is issued and 
immediately effective or as to any absent party, notice shall be given as 
provided in Subsections (2)(a) through (e) 
(3) Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner as provided 
in Subsection (2) 
History L. 1951, ch 58, fc 1, C 1943, (1) renumbering the existing provisions and 
Supp , 104 36 6, L 1981, ch 160, fc 3, 1986, miking related reference changes substituted 
ch 137, & 2, 1987, ch 12), *} 1, 1992, ch 141 the eh iptei reference lor "the preceding sec 
<& 3, 1997, ch 203, fc 1 tiont." near the beginning of Subsection (2) and 
Amendment Notes — The 1997 amend added the provisions for commercial tenants in 
ment effective May 5 1997 added Subsection Subsections (2)( i) ind (2Kb) 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint — Time for 
appearance — Service of summons. 
NOTTS TO DI CISIONS 
Insufficiency of process in bound volume See Keller v Southwood N 
In accord with first note under this heading Med Pavilion Inc 959 P2d 102 (Utah 1998) 
78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement 
— Disposition of personal property — Hearing. 
(1) Each order of restitution shall 
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises remove his personal 
property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be 
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable, 
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the court for the 
defendant to vacate the premises, which shall be three business days 
following service of the order, unless the court determines that a longer or 
shorter period is appropriate under the circumstances, and 
(c) advise the defendant of the defendant's right to a hearing to contest 
the manner of its enforcement 
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the defendant to 
request a hearing as listed on the form shall be served in accordance with 
Section 78-36 6 by a person authorized to serve process pursuant to 
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Section 78-27-58 If personal service is impossible or impracticable, service 
may be made by 
(l) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the defendant's 
last-known address and posting a copy of the order and the form at a 
conspicuous place on the premises, or 
(n) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the commercial 
tenant defendant's last-known place of business and posting a copy of 
the order and the form at a conspicuous place on the business 
premises 
(b) A request for hearing by the defendant may not stay enforcement of 
the restitution order unless 
(I) the defendant furnishes a corporate bond, cash bond, certified 
funds, or a property bond to the clerk of the court in an amount 
approved by the court according to the formula set forth in Subsection 
78-36-8 5(2)(b), and 
(n) the court orders that the restitution order be stayed 
(c) The date of service, the name, title, signature, and telephone 
number of the person serving the order and the form shall be legibly 
endorsed on the copy of the order and the form served on the defendant 
(d) Within ten days of service, the person serving the order and the form 
shall file proof of service in accordance with Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the order within the time 
prescribed by the couit, a sheriff or constable at the plaintiff's duection 
may enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible 
to remove the defendant 
(b) Any personal property of the defendant may be removed from the 
premises by the sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location 
for safe storage The sheriff or constable may delegate responsibility for 
storage to the plaintiff, who shall store the personal property in a suitable 
place and in a reasonable manner 
(c) The personal property removed and stored shall be inventoried by 
the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff who shall keep the original 
inventory and personally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of the 
inventory immediately after the personal property is removed 
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant within 30 days of removal of 
personal property from the premises, the sheriff or constable or the 
plaintiff shall promptly return all of the defendant's personal property 
upon payment of the reasonable costs incurred for its removal and storage 
(b) The person storing the personal property may sell the property 
remaining in storage at a public sale if 
d) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of 
the personal property within 30 days of its removal from the premises, 
or 
(n) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the 
removal and storage of the personal property 
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing the personal property shall 
mail to the defendant's last-known address a written notice of the time and 
place of the sale 
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he may specify the oider in 
which the personal property shall be sold, and only so much personal 
property shall be sold as to satisfy the costs of removal, storage, advertis-
ing, and conducting the sale The remainder of the personal property, if 
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any, shall be released to the defendant If the defendant is not present at 
the sale, the proceeds, after deduction of the costs of removal, storage, 
advertising, and conducting the sale shall be paid to the plaintiff up to the 
amount of any judgment the plaintiff obtained against the defendant Any 
surplus shall be paid to the defendant, if the defendant's whereabouts are 
known. If the defendant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus shall 
be disposed of in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed 
Property Act 
(e) The plaintiff may donate the property to chanty if 
d) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of 
the personal property within 30 days of its removal from the premises, 
or 
(11) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the 
removal and storage of the personal property, and 
(in) donation is a commercially reasonable alternative 
(f) If the property belonging to a person who is not a defendant is 
removed and stored in accordance with this section, that person may claim 
the property by delivering a written demand for its release to the sheriff or 
constable or the plaintiff If the claimant provides pioper identification 
and evidence of ownership, the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff shall 
promptly release the property at no cost to the claimant 
(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the manner of enforcement of the 
restitution order, the defendant or any person claiming to own stored personal 
property may file a icquest for a hearing The court shall set the matter foi 
hearing within ten days from the filing of the request, or as soon thereafter as 
practicable, and shall mail notice of the hearing to the parties 
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms necessary to implement this 
section 
History: C. 1953,78-36-10.5, enacted by L. ant to the acts coordination clause) making 
1994, ch. 225, $ 3,1995, ch. 68, fi 5; 1996, ch. related designation changes, deleted from Sub 
79, & 116; 1997, ch. 203, 5 2; 1997, ch. 352, section (3Kb) a rcqutrement that the plaintiff 
& 1, 1998, ch. 118, $ 1. consent to delegation, inserted "or the plaintiff 
Amendment Notes — The 1997 amend in Subsections (3Xc) and (4Xa) added Subset 
ment by ch 203, effective May 5, 1997, deleted tion (4Xe) making related designation changes 
"the terms of the order of restitution or" after and deleted "the terms of order of restitution or 
"contest" in Subsection (lXc) and after "dispute the" after "dispute concerning" in Subsection 
concerning" in Subsection (5), subdivided Sub- (5) 
section (2Xa) and added Subsection (2XaXu), The 1998 amendment, effective May 4 1998 
and made related changes added Subsection (lXc), making a related 
The 1997 amendment by ch 352, effective change 
May 5, 1997, deleted Subsection (lXc), relating Coordination clause. — Laws 1997, ch 
to the defendant's right to a hearing, in Subsec- 203 and ch 352 each amended this section, 
tion (2Xa) inserted "as listed on the form" and both acts included coordination clauses (ch 
substituted the present service provisions for a 203, § 3, and ch 352 § 3) reconciling the 
requirement of personal service under U R C P amendments by the two acts and directing that 
4 and a provision for substitute service, added the Subsection (2Xb) added by ch 3r>2 be added 
Subsection (2Xb) (redesignated as (2Xc) pursu- as Subsection (2Xc) 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — 
Personal property of tenant left on premises. 
(1) In the event of abandonment, the owner may retake the premises and 
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term, or 
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(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to rerent the premises 
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value and 
the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable 
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary 
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less 
normal wear and tear. This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a), 
notwithstanding that the owner did not rerent the premises. 
(2) (a) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal 
property on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property 
from the dwelling, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and 
storage costs from the tenant. 
(b) (i) The owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant of 
the location of the personal property. 
(ii) If the property has been in storage for over 30 days and the 
tenant has made no reasonable effort to recover it, the owner may: 
(A) sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any 
amount the tenant owes; or 
(B) donate the property to charity if the donation is a commer-
cially reasonable alternative. 
(c) Any money left over from the sale of the property shall be handled as 
specified in Title 67, Chapter 4a, Part 2, Standards for Determining When 
Property is Abandoned or Unclaimed. 
(d) Nothing contained in this act shall be in derogation of or alter the 
owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 3, Lessors' Liens. 
History: C. 1953,78-36-12.6, enacted by L. ment, effective May 5,1997, subdivided Subsec-
1981, ch. 160, ft 8; 1986, ch. 194, ft 20; 199S, tion (2), added Subsection (2)(b)(iiXB), and 
ch. 198, 5 48; 1997, ch. 352, ft 2. made stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
CHAPTER 37 
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability of section. 
Exhaustion of security. 
Cited. 
Applicability of section. 
The one-action rule applied to the co-maker 
of a secured promissory note who provided none 
of the security on the note; therefore, because 
the creditor could not proceed against the co-
maker personally until property securing the 
note was foreclosed or lost, the statute of limi-
tations did not run on the creditor's claim. APS 
v. Briggs, 927 P.2d 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
This section did not apply to bar a creditor's 
action under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act before a deficiency judgment was entered 
against the debtor. National Loan Investors, 
L.P. v. Givens, 952 P.2d 1067 (Utah 1998). 
Exhaustion of security. 
After property was sold and the proceeds 
applied to reduce the amount owed to a lending 
bank, the bank's security interest that arose 
under the note and trust deed was exhausted. 
Rushton v. State Bank, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th Cir. 
1999). 
Cited in State Bank v. Rushton, 207 Bankr. 
721 (D. Utah 1997), aff'd, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th 
Cir. 1999). 
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78-37-2. Deficiency judgment — Execution. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State Bunk v. Rushton, 207 Bankr. 
721 (D. Utah 1997), aff'd, 164 F.3d 1338 (10th 
Cir. 1999). 
CHAPTER 38 
NUISANCE, WASTE, AND OTHER 
DAMAGE 
Section 
78-38-.5. Legislative intent. 
78-38-1. Nuisance defined — Right of 
action for — Judgment. 
78-38-4.6. Enforcement. 
78-38-9. Nuisance — Right of action to 
78-38-.5. Legislative intent. 
(1) The Legislature finds: 
(a) the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined 
that environmental tobacco smoke is a Group A carcinogen, in the same 
category as other cancer-causing chemicals such as asbestos; 
(b) the EPA has determined that there is no acceptable level of exposure 
to Class A carcinogens; and 
(c) the EPA has determined that exposure to environmental tobacco 
smoke also causes an increase in respiratory diseases and disorders 
among exposed persons. 
(2) The Legislature finds that environmental tobacco smoke generated in a 
rental or condominium unit may drift into other units, exposing the occupants 
of those units to tobacco smoke, and that standard construction practices are 
not effective in preventing this drift of tobacco smoke. 
(3) The Legislature further finds that persons who desire to not be exposed 
to drifting environmental tobacco smoke should be able to determine in 
advance of entering into a rental, lease, or purchase agreement whether the 
subject unit may be exposed to environmental tobacco smoke. 
History: C. 1953, 78-38-.S, enacted by L. became effective on May 5, 1997, pursuant to 
1997, ch. 230, 8 3. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 230 
78-38-1. Nuisance defined — Right of action for — Judg-
ment. 
( D A nuisance is anything which is injurious to health, indecent, offensive to 
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with 
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property. A nuisance may be the subject of 
an action. 
(2) A nuisance may include the following: 
(a) drug houses and drug dealing as provided in Section 78-38-9; 
(b) gambling as provided in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 11; 
abate nuisances — Wrug 
houses and drug dealing — 
Gambling — Group criminal 
activity — Prostitution — 
Weapons. 
78-35a-108 JUDICIAL CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Constitutionality of former section. 
A I' hl'tv ^ n e t n r e e - m o n t f t limitation period formerly 
ConsSulionality of former section. fontei,ned i n f j * ^ o " was an unreasonable 
J
 limitation on the constitutional right to petition 
Applicability. for a habeas corpus writ; it violated petitioners' 
Petitions for writs of certiorari and manda- rights under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 11 to seek 
mus were not subject to the statute of limita- a civil remedy in state courts. Currier v. 
tions that was intended to govern petitions for Holden, 862 P.2d 1367 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), 
writs of habeas corpus. Renn v. Utah Stote Bd. cert, denied, 870 P.2d 967 (Utah 1994) (decided 
of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995) (decided under former section), 
under former section). 
78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief — Notice. 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either: 
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or 
sentencing proceeding as appropriate. 
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be 
stayed for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give 
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will 
pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no 
action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time 
during the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift 
the stay and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner. 
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence 
the petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to 
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters 
that may be necessary. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-108, enacted by became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
L. 1996, ch. 235, ft 8. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel. 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, 
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis. 
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not 
be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the 
following factors: 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require 
an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that 
require the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective 
cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-35a-109, enacted by 
L. 1996, ch. 235, ft 9. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 235 
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
78-35a-110. Appeal — Jurisdiction. 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for 
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3. 
History: C. 1953, 78-35a-110, enacted by 
L. 1996, ch. 235, ft 10. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 235 
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
CHAPTER 36 
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
Section 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" denned. 
78-36-2 "Forcible detainer" denned. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for 
t«rm IPHH than life. 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural 
lands to hold over. 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenunt 
against undertenant. 
78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served. 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in com-
plaint — Time for appearance 
— Service of summons. 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff -
Alternative remedies. 
78-36-9. Proof required of plaintiff - De-
fense. 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, dam-
ages, and rent — Immediate 
enforcement — Treble dam-
ages. 
78-36-10.5 Order of restitution - Service 
— Enforcement — Disposi-
tion of personal property — 
Hearing 
78-36-11. Time for appeal. 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without ju-




78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises - Retak-
ing and rerenting by owner — 
Liability of tenant — Per-
sonal property of tenant left 
on premises. 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a house, or by 
fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind of violence or circumstances 
of terror, enters upon or into any real property; or, 
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, turns out by force, 
threats or menacing conduct the party in actual possession. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58. ft 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-36-1. Cross-References. — Burglary and crimi-
nal trespass, §§ 76-6-201 to 76-6-206. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Damages 
— Mental anguish 
— Nominal 
Forcible detainer distinguished 
Landlord and tenant 
— Contract rights 
— Motel operator and occupant 
Unlawful eviction 
Policy of section 
— Abolishment of common law 
Purpose of provisions 
— Preventing disturbances of peace 
— Summary remedy 
Rent 
Separate tort action 
What constitutes forcible entry 
— Removal of doors 
Damages, 
— Mental anguish. 
Tenant who is wrongfully evicted can collect 
damages for mental anguish and humiliation 
Mental pain and suffering in connection with a 
wrong which apart from such pain and suffer-
ing constitutes a cause of action is a proper 
element of damages where it is a natural and 
proximate consequence of the wrong Lambert 
v Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P2d 241 (1953) 
— Nominal. 
The statute places a duty upon any person, 
whether entitled to possession or not, not to use 
force or stealth or fraud in gaming possession of 
realty Correspondingly, it creates a right in the 
person in actual peaceable possession not to 
have his possession disturbed other than by 
legal process Therefore, regardless of his lack 
of entitlement to the property, the tenant has a 
cause of action for the invasion of that right 
Where no actual damages are proved he should 
be awarded nominal damages to preserve the 
right King v Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P2d 
1114 (1955) 
Forcible detainer distinguished. 
Forcible entry and forcible detainer, while 
often spoken of together, are in fact separate 
and distinct wrongs Buchanan v Cntes, 106 
Utah 428,150 P 2d 100, 154 AX R 167 (1944) 
Landlord and tenant. 
— Contract rights. 
Anyone committing acts specifically prohib-
ited under this section would be guilty of forc-
ible entry including a party who may by con-
tract be authorized to enter or an owner who as 
a matter of law may have a right to possession, 
contract purporting to establish right of re-
entry for default of rent payments did not give 
landlord nght to remove employee of tenants 
from office and change locks on all doors Free 
way Park Bldg, Inc v Western States Whsle 
Supply, 22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P2d 778 (1969) 
— Motel operator and occupant. 
Unlawful eviction. 
Where evidence disclosed that relationship 
between operators of a motel and the occupants 
of an apartment therein was one of landlord 
and tenant, and not one of innkeeper and guest, 
the occupants could only be dispossessed of the 
apartment by resort to the statutory remedy of 
unlawful detainer When the owner of the motel 
locked out the occupants for unpaid rent, there 
was an unlawful eviction Lambert v Sine, 123 
Utah 145, 256 P2d 241 (1953) 
Policy of section. 
— Abolishment of common-law. 
The forcible entry statute expressed a policy 
that no person should enter by force, stealth, 
fraud or intimidation, premises of which an 
other had peaceable possession This had the 
effect of taking away the common-law right of a 
landlord to possess his own property by no more 
force than was necessary and left the one 
against whom force was used to pursue his 
common-law action Buchanan v Cntes, 106 
Utah 428, 150 P2d 100, 154 A L R 167 (1944) 
Purpose of provisions. 
— Preventing disturbances of peace 
The forcible entry and detainer statute was 
enacted for the primary purpose of preventing 
disturbances of the peace brought about 
through self-help in the matter of disposses 
sion King v Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419,285 P2d 1114 
(1955) 
— Summary remedy. 
Purpose of this statute is to provide a speedy 
remedy, summary in character, to obtain pos 
session of real property Paxton v Fisher, 86 
Utah 408, 45 P2d 903 (1935) 
Rent. 
This chapter provides a summary remedy for 
the recovery of real property in case of forcible 
entry or the forcible or unlawful detainer 
thereof That is the purpose of the chapter, and 
not to deal with the subject of remedies for rent 
The question of rent is drawn into the statute, 
not for the purpose of providing a remedy for its 
recovery, but to complete a case of unlawful 
detainer, which is the gist of the action Voyles 
v Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P 913 (1930) 
Separate tort action. 
A landlord who is entitled to possession must, 
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on the refusal of the tenant to surrender the 
premises, resort to the remedy given by law to 
secure it A violation of that duty set by the 
statute gives rise to an action for damages not 
in an action under the forcible entry and de 
tamer statute but as a separate tort King v 
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P2d 1114 (1955) 
What constitutes forcible entry. 
— Removal of doors. 
Where defendant landlord entered upon the 
premises in plaintiff's absence by unlocking the 
doors and removing the doors from their hinges 
and carrying them away, the weather being at 
the time freezing, these facts were held to 
sufficiently show a forcible entry Buchanan v 
Cntes, 106 Utah 428,150 P2d 100, 154 A L R 
167 (1944) 
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78-36-2. "Forcible detainer* defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and 
keeps the possession of any real property, whether the same was acquired 
peaceably or otherwise, or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupants of any real 
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the 
surrender thereof, refuses for the period of three days to surrender the 
same to such former occupant The occupant of real property within the 
meaning of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such 
unlawful entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such 
lands 
Cross-References. — Burglary and crimi-
nal trespass. §§ 76-6-201 to 76 6 206 History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-36-2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Consent to entry 
- Evidence 
-Failure of action 




Occupancy "within five days * 
-Allegation 
"Unlawfully enters * 
Consent to entry 
-Evidence. 
To show intention of parties and acquiescence 
by plaintiff in defendant's possession escrow 
agreement and quitclaim deed executed by 
plaintiff were held to be properly admitted in 
evidence Seeley v Houston 105 Utah 202 141 
P2d 880 (1943) 
- Failure of action. 
As one of the elements of this action is the 
unlawful entry, the action must fail if it is found 
that defendant entered with consent of plain-
tiff Seeley v Houston, 105 Utah 202, 141 P2d 
880 (1943) 
Issues. 
— Immediate right of possession 
In action of forcible entry and detainer, the 
only question involved is the immediate nght to 
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possession. Seeley v. Houston, 105 Utah 202, Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P.2d 100,154 A.L.R. 
141 P.2d 880 (1943). 167 (1944). 
Fact that one of defendants in forcible de-
Liability, tainer action by lessee of state land had signed 
\jOUBOr purchase contract covering such land would 
""Where, without serving the three days' notice » £ * » J ^ L T M t f i h S S T S f t M ^ I S 
^^.. i^^ k« A TO QC it i v«\ . iA..A* ~JI~~*A »h. raxton v. Fisher, oo Utah 408, 45 r.zd 903 
required by* 78-36-3( lXc), a lessor entered the
 ( 1 9 3 5 ) B u c h a n a n v C r i t e , 1 0 6 U u h 4 2 8 1 6 0 
premises of hi . tenant, whose rent was two ^ ^
 1 5 4 A L R w { i u i ) 
months in arrears, changed the locks on the 
doors and refused to allow the tenant to enter to Occupancy "within five days." 
remove equipment and perishable goods, lessor _ Allegation. 
was guilty of forcible detainer and conversion of Allegation of -more" than five days includes 
the personal property on the premises. period of-within" five days. Woodbury v. Bun-
Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330,400 P.2d 507 J ^
 9 8 Utah 216,98 P.2d 948 (1940); American 
(1965). Mut. Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Jones, 102 Utah 318, 
_PnM.li . .*, . 1 1 7 R 2 d 2 9 3 <1M1>. rehearing denied, 102 
W ^ e ^ k a s e r of state land took poMes- U t e h 3 2 8 ' l 3 3 P M 3 3 2 <1943>-
sion of land while lessee from state was away "Unlawfully enters.* 
and refused to quit premises upon demand, he "Unlawfully enters* in Subsection (2) means 
was liable for forcible entry and detainer, since unlawfully as relating to an occupant who was 
such purchaser should have made proper de- there within five days. Woodbury v. Bunker, 98 
mand, and if it was refused, should have settled Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940); Buchanan v. 
question of possession by law. Paxton v. Fisher, Crites, 106 Utah 428,160 P.2d 100,154 A.L.R. 
86 Utah 408, 45 P.2d 903 (1935); Buchanan v. 167 (1944). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
Entry and Detainer § 1. tainer *=» 5. 
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer H 1, 2. 
78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than 
life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the 
property or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or 
period for which it is let to him, which specified term or period, whether 
established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, 
shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term 
or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with 
monthly or other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after 
the end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his 
designated agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or 
more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice 
requiring him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or 
period; or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of 
the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after 
default in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring 
in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained 
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premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after 
service, which notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes 
due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the 
covenants of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or 
when he sets up or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, 
or when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the premises any 
nuisance, including nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in 
possession after service upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other than those previously 
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of the conditions or covenant or the surrender of the property, 
served upon him and upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the 
premises remains uncomplied with for three days after service. Within 
three days after the service of the notice, the tenant, any subtenant in 
actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of the term, or other 
person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or cov-
enant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that if the 
covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot 
afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined 
under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(1 Xd) are not 
applicable to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 
only. 
Hiatory: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-3; L. 1981, ch. 160, ft 1; 1986, 
ch. 137, ft 1; 1989, ch. 101, ft 1; 1992, ch. 141, 
12. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27,1992, inserted "includ-
ing nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9," in 
Subsection (lXd) and added Subsection (3). 
Cross-References. — Nuisances, Title 47. 
Right to recover treble damages from tenants 
committing waste, S 78-38-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Cause of action. 
— Default in rent. 
— Prerequisites. 
— Presumptions. 
— When determined. 
— When exists. 
Federal regulations. 
— Modification of state rei 
In general. 
Notice to quit. 
-Administrative claim. 
— Liability of tenant. 
— Prerequisites. 
— Sufficiency. 
— Tenancy at will. 
Persons liable. 
Pleadings. 
— Tenancy at will. 
Right of re-entry. 
— Contractual provisions. 
Strict performance. 
— Waiver. 
Strict statutory compliance. 
— Not required. 
— Required. 
Substantial compliance. 
Termination of lease. 
Treble damages. 
— Contract of sale. 
— Intervenor. 
— Lease. 
Cause of action. 
— Default in rent. 
No cause of action for unlawful 
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based on default in payment of rent survived 
where tenant tendered rent due within three 
days after service of unlawful detainer action, 
regardless of defects in such notice Dang v Cox 
Corp , 655 P2d 658 (Utah 1982) 
— Prerequisites. 
Notice to quit is necessary to give rise to 
cause of action Carstensen v Hansen, 107 
Utah 234, 152 P2d 954 (1944) 
Service of the statutory notice and the ten-
ant's noncompliance are prerequisites to the 
tenant's being in unlawful detainer Olympus 
Hills Shopping Ctr, Ltd v Landes, 821 P2d 
451 (Utah 1991) 
— Presumptions. 
Action of unlawful detainer presupposes ab-
sence of fraud and force, as well as existence of 
relation of landlord and tenant Holladay Coal 
Co v Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P 882 (1899) 
— When determined. 
Whether a cause of action exists under this 
section is to be determined at the time the 
uclion 18 commenced Van Zyverden v Farrar, 
15 Utah 2d 367, 39J P2d 4b8 (1964) 
— When exists. 
Upon expiration of tenant's lease, the tenant 
18 subject to ou8tei by an unlawful detainer 
action (not forcible detainer) under and pursu-
ant to this section Woodbury v Bunker 98 
Utah 216, 98 P2d 94H (1940), American Mut 
Bldg & Loan Co v Jones. 102 Utah 318, 117 
P2d 293 (1941), rehearing denied, 102 Utah 
328, 133 P2d 332 (1943) 
Unless tenant has retained the right to 
refuse inspection by prospective purchasers of 
premises, unreasonable refusal to permit entry 
of premises for that purpose constitutes unlaw-
ful detainer Glenn v Keyes, 107 Utah 415, 154 
P2d 642 (1944) 
Federal regulations. 
— Modification of state remedies. 
OPA rental and housing regulations, under 
Federal Price Contro' Act, were binding upon 
Utah courts and modified any state remedy to 
extent that such remedy was in conflict with 
that act Callisterv Spencer, 113 Utah 497,196 
P2d 714 (1948) 
In general. 
This chapter takes away the landlord's com-
mon law right to use self help to remove a 
tenant, grants the landlord a summary court 
proceeding to evict a tenant who has violated 
some express or implied provision of the lease, 
and provides five instances in which the tenant 
is in unlawful detainer The remedy for a suc-
cessful landlord is restitution of the premises, 
treble damages, and recovery (or waste or rent 
due If the unlawful detainer action is based on 
default in payment of rent, the judgment will 
also mandate forfeiture of the lease P H Inv v 
Oliver, 818 P2d 1018 (Utah 1991) 
Notice to quit. 
— Administrative claim. 
Notice to quit or pay rent served on govern-
ment as required by this section was not an 
administrative claim sufficient to satisfy 28 
U S C § 2675(a), and federal court therefore 
had no jurisdiction over forcible entry and de-
tainer action brought under Federal Tort 
Claims Act Three-M Enters, Inc v United 
States, 548 F2d 293 (10th Cir 1977) 
— Liability of tenant. 
Action by lessor, after end of fixed term of 
lease, to terminate lease and require lessee to 
vacate premises did not terminate provision 
obliging tenant to pay attorney fees, where 
parties entered stipulation, while matter was 
pending, that lessee considered lease in effect 
and held under it after end of fixed term 
Milliner v Farmer, 24 Utah 2d 326, 471 P2d 
151 (1970) 
— Prerequisites. 
Notice in accordance with Subsection (lXe) 
should precede notice to quit, and must be 
uncomplicd with for five days after the service 
before a notice to quit is in order Fireman's Ins 
Co v Brown, 529 P2d 419 (Utah 1974) 
— Sufficiency. 
A notice to quit is sufficient under Subsection 
(1Kb) in the case of a tenancy at will, as 
provided in contract of sale in case of default, 
where it merely declares a forfeiture, and is not 
insufficient under Subsection (lXe) because not 
giving purchasers alternative of performing 
conditions of the agreement Forrester v Cook, 
77 Utah 137, 292 P 206 (1930), American 
Holding Co v Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432, 464 
P2d 592 (1970) 
Notice to quit which notified tenant that he 
was violating substantial obligations of tenancy 
by conducting certain businesses on premises, 
and which plainly informed tenant that he 
must desist from such objectionable practices 
by certain date and that, if on or before that 
date he failed to desist therefrom and had not 
surrendered premises, action would be com-
menced for restitution of premises, was not 
defective because notice was not expressed in 
the alternative as required by Subsection (lXe) 
of former § 104-60-3, i e , that violation must 
cease or tenancy be vacated, since such was 
plain intent of notice without use of word "or " 
Calhster v Spencer, 113 Utah 497,196 P2d 714 
(1948) 
Notice by landlord stating that tenants had 
failed to make paymentr nf rent due under 
lease, had failed to pay utility bills, and further 
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providing that tenants were to quit premises 
and deliver up possession to landlord within 
fifteen days did not comply with statutory re-
quirements under this section, in absence of 
compliance, landlord was not entitled to main-
tain action for restitution of premises Ameri-
can Holding Co v Hanson, 23 Utah 2d 432,464 
P2d 592 (1970) 
Notice of forfeiture, while sufficient to termi-
nate a lease for breach of covenant, is not 
sufficient to put lessee in unlawful detainer, the 
notice to quit must be in the alternative, i e , 
either perform or quit, before lessee becomes 
subject to the provisions of this chapter 
Pingree v Continental Group of Utah, Inc , 558 
P2d 1317 (Utah 1976) 
Lessee was not in unlawful detainer and 
lessor was not entitled to maintain an action 
under this section where lessor's notice to va-
cate premises was defective in that it did not 
state that lessee had the alternative of paying 
the delinquent rent or surrendering the pre-
mises Sovtrtcn v Meadows 595 P2d 852 
(Utah 1979) 
A notice lo .i month to month tenant to quit 
the pi i nnscs need not contain Lhc ultci native of 
paying rent Utc Cal Land Dev v Inter moun-
tain Stock Exch , 628 P2d 1278 (Utah 1981) 
The cntn. il distinction between a notice of 
unlawltil dttainti and a notui ol foifcilme IH 
that th< notice ol lotUiluiL simply dictates a 
termination ol the It UM without giving the 
lessee the alternative of making up the defi-
ciency Dang v Cox Corp , 655 P2d 658 (Utah 
1982) 
Letter stating that It In the event that lies 
seel docs not immediately rc-open and eontinu 
ouBly conduct noimal business opeiations in 
the premises, I lessor) will terminate the Lease 
as well as seek damages and all other 
available legal relief for the breach" met the 
requirements of Subsection (lXe) Olympus 
Hills Shopping Ctr, Ltd v Smith's Food & 
Drug Ctrs , Inc, 889 P2d 445 (Utah Ct App 
1994), cert denied. 899 P2d 1231 (Utah 1995) 
— Tenancy at will. 
At common law a tenant at will was not 
entitled to notice to quit possession Buchanan 
v Cntes, 106 Utah 428, 150 P2d 100, 154 
ALR 167(1944) 
It is only after buyer is in the status of a 
tenant at will that he is amenable to the notice 
provided by this section, which requires him to 
vacate within five days or be guilty of an 
unlawful detainer Van Zyverden v Farrar, 15 
Utah 2d 367, 393 P2d 468 (1964) 
Where lease was terminated by failure of 
tenant to pay rent and taxes, the tenant be-
came a tenant at will and landlord properly 
proceeded to regain possession by the proce-
dure set forth in Subsection (1Mb) by giving 
notiee to vacate Shoemaker v Pioncci Invs , 14 
Utah 2d 250, 381 P2d 735 (1963) 
Notice to purchaser who had become tenant 
at will for failure to make payment was suffi-
cient under Subsection (lXe) even though sev-
eral months had elapsed between first and final 
notice Beneficial Life Ins Co v Dennett, 24 
Utah 2d 310, 470 P2d 406 (1970) 
Persons liable. 
No one but tenant of real property for term 
less than life can be guilty of unlawful detainer 
Holladay Coal Co v Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P 
882(1899) 
Pleadings. 
— Tenancy at will. 
Since on month-to-month tenancy owner 
could recover property on fifteen-day notice, 
allegation in complaint that such tenant had 
violated substantial obligations of rental agree-
ment was not necessary in unlawful detainer 
action Calhster v Spencer, 113 Utah 497, 196 
P2d 714(1948) 
Right of re-entry. 
— Contractual provisions. 
Under contract for sale and exchange of real 
estate, providing that seller at his option could 
• e-enter premises and be released from his 
obligations upon default of buyer, seller was 
bound to give buyer notice of hiK intention to 
take advantage of forfeiture provision of con-
tract, since such provision was not self-execut-
ing Leone v Zuniga, 84 Utah 417, 34 P2d 699, 
94 ALR 1232(1934) 
Strict performance. 
— Waiver. 
Acceptance by vendor of purchaser s past-due 
payments under uniform real estate contract, 
and other conduct leading latter to believe that 
strict performance would not be required by 
vendor, imposes duty on vendor to give pur-
chaser reasonable notice before vendor may 
insist on strict performance by purchaser Pa-
cific Dev Co v Stewart, 113 Utah 403,195 P2d 
748(1948) 
Strict statutory compliance. 
— Not required. 
There is no reason for the strict rule that 
landlord must demand the precise or enact 
amount of rent due or lose his right to recover 
possession of the premises A tenant is guilty of 
unlawful detainer when he continues in posses-
sion after default m payment of any rent, and 
after notice in writing requiring in the alterna-
tive the payment of the rent or the surrender of 
the premises, etc Commercial Block Realty Co 
v Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 Utah 505, 
267 P 1009(1928) 
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— Required. 
This section, which provides a severe remedy, 
must be strictly complied with before the cause 
of action thereon may be maintained. Van 
Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 
468 (1964). 
Substantial compliance. 
The substantial compliance doctrine applies 
in some residential lease situations to defeat a 
landlord's attempt to forfeit a lease because of a 
tenant's minor breach. Housing Auth. v. 
Delgado, 914 P.2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The substantial compliance doctrine furthers 
the courts' general policy disfavoring forfei-
tures by allowing equity to intervene and res-
cue a lessee from forfeiture of a lease when the 
lessee has substantially complied with the 
lease in good faith. Housing Auth. v. Delgado, 
914 P.2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Trial court correctly determined that the eq-
uitable doctrine of substantial compliance ap-
plies to residential leases in Utah, and its 
findings that defendant had substantially com-
plied with lease at <ssue was supported by 
adequate evidence. Housing Auth. v. Delgado, 
914 P.2d 1163 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Termination of lease. 
A lease may be terminated pursuant to an 
unlawful detainer action. Hackford v. Snow, 
657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982). 
Treble damages. 
— Contract of sale. 
In a suit for amounts due under a contract of 
sale of real estate, where the vendors gave 
notice of forfeiture of the contract only and did 
not give the purchaser an alternative to pay up 
or quit, as is required under this section, the 
vendors were not entitled to treble damages for 
unlawful detainer. Erisman v. Overman, 11 
Utah 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85 (1961). 
— Intervenor. 
A person not actually occupying the premises 
who intervenes in an action to obtain posses-
sion and for damages for unlawful detainer, 
and who asserts ownership and the right to 
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may 
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for 
treble damages where the court finds this in-
tervener's claim invalid. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 
Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882, modified on another 
point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 (1957). 
— Lease. 
Under a lease contract for a period of years, 
in which the lessee defaulted, notice by the 
lessor for the lessees to quit the premises was 
not sufficient for treble damages. Under such a 
lease the statutes require an alternative notice 
that the tenant either perform or quit before he 
becomes an unlawful detainer and subject to 
treble damages. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 
59, 278 P.2d 294 (1954). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and 
Tenant ft 352 et seq.; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord 
and Tenant § 264 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 52A CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant 
ft 758. 
A.L.R. — Right of landlord legally entitled to 
possession to dispossess tenant without legal 
process, 6 A.L.R.3d 177. 
Grazing or pasturage agreement as violation 
of covenant in lease or provision of statute 
against assigning or subletting without lessor's 
consent, 71 AL.R.3d 780. 
Express or implied restriction on lessee's use 
of residential property for business purposes, 
46 A.L.R.4th 496. 
Landlord's permitting third party to occupy 
premises rent-free as acceptance of tenant's 
surrender of premises, 18 A.L.R.Sth 437. 
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant *» 
290. 
78-36-4. Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold over. 
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the tenant has held 
over and retained possession for more than 60 days after the expiration of his 
term without any demand of possession or notice to quit by the owner, his 
designated agent, or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by 
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor in estate, and 
shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the lease for another full year, and 
shall not be guilty of an unlawful detainer during that year; and the holding 
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over for the 60-day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on the part 
of the tenant to hold for another year. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-4; L. 1981, ch. 160, ft 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and A.L.R. — What constitutes tenant's holding 
Tenant ft 1193. over of leased premises, 13 A.L.R.Sth 169. 
CJ.S. — 51C CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant *=» 
i 136(3). 114(3). 
78-36-5. Remedies available to tenant against underten-
ant. 
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed in this chapter to 
obtain possession of the premises let to an undertenant in case of his unlawful 
detention of the premises underlet to him. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Key Numbers. — Landlord and tenant • » 
Tenant § 1179. 80(3). 
CJ.S. - 51C CJ.S. Landlord and Tenant 
( 48(1) et seq. 
78-36-6. Notice to quit — How served. 
The notices required by the preceding sections may be served: 
(1) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; 
(2) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to 
the tenant at his place of residence; 
(3) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his usual place of 
business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age and discretion at 
either place and mailing a copy to the tenant at the address of his place of 
residence or place of business; 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the place 
of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the leased 
property; or 
(5) if an order of abatement by eviction of the nuisance is issued by the 
court as provided in Section 78-38-11, when issued, the parties present 
shall be on notice that the abatement by eviction order is issued and 
immediately effective or as to any absent party, notice shall be given as 
provided in Subsections (1) through (4). 
(6) Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same manner. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, ft 1; C. 1943, Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amend-
Supp., 104 36-6; L. 1981, ch. 160, ft 3; 1986, ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
ch. 137, ft 2; 1987, ch. 123, ft 1) 1992, ch. 141, tion (5) and designated the former second sen-
| 3. tence of Subsection (4) as Subsection (6). 
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Cross-References. 
Rules 4 . 5 . U R C P 
Service of process, 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Death of landlord 
— Substitution of parties 
Delay in bringing action 
Improper service 
— Failure to mail 
Leaving copy with spouse 
— Failure to serve personally 
- - M a i l 
Rules of Civil Procedure 
-Effect 
Strict statutory compliance 
Death of landlord. 
— Substitution of parties. 
Notice served by agent of landlord during his 
lifetime did not lose its force upon landlord's 
death in view of C L 1917, $ 6513 permitting 
substitution of personal representative for de-
ceased, nor was executor under recessity of 
serving another demand for possession before 
bringing action, for he was entitled to carry on 
the litigation from point where original party 
left it Boland v Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P 7 
(1930) 
Delay in bringing action. 
Mere lapse of time does not operate as an 
abandonment of all claim and demand under 
the notice, nor does mere delay in bringing suit, 
where explained, render demand for possession 
of the premises of no force or effect Boland v 
Nihlros, 77 Utah 205, 293 P 7 (1930), an action 
in which six years elapsed between demand for 
possession on commencement of action and in 
which there were delays in bringing suit to 
trial 
Improper service. 
— Failure to mail. 
Leaving copy with spouse. 
An action for unlawful detainer cannot be 
maintained against a tenant to whom no copy 
of the notice required by the statute was 
mailed, although a copy was left with his wife 
Perkins v Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P 2d 446 
(1962) 
— Failure to serve personally. 
- - M a l i 
Assuming that compliance with this section 
can be waived by defendant tenant, entering 
general appearance cannot have that effect It 
was not a compliance with statute for landlord, 
after failing in a few attempts to find tenants at 
home and serve them personally with notice, to 
mail a copy of notice to quit, addressed to them 
at their place of residence Carstensen v 
Hansen, 107 Utah 234, 162 P2d 954 (1944) 
(decided under prior law) 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
-Effect . 
The general provisions of Rule 4, U R C P, 
relating to service do not modify the provisions 
of this section, which specifically applies to 
service in unlawful detainer actions Ute-Cal 
Land Dev v Intermountain Stock Exch, 628 
P2d 1278 (Utah 1981) 
Strict statutory compliance. 
To hold that any method of service other than 
that prescribed in the statute is sufficient to 
comply with it would be to nullify the intention 
of the legislature Carstensen v Hansen, 107 
Utah 234, 162 P2d 964 (1944) 
Unlawful detainer being a summary proce-
dure, the statute must be strictly complied with 
in order to enforce the obligations imposed by 
it Perkins v Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P2d 
446 (1954) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am Jur 2d Landlord and 
Tenant f 274. 275 
C.J.S. — 62A C J S Landlord and Tenant 
i 769(1) etseq 
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant *» 
283 
78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. 
(1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there 
is one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, 
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shall be made a party defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in 
Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be 
nonsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party 
defendant, but when it appears that any of the parties served with process or 
appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against 
those parties 
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in controversy after the 
service of any notice as provided in this chapter, the fact that such notice was 
not served on the subtenant is not a defense to the action All persons who 
enter under the tenant after the commencement of the action shall be bound by 
the judgment the same as if they had been made parties to the action 
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary party defendant 
only m an abatement by eviction action for an unlawful drug house as provided 
in Section 78-38-13 
History. L 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C 1943, 
Supp , 104-36-7, 1992, ch. 141,ft 4. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective Apnl 27, 1992, added the sub-
section designations, substituted "shall" for 
*need" near the beginning of Subsection (1) and 
inserted "except as provided in Section 78 38 
13," near the middle of that subsection, added 
Subsection (3), and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section 
Cross-References. — Necessary joinder of 
parties, Rule 19, U R C P 
Nonsuit, dismissal of actions Rule 41, 
U R C P 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Liability of parties 
— Intervenor 
Necessary parties 
— Agent of landlord 
— Assignor of sales contract 
Liability of parties. 
— Intervenor 
A person not actually occupying the premises 
who intervenes in an action to obtain posses 
sion and for damages for unlawful detainer, 
and who asserts ownership and the right to 
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may 
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for 
treble damages where the court finds this in-
tervener's claim invalid Tanner v Lawler 6 
Utah 84, 305 P2d 882, modified on another 
point, 66 Utah 2d 268, 311 P2d 791 (1957) 
Necessary parties. 
— Agent of landlord. 
Agent of landlord is not a necessary or proper 
party in forcible detainer proceeding Dunbar v 
Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P 982 (1926) 
— Assignor of sales contract 
It was not necessary for assignee of seller's 
interest in real estate sale contract to notify 
original purchaser of the forfeiture for default 
or make him a defendant in the unlawful de 
tainer action since an action for unlawful de 
tamer is primarily against the person in pos-
session and it is not necessary for everyone 
having an interest to be made a party Pearce v 
Shurtz, 2 UUh 2d 124, 270 P2d 442 (1954) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
60 Am Jur 2d Landlord and Am. Jur. 2d. 
Tenant^ 1019 
C.J S. — 52A C J S Landlord and Tenant 
I 764 
Key Numbers. — Landlord and Tenant «=» 
291(6) 
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78-36-8. Allegations permi t ted in complaint — Time for 
appea rance — Service of summons. 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth the facts on which 
he seeks to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence 
which may have accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful 
detainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation for the occupation of the 
premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer charged is after default in the 
payment of rent, the complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The court 
shall indorse on the summons the number of days within which the defendant 
is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be less than three 
or more than 20 days from the date of service. The court may authorize service 
by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication is complete one 
week after publication. Service by mail is complete three days after mailing. 
The summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as 
ordered, and shall be served as in other cases. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, ft 1; C. 1943, Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P. 
Supp., 104-36-8; 1987, ch. 123 ft 2. 
Cross-References. — General rules of 
pleadings, Rule 8, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action to recover rent. 
Damages. 
— Right to demand. 
Dismissal. 
— Joint motion. 
Insufficiency of process. 
Necessary allegations and proof. 
— Date of notice to surrender. 
Action to recover rent. 
Plaintiff may bring action to recover rent 
due, and a separate action in unlawful detainer 
for recovery of possession and for damages. 
Judgment in one action will not bar action in 
the other proceeding, the issues in the two 
actions not being the same, and, therefore, not 
being adjudicated. Voyles v. Straka, 77 Utah 
171. 292 P. 913 (1930). 
Damages. 
— Right to demand. 
The plaintiff in his complaint may not only 
ask for possession of the premises, but also for 
damages accruing to trial. Forrester v. Cook, 77 
Utah 137, 292 P. 206 (1930). 
Dismissal. 
— Joint motion. 
Where complaint in forcible entry and de-
tainer action stated cause of action against one 
defendant, joint demurrer (now motion to dis-
miss) by two defendants was properly over-
ruled. Paxton v. Fisher, 86 Utah 408, 45 P. 2d 
903 (1935). 
Insufficiency of process. 
Defendant, by answering plaintiffs' com-
plaint without raising the defense of insuffi-
ciency of process for failure to comply with the 
indorsement provision of this section and by 
proceeding through trial and the verdict before 
raising that defense, waived it under U.R.C.P. 
12(h). Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Necessary allegations and proof. 
Plaintiff must allege and prove, not only that 
he has right to property's possession, but also 
that property is being unlawfully detained from 
him, after notice to quit, served as provided by 
law. Barnes v. Cox, 12 Utah 47,41 P. 657 (1895). 
As a rule, all that is required to be alleged by 
plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and de-
tainer, is facts and circumstances constituting 
entry or detainer complained of, and either that 
he was peaceably in actual possession of pre-
mises at time of forcible entry, or, in some cases, 
that he was entitled to possession of premises 
at time of forcible detainer. Holladay Coal Co. v. 
Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 (1899). 
Plaintiff, in action of forcible entry and de-
tainer, need not allege his estate in or title to 
premises, nor, with few exceptions, is he re-
quired to allege his right of possession. 
Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 
882 (1899). 
— Date of notice to surrender. 
In action of forcible entry and detainer, held 
that exact date on which notice to surrender 
premises was given was wholly immaterial, 
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and that plaintiff was only required to aver and sufficient notice was given and that surrender 
prove specific fact that, subsequent to time of of premises by defendants was refused for pe-
unlawful entry, while defendants were in pos- riod of three days thereafter. Holladay Coal Co. 
session and prior to commencement of action, v. Kirker, 20 Utah 192, 57 P. 882 (1899). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
Entry and Detainer ( 38 et seq. tainer *» 24. 
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer §§ 39,42,44. 
78-36-8.5. Possession bond of plaintiff — Alternat ive rem-
edies. 
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the entry of final 
judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a possession bond. The bond may 
be in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property 
bond executed by two persons who own real property in the state and who are 
not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in an amount that 
is the probable amount of costs of suit and damages which may result to the 
defendant if the suit has been improperly instituted. The bond shall be payable 
to the clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs and 
damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall notify the 
defendant that he has filed a possession bond. This notice shall be served in the 
same manner as service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all of 
the alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2). 
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures applicable to an 
action if the plaintiff files a possession bond under Subsection (1): 
(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based solely upon 
nonpayment of rent or utilities, the existing contract shall remain in force 
and the complaint shall be dismissed if the defendant, within three days 
of the service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued rent, utility 
charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as 
provided in the rental agreement. 
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he executes and files a 
counter bond in the form of a corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, 
or a property bond executed by two persons who own real property in the 
state and who are not parties to the action. The form of the bond is at the 
defendant's option. The bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court. The 
defendant shall file the bond prior to the expiration of three days from the 
date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiff's possession bond. The 
court shall approve the bond in an amount that is the probable amount of 
costs of suit and actual damages that may result to the plaintiff if the 
defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court shall consider 
prepaid rent to the owner as a portion of the defendant's total bond. 
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a hearing to be held 
prior to the expiration of three days from the date the defendant is served 
with notice of the filing of plaintiffs possession bond. 
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a remedy under 
Subsection (2) within the required time, the plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, 
shall be granted an order of restitution. The constable of the precinct or the 
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sheriff of the county where the property is situated shall return possession of 
the property to the plaintiff promptly. 
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection (2)(c), and if the 
court rules after the hearing that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the 
property, the constable or sheriff shall promptly return possession of the 
property to the plaintiff. If at the hearing the court allows the defendant to 
remain in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the 
parties, the court shall require the defendant to post a bond as required in 
Subsection (2Kb). If a t the hearing the court rules that all issues between the 
parties can be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court shall, 
upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the merits. 
History: C. 1953, 78-86-8.5, enacted by L. County sheriff, Title 17, Chapter 22. 
1981, ch. 160, ft 4; 1983, ch. 209, ft 1; 1987, Service of summons, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.R 
ch. 123, ft 3. 
Cross-References. — Contracts of surety-
ship, 5 31A-22-101 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in P. H. lnv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 
(Utah 1991). 
78-36-9. Proof r e q u i r e d of plaintiff — Defense . 
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or forcible detainer the 
plaintiff shall only be required to show, in addition to the forcible entry or 
forcible detainer complained of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession 
at the time of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the time 
of the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his defense that he or his 
ancestors, or those whose interest in such premises he claims, had been in the 
quiet possession thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next 
before the commencement of the proceedings, and that his interest therein is 
not then ended or determined; and such showing is a bar to the proceedings. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. - Limitation of actions, 
Supp., 104-36-9. real property, ft 78-12-2 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS — Deed. 
Fraud and duress. 
Defenses and counterclaims. _ Tax title. 
~- -Counterclaim. Defense, and counterclaim.. 
— Tender of rent. _ Tenant. 
Possession. _ . . 
- Constructive Counterclaim. 
n - T . r * Defendant in forcible detainer action cannot 
- - R j g h t of entry.
 file c o u n t e r c l a im, a n d i g i i m i t e d to defenses 
- Public land. predicated on nonexistence of relationship of 
Security interest in personal property. landlord and tenant between parties, nonexist-
— Partial possession of premises.
 e n c e 0f valid lease or contract to pay rent, or 
Title adjudication. that no rent is due; but he may bring suit in 
- Color of title. court of equity to determine right* and enjoin 
Suite louse. forcible detainer proceeding pending Much de-
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termination. Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 
250 P. 982 (1926) (decided under prior law). 
Under Rule 13, U.R.C.P., counterclaim alleg-
ing misrepresentation and fraud concerning 
the contract of purchase of the involved prop-
erty could be asserted by defendants in an 
unlawful detainer action. White v. District 
Court, 232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951). 
— Tender of rent . 
A tender by tenant of rent, if insufficient in 
amount, is no tender at all, and the fact that 
subsequent tenders were, in the aggregate, 
equivalent to the rent due, will not make the 
tender sufficient and valid. Commercial Block 
Realty Co. v. Merchants' Protective Ass'n, 71 
Utah 505, 267 P. 1009 (1928). 
Possession. 
— Constructive. 
Right of entry. 
Under an allegation of possession plaintiff 
can show constructive possession, in that it is 
an association of qualified persons in posses-
sion of coal mines upon which sufficient money 
has been expended to give a preference right of 
entry to 640 acres of surrounding land under 
the law. Holladay Coal Co. v. Kirker, 20 Utah 
192,57 P. 882(1899) 
- P u b l i c land. 
Possession of public land is pinna facie evi-
dence of right to possession as against a mere 
intruder or trespasser. Wilson v. Triumph 
Consol. Mining Co., 19 Utah 66, 56 P. 300, 75 
Am. St. R. 718(1899). 
Security interest in personal property. 
— Partial possession of premises. 
Plaintiff's security interest in bar equipment 
did not constitute partial possession of pre-
mises, and plaintiff could not maintain action 
for forcible entry or for wrongful eviction. 
Wangagard v. Fitzpatrick, 542 P2d 194 (Utah 
1975). 
Title adjudication. 
In action for possession and damages for 
unlawful detention of farm lands, trial court 
erred in rendering judgment and decree in 
defendants favor quieting title to premises, 
since question of title is not ordinarily involved 
in such actions. Welling v. Abbott, 52 Utah 240, 
173 P. 245 (1918). 
It is not proper to quiet title to real estate in 
action of forcible entry or in action for unlawful 
detainer. Thomson v. Reynolds, 53 Utah 437, 
174 P. 164 (1918). 
- Color of t i t le. 
Sta te lease. 
In suit for forcible entry, it was proper to 
introduce lease from State Land Board (now 
Board of State Lands) to plaintiffs to show that 
they held under color of title and that it was 
necessary for defendants to resort to statute to 
obtain possession. Paxton v. Deardon, 94 Utah 
149, 76P.2d561 (1938). 
- Deed. 
- — Fraud and duress . 
It is not intention of forcible entry and de-
tainer proceedings to try title or equities be-
tween parties, so that, in such an action, defen-
dant was not permitted to show that deed 
executed by him to plaintiff was obtained from 
him by means of fraud and duress since such 
defense would constitute an attempt to dispute 
landlord's title. Williams v Nelson, 65 Utah 
304, 237 P. 217 (1925). 
- T a x title. 
Affirmative defense and counterclaim setting 
up tax title and seeking to have property in 
question quieted in defendant, held not to lie i I 
forcible detainer action. Woodbury v. Bunker, 
98 Utah 216, 98 P.2d 948 (1940). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible 
Entry and Detainer ftft 42 to 44 
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer § 53 et seq. 
Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
tainer «=» 29. 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent — 
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment 
entered in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the 
premises as provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If the proceeding is for unlawful 
detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the 
lease or agreement under which the property is held, or after default in the 
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payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or 
agreement 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the 
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following. 
(a) forcible entry, 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is 
alleged in the complaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after 
default in the payment of rent; and 
(e) the abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 
78-38-9 through 78-38-16 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for 
three times the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2Xa) 
through (2)(c), and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the 
lease or agreement 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of 
the rent, execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the 
entry of the judgment In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced 
immediately 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-10, L. 1981, ch. 160, ft 5; 1987, 
ch. 123, ft 4; 1992, ch. 141, ft 5; 1994, ch. 225, 
ft 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective Apnl 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2Xe) and added the clause beginning "ex-
ecution upon the judgment" to the end of the 
ANALYSIS 
Damages 
— Loss of value 
— Nominal damages 
— Rent and profits 
— Treble damages 
Effect of judgment 
Execution upon judgment 
— Failure to pay rent 
Grace period 
— Attempt to use 
Real estate sale contracts 
— Liquidated damages 
Separate action for rent 
Statutory remedy 
— Tort liability for noncompliance 
Cited 
Damages. 
— Loss of value. 
The loss of the value of the use and occupa-
tion of the premises, during the period when 
the premises were unlawfully withheld from 
first sentence of Subsection (4) 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
added "as provided in Section 78-36-10 5" to the 
second sentence in Subsection (1) 
Cross-References. — Fees of constable, 
ft 21-3-3 
Fees of sheriff, ft 21 2 4 
plaintiff, is "damage" suffered Forrester v 
Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P 206 (1930) 
— Nominal damages. 
Where husband and wife occupy the pre-
mises, and the notice required by statute is 
served only on the wife so that an action for 
unlawful detainer can be maintained merely 
against her, the successful plaintiff is entitled 
to nominal damages only, since, even if the wife 
had moved, the plaintiff would have had no 
nght to possession of the premises as against 
the husband, and he thus suffered no actual 
damage by reason of the fact that the wife 
remained there Perkins v Spencer, 121 Utah 
468, 243 P2d 446 (1952) 
— Rent and profits. 
Damages recoverable must be the natural 
and proximate consequences of the unlawful 
detainer and nothing more Rents and profits, 
or rental value of the premises, during deten-
tion are included in damages Rental value or 
reasonable value of the use and occupation of 
the premises becomes an element of damages 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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78-36-10 for retaining possession This is not rent, it is 
damages Forrester v Cook, 77 Utah 137,292 P 
206(1930) 
This section was not designed to provide a 
summary remedy for the recovery of rent The 
language thereof that "judgment shall be ren-
dered for the rent," etc, is applicable only 
when rent is claimed in the complaint for it 
would be improper in any case to award a 
judgment for what is not so claimed Voyles v 
Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P 913 (1930) 
— Treble damages. 
Where all issues were decided in plaintiffs 
favor, trial court's refusal to treble damages, 
awarded plaintiff by jury, was error Eccles v 
Union Pac Coal Co, 15 Utah 14, 48 P 148 (1897) 
Where tenant merely remains over upon ter-
mination of lease and increase in rent, but does 
not contest landlords right to terminate lease 
or his right to possession, tenant is conclusively 
presumed to have acquiesced in increased 
rental and landlord is not entitled to treble 
damages Belnap v Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251 P 
1073 (1926) 
The provision for treble damages is highly 
penal, and, therefore, subject to strict construc-
tion It will be observed that only damages are 
to be trebled, not rents and waste But the 
language is mandatory making it compulsory 
upon the court to render and enter judgment 
for three times the amount of the damages 
assessed, after a finding of damages by the jury 
And rents which may not be trebled are such as 
accrue before termination of the tenancy 
Forrester v Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 P 206 
(1930) 
A person not actually occupying the premises 
who intervenes in an action to obtain posses-
sion and for damages for unlawful detainer, 
and who asserts ownership and the right to 
possession by the occupier as his tenant, may 
be guilty of unlawful detainer and liable for 
treble damages where the court finds this in-
terveners claim invalid Tanner v Lawler, 6 
Utah 2d 84 305 P2d 882, modified on another 
point, 66 Utah 2d 268, 311 P2d 791 (1957) 
Plaintiffs failure to comply with the provi-
sions of ft 78-36-8 converted his action for un-
lawful detainer into one at common law for 
ejectment and defeated his nght under this 
section to treble damages Pingree v Continen-
tal Group of Utah, Inc, 558 P2d 1317 (Utah 
1976) 
After the termination of the tenancy by no-
tice to quit, the person in unlawful possession is 
not owing rent under contract, but must re-
spond in damages This is not rent, but "dam-
ages," and, therefore, may be trebled Forrester 
v Cook, 77 Utuh 137, 292 P 206 (1930), Monroe, 
Inc v Sidwull, 770 P2d 1022 (Utah Ct App 
19S9) 
Effect of judgment. 
This section recognizes that the contractual 
obligations of a lease survive the service of a 
statutory notice It is the judgment that decrees 
the forfeiture of a lease and not the service of 
the statutory notice Olympus Hills Shopping 
Ctr, Ltd v Landes, 821 P2d 451 (Utah 1991) 
Execution upon judgment. 
— Failure to pay rent. 
When landlord prevails in unlawful detainer 
action because of tenants failure to pay rent 
under a lease which has not expired, he cannot 
have any judgment unless he shows that there 
is rent due and the amount thereof, when that 
is done, the tenant has five days in which to pay 
the judgment and costs, and then he will be 
restored to the premises under his lease The 
landlord cannot prevent the tenant from paying 
the judgment and regaining his rights under 
the unexpired lease by the device of failing to 
have the amount of rent due included in the 
judgment In such a case unless the judgment 
determines the amount of rent due, it is defec-
tive, and the restitution part cannot be lawfully 
enforced Monter v Kratzers Specialty Bread 
Co, 29 Utah 2d 18, 504 P2d 40 (1972) 
Grace period. 
— Attempt to use. 
Where evicted lessees asserted that they 
were not afforded the five-day post-judgment 
grace period to pay the delinquency and pre-
serve the lease, the issue was moot since the 
defendants did not make an attempt to take 
advantage of the grace period All red v Smith, 
674 P2d 99 (Utah 1983) (decided under facts 
existing prior to 1981 amendment) 
Real estate sale contracts 
— Liquidated damages. 
By common practice in Utah, an action in 
unlawful detainer may be brought against a 
vendee of realty whose payments are far in 
arrears, after sufficient demands for payment 
have been made and subsequent notice to quit 
has been given by vendor; where a vendor does 
cancel the contract for sale and bring such an 
action, vendee may be required, if the contract 
so provides, to forfeit as liquidated damages all 
money theretofore paid to the vendor along 
with all improvements placed on the land by 
the vendee, unless such forfeiture would be 
unconscionable Weyher v Peterson 16 Utah 
2d 278, 399 P2d 438 (1965) 
Separate action for rent. 
Judgment in unlawful detainer for rcstitu 
tion of the premises and for treble damages 
does not bar action to recover rent due, rent not 
being claimed or adjudged in the possessory 
action, because the right to recover possession 
6 1 9 
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premises, resort to the remedy given by law to 
secure it. A violation of that duty set by the 
statute gives rise to an action for damages, not 
in an action under the forcible entry and de-
tainer statute but as a separate tort. King v. 
Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114 (1955). 
Cited in Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
REFERENCES 
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at 
higher rent during lessee's term, 50 A.L.R.4th 
403. 
Air-conditioning appliance, equipment, or ap-
paratus as fixture, 69 A.L.R.4th 359. 
Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-
tainer «=» 38. 
78-36-10.5. Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement 
— Disposition of personal property — Hearing. 
(1) Each order of restitution shall: 
(a) direct the defendant to vacate the premises, remove his personal 
property, and restore possession of the premises to the plaintiff, or be 
forcibly removed by a sheriff or constable; 
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the court for the 
defendant to vacate the premises, which shall be three business days 
following service of the order, unless the court determines that a longer or 
shorter period is appropriate under the circumstances; and 
(c) advise the defendant of his right to a hearing to contest the terms of 
the order of restitution or the manner of its enforcement. 
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the defendant to 
request a hearing shall be served personally upon the defendant in 
accordance with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by a person 
authorized to serve process pursuant to Section 78-27-58. If personal 
service is impossible or impracticable, service may be made by mailing a 
copy of the order and the form to the defendant's last-known address and 
posting a copy of the order and the form at a conspicuous place on the 
premises. 
(b) The date of service, the name, title, signature, and telephone 
number of the person serving the order and the form shall be legibly 
endorsed on the copy of the order and the form served on the defendant. 
(c) Within ten days of service, the person serving the order and the form 
shall file proof of service in accordance with Rule 4(h), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the order within the time 
prescribed by the court, a sheriff or constable at the plaintiffs direction 
may enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible 
to remove the defendant. 
(b) Any personal property of the defendant may be removed from the 
premises by the sheriff or constable and transported to a suitable location 
620 
by summary remedy, and the claim for rent, do 
nut constitute one entire and indivisible cause 
oC action. Voylcs v. Straka, 77 Utah 171, 292 P. 
913(1930). 
Statutory remedy. 
— Tort liability for noncompliance. 
A landlord who is entitled to possession must, 
on the refusal of the tenant to surrender the 
COLLATERAL 
Utah Law Review. — Forfeiture Under 
Installment Land Contracts in Utah, 1981 
Utah L. Rev. 803, 807. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Forcible 
Entry and Detainer $ 53. 
C.J.S. - 36A C.J.S. Forcible Entry and De-
tainer $ 68 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Landlord and tenant: respective 
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for safe storage. The sheriff or constable, with the plaintiff's consent, may 
delegate responsibility for storage to the plaintiff, who must store the 
personal property in a suitable place and in a reasonable manner. 
(c) The personal property removed and stored shall be inventoried by 
the sheriff or constable who shall keep the original inventory and 
personally deliver or mail the defendant a copy of the inventory immedi-
ately after the personal property is removed. 
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant within 30 days of removal of 
personal property from the premises, the sheriff or constable shall 
promptly return all of the defendant's personal property upon payment of 
the reasonable costs incurred for its removal and storage. 
(b) The person storing the personal property may sell the property 
remaining in storage at a public sale if: 
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or demand return of 
the personal property within 30 days of its removal from the premises; 
or 
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs incurred for the 
removal and storage of the personal property. 
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing the personal property shall 
mail to the defendant's last-known address a written notice of the time and 
place of the sale. 
(d) If the defendant is present at the sale, he may specify the order in 
which the personal property shall be sold, and only so much personal 
property shall be sold as to satisfy the costs of removal, storage, advertis-
ing, and conducting the sale. The remainder of the personal property, if 
any, shall be released to the defendant. If the defendant is not present at 
the sale, the proceeds, after deduction of the costs of removal, storage, 
advertising, and conducting the sale shall be paid to the plaintiff up to the 
amount of any judgment the plaintiff obtained against the defendant. Any 
surplus shall be paid to the defendant, if the defendant's whereabouts are 
known. If the defendant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus shall 
be disposed of in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 4a, Unclaimed 
Property Act. 
(e) If the property belonging to a person who is not a defendant is 
removed and stored in accordance with this section, that person may claim 
the property by delivering a written demand for its release to the sheriff or 
constable. If the claimant provides proper identification and evidence of 
ownership, the sheriff or constable shall promptly release the property at 
no cost to the claimant. 
(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the terms of the order of restitution 
or the manner of its enforcement, the defendant or any person claiming to own 
stored personal property may file a request for a hearing. The court shall set 
the matter for hearing within ten days from the filing of the request, or as soon 
thereafter as practicable, and shall mail notice of the hearing to the parties. 
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms necessary to implement this 
section. 
History: C. 1953,78-36-10.5, enacted by L. 
1994, ch. 225, & 3; 1995, ch. 68, 5 5; 1996, ch. 
79, ft 116. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1,1995, added "by a person 
authorized to serve process pursuant to Section 
78-27-58" to the first sentence in Subsection 
(2Xa). 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, substituted "Title 67, Chapter 4a, Un-
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claimed Property Act" for "Title 78, Chapter 44, 
Uniform Unclaimed Property Act" in Subsec-
tion (4Xd) 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch 225 
became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Lessor's lien. 
Although this section envisions the return of 
personal property to the tenant, it does not 
preclude the creation and enforcement of a 
lessors hen under ft 38-3-1 or one created by 
contract Butters v Jackson, 917 P2d 87 (Utah 
Ct App 1996) 
78-36-11. Time for appeal. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either party may, within ten days, 
appeal from the judgment rendered. 
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16, any party 
may appeal from the judgment rendered within three days 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ft 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-36-11; 1992, ch. 141, ft 6, 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, rewrote the 
section, which formerly read "Either party 
may, within ten days appeal from the judg-
ment rendered " 
Cross-References. — Stay of execution 
pending appeal, Rule 62, U R C P 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability of section 
— Held applicable 
— Held inapplicable 
Failure to comply 
— Loss of jurisdiction 
Applicability ot section. 
— Held applicable. 
Time for taking appeal in forcible entry and 
detainer suit was governed by this section, 
which is valid, and general provision providing 
for appeals was not applicable Hunsaker v 
Hams, 37 Utah 226, 109 P 1 (1910) 
Fact that judgment rested on construction of 
whether lease was terminated upon sale of 
property did not change action from one in 
unlawful detainer, so that it was necessary to 
take appeal within ten days as provided by this 
section Brandley v Lewis, 97 Utah 217,92 P2d 
338 (1939) 
Fact that demurrer to complaint required 
trial court to construe written instrument to 
determine whether plaintiff was entitled to any 
relief did not change action from one of unlaw-
ful detainer, so that it was necessary to take 
appeal within ten days as provided by this 
section Madsen v Chournos, 102 Utah 247, 
129 P 2d 986(1942) 
Appeal from dismissal of unlawful detainer 
action for failure to amend complaint within 
time allowed was governed by this section 
Madsen v Chournos, 102 Utah 247, 129 P2d 
986(1942) 
A party had ten duys, as provided by this 
section, and not one month, as provided by 
former Rule 73(a), U R C P, in which to appeal 
from a judgment for unlawful detainer Ute-Cal 
Land Dev v Intermountain Stock Exch , 628 
P2d 1278 (Utah 1981) 
— Held inapplicable. 
Where, in first count, plaintiff sought to re-
cover possession of real estate, and in second 
count sought to quiet title to certain land ad-
joining property involved in first cause of ac-
tion, and it appeared that case was tried as 
action in equity, plaintiff could not defeat ap-
peal by contending that action was one of 
forcible detainer Ottenheimer v Mountain 
States Supply Co, 56 Utah 190, 188 P 1117 
(1920) 
Where a complaint contained two causes of 
action asking for treble damages for forcible 
entry and detainer, one cause of action for a 
temporary restraining order and temporary in-
junction, and a fourth cause of action for dam-
ages for breach of a lease, the hybnd nature of 
the plaintiffs action prevented this statute 
from controlling the time limitation for filing an 
appeal Fashions Four v Fashion Place Assocs, 
681 P 2d 830 (Utah 1984) 
Where plaintiff in forcible detainer action 
was held liable on counterclaim, time for appeal 
was not governed by ten-day limitation of thia 
section, but by general six-month statute, ten-
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day limit of this section being applicable only to Failure to comply. 
judgments in forcible detainer Dunbar v 
Hansen, 68 Utah 398, 250 P 982 (1926) - Loss of jurisdiction. 
Ten day period for appeal provided in forcible Where judgment was entered against appel-
entry and detainer cases was inapplicable to lants on July 1 and they did not file notice of 
appeal from money judgment entered for land- appeal until July 15, appeal was not timely 
lord after recovery of possession, six-month filed and Supreme Court was without junsdic 
period of general statute being applicable tion to hear it Coombs v Johnson, 26 Utah 2d 
Belnap v Fox, 69 Utah 15, 251 P 1073 (1926) 8, 484 P2d 155 (1971) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am Jur 2d Forcible Key Numbers. — Forcible Entry and De-Entry and Detainer ft 55 tamer *=» 43 
C.J.S. - 36A C J S Forcible Entry and De-tainer § 90 
78-36-12. Exclusion of tenant without judicial process 
prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted. 
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from the tenant's 
premises in any manner except by judicial process, provided, an owner or his 
agent shall not be prevented from removing the contents of the leased premises 
under Subsection 78-36-12 6(2) and retaking the premises and attempting to 
rent them at a fair rental value when the tenant has abandoned the premises 
History: C. 1953, 78-36-12, enacted by L. 
1981, ch 160, ft 6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Condemnation of leasehold premises. help evictions and abused the building inspec-
A landlord's actions in having a house effec- tion process and were unconscionable under 
tively condemned for the purpose of evicting a the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act Wade 
tenant rather than repairing a leaking sewer v Jobe, 818 P2d 1006 (Utah 1991) 
system violated state policy disfavoring self-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Landlord and tenant respective higher rent during lessee s term 50 A L R 4th 
rights in excess rent when landlord relets at 403 
78-36-12.3. Definitions. 
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from entering into the 
premises with intent to deprive the tenant of such entry. 
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and shall also have the 
same meaning as landlord under common law and the statutes of this state 
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations 
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent 
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after the 
due date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence of 
the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises, 
or 
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(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent 
from the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent when due and the 
tenant's personal property has been removed from the dwelling unit and 
there is no reasonable evidence that the tenant is occupying the premises 
History* C 1953,78-36 12 3 , e n a c t e d b y L 
1981, c h 160, ft 7 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
C i t e d in Fashion Place Assocs v Glad Rags 
I in 754 P2d 940 (Utah 1988) 
78-36-12.6. Abandoned premises — Retaking and 
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant — 
Personal property of tenant left on premises. 
(1) In the event of abandonment, the owner may retake the premises and 
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and the tenant who abandoned the 
premises shall be liable 
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the term, or 
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to rerent the premises 
at a fair rental value, plus the difference between the fair rental value and 
the rent agreed to in the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable 
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs, if any, necessary 
to restore the rental unit to its condition when rented by the tenant less 
normal wear and tear This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a) 
notwithstanding that the owner did not rerent the premises 
(2) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has left personal property 
on the premises, the owner is entitled to remove the property from the 
dwelling, store it for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage costs 
from the tenant The owner shah make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant 
of the location of the personal property, however, if the property has been in 
storage for over 30 days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to 
recover it, the owner may sell the property and apply the proceeds toward any 
amount the tenant owes Any money left over from the sale of the property 
shall be handled as specified in Title 67, Chapter 4a, Part 2, Standards for 
Determining When Property is Abandoned or Unclaimed Nothing contained in 
this act shall be in derogation of or alter the owner s rights under Title 38, 
Chapter 3 
History C 1953, 78*36-12 6, e n a c t e d by L M e a n i n g of " th i s a c t * - The term "this 
1981, c h 160, ft 8, 1986, c h 194, ft 20, 1995, a c t " in Subsection (2) means Laws 1981, 
c h 198, ft 48 Chapter 160 which appears as $4 78 36 3 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s - The 1995 amend 78 36 4 78 36 6 78 36 8 fi 78 36 10 78 36 12 
ment effective May 1 1995 subst i tuted the and 78 36 12 3 
language beginning with "Title 67" and ending C r o s s References - Residential renters 
with "Unclaimed" in the next to-last sentence deposits Title 57 Chapter 17 
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Section 
78 37 5 
78 37 6 
78 37 7 
78 37 8 
78 37 9 
Sales — When debt dui in in 
stal lment* 
Right of redemption — Sales b> 
parcels — Of land and w it< i 
stock 
Repeuled 
Restraining possessoi fiom in 
jur ing property 
Attorney fees 
Form of action — Judgment — 
Special execution 
78 37 1 5 Environmental impairment to 
real property security interest 
— Remedies of lender 
78 37 2 Deficiency judgment — Execu 
tion 
78 37 3 Necessary part ies — Unre 
corded r ights barred 
78 37 4 Sales — Disposition of surplus 
moneys 
78-37-1. Form of action — Judgment — Special execution. 
There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement 
of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be 
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter Judgment shall be given 
adjudging the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of 
mortgaged property, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing 
costs and dnecting the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the 
provisions of law relating to sales on execution, and a special execution or order 
of sale shall be issued for that purpose 
History L 1951, c h 58, ft 1, C 1943, 
S u p p , 104 37 1, L 1965, c h 172, ft 1 
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s — Execution and pro 
ceedings supplemental thereto Rule 
U R C P 
Trust deeds § 57 1 19 et seq 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action for deficiency 
Additional security 
Applicability of section 
Defenses 
Exclusive remedy 
Exhaustion of security 
Federal action 
Good faith reliance on appraisal 
Legislative intent 
Limitation to single suit 




Servicr of proce ss 
( ib tl 
Act ion for de f i c i ency 
Former s ta tu te held not bar to action at law 
for deficiency remaining after sale under power 
in t rus t deed failed to realize full amount of 
note secured by such deed Mnlloiy v Kcsslei 
18 Utah 11 54 P 892 72 Am St R 765 (1398) 
Addit ional s ecur i ty 
When a creditor takes more than om item of 
security upon an obligation secured by a t ius t 
deed the creditor is not preclude d fiotn in ikuiK 
use of tha t additional security merely lice u w 
the creditor has not sought a doncic ncv IIICIL, 
inc nt within thric months of a non|ii<li< i il s i|< 
of om ol the items eovciitl Ity the IMI»I d < <l 
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Kimberly D. Washburn (USB #6681) 
Attorney for Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake 
1926 East 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801)278-6080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY 
OF SALT LAKE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN THOMAS SNYDER, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000201956 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
Plaintiff Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake ("Housing Authority"), by counsel 
and pursuant Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, submits the following memorandum of law in opposition to Defendant 
John Thomas Snyder's Motion for Summary Judgment in the above-entitled proceeding. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Snyder is being evicted from his apartment at 1966 South 200 East, #A-506, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, for violating the terms of his Lease Agreement with the Housing Authority. 
The Defendant's violation of the lease consists of a verbal assault and threats of physical assault, 
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on Sherrie Rico, a Housing Authority employee and the apartment building manager. Under the 
express terms of the Lease Agreement which defendant Snyder read and signed, such criminal 
activity is grounds for immediate termination of the lease and eviction from the leased premises, 
without prior benefit of administrative grievance procedures. 
Upon being served with process in this action the Defendant filed an answer to the 
complaint. Shortly thereafter, Defendant Snyder - while apparently not denying his tirade against 
Ms. Rico - moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that, inter alia, the Housing Authority 
did not comply with the terms of the lease in the manner in which it was attempting to terminate 
Defendant's tenancy, and that the procedure followed denied him due process of law. 
Defendant's motion was summarily denied, and the matter set for trial on May 8, 2000 in 
accordance with summary procedures specified under Utah's Unlawful Detainer Act, Utah Code 
Annotated, § 78-36-1, etseq.1 
Upon receiving the court's ruling, Defendant (now acting through counsel rather than pro 
se) petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, asking 
(in effect) that the appellate court order this Court to grant Defendant a continuance in order to 
conduct discovery and engage in "settlement negotiations." The Defendant has petitioned the 
1
 The denial of the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was not on the merits of the motion. 
Rather, the Defendant failed to submit the motion as required under the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. The Housing Authority has filed a memorandum in opposition to the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss and the time for filing a reply by the Defendant has long since lapsed. 
Nevertheless, the Defendant has not submitted the motion for the decision of the Court. See 
court file herein. 
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Utah Supreme Court for this relief despite the fact that the Defendant has never asked this Court 
for a continuance of the trial date. Moreover, the Defendant has never contacted the Housing 
Authority to inquire if it would agree to a continuance of the trial date. The Housing Authority 
has duly responded to Defendant's petition for extraordinary relief, which is still pending before 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
In addition, the Defendant has also named himself class representative in a federal class 
action filed before the United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, 
styled: John Thomas Snyder, personally and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated, 
plaintiff vs. Housing Authority of the County of Salt Lake, a government entity, defendant\ Civil 
No. 2:00CV-0336C. Therein, Defendant argues that his Lease Agreement, and all similar leases 
entered into between the Housing Authority and its tenants, are invalid and unenforceable on their 
face because they contain terms not specified in HUD regulations applicable to leases governed by 
the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, etseq. 
Defendant now comes to this court with a motion for summary judgment, claiming that, as 
a matter of law: (1) that the provision of the Lease Agreement relied upon by the Housing 
Authority in evicting him is invalid and unenforceable because it is broader than provisions 
mandated by Housing and Urban Development in regulations applicable to federally-subsidized 
low-income housing (this is the same argument which forms the basis of Defendant's pending 
federal class action); (2) that the Defendant's assault on Housing Authority employee Sherrie 
Rico failed, as a matter of law, to constitute conduct proscribed by the mandatory lease provisions 
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outlined in HUD regulations; and (3) that any other basis for evicting Defendant required a pre-
litigation "grievance procedure" under applicable HUD regulations and Housing Authority 
policies and procedures. 
Without exception, Defendant's arguments fail on their face. As a designated public 
housing administrator ("PHA") under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437, 
et seq., the Housing Authority is charged with the obligation of preserving the peace, health and 
welfare of its residents and employees. HUD regulations specify provisions which must be 
included in any Lease Agreement governed by the terms of the Housing Act; HUD regulations do 
not res/rid a lease's terms to only those mandated provisions. Evidence to be adduced at trial 
will establish that Defendant's conduct was of the sort clearly proscribed by the terms and 
conditions of the lease voluntarily executed by the Defendant. The Defendant's conduct which is 
the basis for seeking the termination of his tenancy constitutes criminal assault under Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-5-102. Moreover, this criminal assault directed toward a Housing Authority 
employee. As such, the Housing Authority is justified and expressly authorized, by federal law 
and regulation and by the terms of Defendant's Lease Agreement complete with the policies and 
procedures incorporated therein, to initiate a summary eviction procedure against the Defendant 
without a providing a access to the Housing Authority's administrative grievance procedure. 
RESPONSE TO "STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS" 
The Housing Authority disputes the following factual statements contained in the 
statement of "Undisputed Facts" set out at pages 1-7 of Defendant's memorandum: 
-4-
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1. The Housing Authority does not dispute paragraphs 1 through 4 of the 
Defendant's statement if undisputed facts. However, the Housing Authority was not served with 
an affidavit of any sort from the Defendant as referred to in paragraph 1. In addition, the 
Defendant makes reference to an "Exhibit A." The motion and memorandum served upon the 
Housing Authority did not contain any attachments or exhibits. Thus, the Housing Authority 
cannot agree that any such exhibit not provided to them is an accurate copy of the lease 
agreement between the parties. 
2. Paragraphs 5-8 purport to characterize the regulatory structure governing the 
Lease Agreement between the Housing Authority and the Defendant. The Housing Authority 
acknowledges that it is the recipient of federal funding in connection with the operation of low-
income housing facilities (including that located at 1966 South 200 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
in which Defendant is currently a resident). The application of federal law and regulations to the 
Housing Authority's activities in that regard, however, is a conclusion of law, and the provisions 
in question speak for themselves. 
3. Paragraph 9 correctly quotes § 11(1) of the parties' Lease Agreement. Paragraph 
10, however, attempts to characterize the Lease Agreement as deficient under applicable HUD 
regulations by observing that "absent from § 11(1) of Plaintiffs lease is any prohibition against 
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the PHA's 
public housing premises by employees of the PHA". This statement ignores that fact that such 
activities are implicitly proscribed by § 11(1) in its prohibition of "all illegal or criminal activity on 
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or near the premises". Moreover, if any such deficiency exists, it is a question of law and not an 
undisputed fact. 
4. Paragraphs 11-13 set forth no facts at all. Instead, these paragraphs are an attempt 
at a premature legal argument to the effect that, because the parties' Lease Agreement contains 
provisions not mandated by HUD in applicable regulations, they are somehow prohibited. For 
reasons set out at Point I of the argument below, this assumption is simply not true. 
5. Paragraphs 14-16 attempt to characterize and interpret the language of the Lease 
Agreement. The Lease Agreement speaks for itself A copy of the Lease Agreement is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 1. 
6. Paragraph 17-19 attempt to characterize the language of the 3-Day Notice of 
Termination of Lease Agreement served on Defendant in this matter. The 3-Day Notice speaks 
for itself A copy of the 3-Day Notice served upon the Defendant is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
7. Paragraphs 20-25 completely mischaracterize the nature of the Housing 
Authority's grounds for evicting Defendant from the leased premises. The Defendant committed 
a criminal assault upon Housing Authority employee, Sherrie Rico. The circumstances of that 
assault are detailed in the 3-Day Termination Notice. See Exhibit 2. In addition, the 
circumstances are set forth as well as in the police report filed by Ms. Rico with the Salt Lake City 
Police Department. A copy of the police report is attached hereto Exhibit 3. 
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The incident is described as follows in the Termination Notice: 
On or about February 23, 2000, during a meeting with the apartment manager, 
Sherrie Rico, and the assistant manager, Julie Cayou, you threatened the safety and 
well-being of Ms Rico. Your threats and intimidation began as you started 
verbally assaulting Ms. Rico. You repeatedly called Ms. Rico "honey" and a 
"fucking bitch." When Ms. Rico requested that you stop your verbal assault, you 
stood up from your chair and moved toward her in a threatening manner. You 
were yelling insults as Ms. Rico an pointing your finger at her as you moved 
toward her. Your demeanor was belligerent and hostile. When you reached Ms. 
Rico you moved so close to her that she had to pull backward to get away from 
the finger that you were thrusting in her face. You continued to call Ms. Rico a 
"fucking bitch" and told her that she had "better pull up her fucking pantyhose 
because you were going to go the rounds." Ms. Rico continued to ask you to 
desist from your threats, but you refused. You threatened Ms. Rico again telling 
her that you "were going to get her" because she cost you $120.00. At this point 
in time, Ms. Rico was nearly falling backward over her chair. You finally stepped 
backward, opened the door and again threatened Ms. Rico when you stated, "I 
don't have time for you right now, I have a doctor's appointment. You fucking 
bitch, you'd better pull up your fucking panty hose because I'm not done with you 
yet." 
Exhibit 2. The 3-Day Notice sets forth the grounds for the eviction of the Defendant. These are 
the sole grounds asserted for seeking the termination of the Defendant's tenancy. 
1. In Paragraph 26, defendant alleges that he has never been arrested or charged with 
criminal conduct in connection with his assault on Sherry Rico. A government's entity's decision 
whether or not to prosecute a criminal charge does not define the parameters of criminal conduct 
2. Paragraph 27 is not a statement of fact, but an astounding legal argument: that the 
Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah protected his right to subject Housing 
Authority employee Sherry Rico to criminal assault simply because his conduct was verbal rather 
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than physical. For reasons which are self-evident, this argument is not made a basis for summary 
judgment. 
8. Paragraph 28 claims (without any evidence whatsoever) that Defendant was 
evicted for complaining about conditions at the leased premises. The Housing Authority's 
reasons for evicting Defendant are set out in the Notice of Termination and in the Housing 
Authority's complaint herein. Exhibit 2. 
9. In response to Paragraph 29, the Housing Authority does not dispute that 
Defendant's conduct forming the basis of this eviction action was not directed at other tenants. It 
was directed at Housing Authority employee Sherrie Rico. It was, nonetheless, (1) illegal and 
criminal conduct engaged in by Defendant on or near the leased premises, and (2) criminal 
conduct which threatened the health or safety of a Housing Authority employee. Both of these 
facts were clearly set out in the Notice of Termination. Exhibit 2. Moreover, the dispute of this 
fact alone precludes the entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant. 
10. Paragraph 30 is, again, not an assertion of fact but a legal argument concerning the 
right to a pre-eviction grievance procedure. For those reasons set out at Point III, below, no such 
right exists in this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT IS NOT BEING EVICTED ON THE 
STRENGTH OF AN INVALID LEASE PROVISION. 
Defendant's first claims that, regardless of the nature or severity of his assault upon 
Sherrie Rico, it may not form the basis of an eviction under § 11(1) of the parties' Lease 
Agreement, which prohibits "all illegal or criminal activity on or near the premises". In an attempt 
to support this position, the Defendant points to HUD regulations set out at 24 CFR § 966.4 (f), 
and observes that, since that provision does not mandate the inclusion of the lease provision relied 
upon by the Housing Authority in this action, it therefore somehow prohibits such a provision 
being included in the lease. Thus, the Defendant claims, this court may not enforce the Lease 
Agreement as written. It should be noted, that the Defendant cites not a single case, statute, 
regulation, or other legal declaration in support of this proposition. This is because there is no 
legal authority which supports such a proposition. 
The Housing Authority does function as a "public housing agency" or PHA under the 
United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 et seq. and regulations promulgated by the 
thereunder by the Department of Housing and Urban Development with respect to its 
management of the leased premises herein. This means that, as a PHA, the Housing Authority is 
charged with furnishing safe, sanitary, structurally-sound and affordable rental housing for low-
income individuals through the receipt and application of federal subsidy funding. 
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The Housing Act begins with the following policy declaration in this regard: 
It is the policy of the United States to promote the general welfare of the Nation 
by employing its funds and credit, as provided in this chapter, to assist the several 
and their political subdivisions to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing 
conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings for 
families of lower income and, consistent with the objectives of this chapter, to vest 
in local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the 
administration of their housing programs. (Emphasis added). 
42 U.S.C. § 1437. This section further governs the creation of leases between a public housing 
agency and tenants of federally-subsidized housing. The law specifies certain provisions which 
must be included in any such lease; it begins, however, with the observation that a public housing 
agency shall "utilize leases which ... do not contain unreasonable terms and conditions" 
(emphasis added). In addition to those provisions mandated by law, therefore, public housing 
agency is implicitly empowered (in carrying out the policy objective vesting the agency with "the 
maximum amount of responsibility of the administration of [its] housing programs") to include 
additional terms and condition which are reasonable. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1). 
Regulations promulgated by HUD under the Housing Act expand upon and punctuate a 
public housing agency's discretion in this regard. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 details provisions which must 
be included in any lease between a PHA and its tenants, "[a] lease shall be entered into between 
the PHA and each tenant of a dwelling unit which shall contain the provisions described 
hereinafter." Id. (Emphasis added). Provisions which may not be contained in a lease between a 
public housing agency and its tenants are separately enumerated at 24 C.F.R. § 966.6: 
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Lease clauses of the nature described below shall not be included in new leases 
between a PHA and a tenant and shall be deleted from existing leases either by 
amendment thereof or execution of a new lease .... 
Again, by clear implication, and consistent with Congressional policy statement granting 
public housing agencies maximum authority in the administration of federally-subsidized housing 
programs under the Act, a public housing agency must be permitted to include, in any lease 
agreement, both the provisions mandated by 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 and any other reasonable lease 
provisions necessary to carry out the purposes of the Housing Act, so long as they do not include 
any provisions prohibited by 24 C.F.R. § 966.6. The language of Section 11 (I) of the Lease 
Agreement in this case is nowhere prohibited by 24 C.F.R. § 966.6. 
Cases interpreting the scope and breadth of a public housing agency's authority in the 
administration of housing projects under the Act (including terms of lease agreements) have 
expressly upheld the agency's authority to include all reasonable provisions in its leases, 
regulations, etc., so long as such provisions are not expressly prohibited by law or regulation. 
For example, in Rivera v. Reading Housing Authority, 819 F. Supp. 1323 (E. D. Perm. 
1993), a public housing agency imposed a policy requiring that minor applicants for housing 
obtain a judicial decree of emancipation in order to be eligible to rent publically-subsidized 
housing. The plaintiff (a minor applicant) challenged the enforceability of the policy in that it was 
not specified by applicable HUD regulations. The court rejected the challenge and upheld the 
requirement, citing the mandate of the Act that public housing agencies be vested with "the 
maximum amount of power and responsibility ... in order to promote efficient management of 
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housing programs." Id. at 329. In reaching its conclusion, the Rivera court stated the following 
with regard to the appropriate standard of judicial review of public housing agency practices 
under applicable HUD regulations: 
... [I]n assessing whether the [housing agency] has violated the Housing Act or 
HUD regulations, we must keep in mind that the Housing Act gives local housing 
authorities discretion to select applicants and to otherwise manage the day-to-day 
affairs of subsidized housing projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437. We also recognize 
that the administration of local housing authorities is a difficult task, and the 
concern for efficient management is particularly important, because the number of 
applicants greatly exceeds the available housing. [Citations omitted]. 
Consequently, the scope of judicial review of a local Housing Authority's policies 
and practices is limited, and we will not view its actions as a violation of the 
Housing Act or HUD regulations so long as the Housing Authority's eligibility 
requirements are "consistent with [HUD] regulations and is in harmony with the 
overall policies" of the Housing Act. 
Id. at 1329-1330, citing Vandermark v. Housing Authority of York, 663 F.2d 436 (3rd Cir. 1981). 
In the case of Greenville Housing Authority v. City of Greenville, 281 S.C. 604, 316 S.E. 
2d 718 (Ct. App. S. C. 1984), a tenant in a housing complex subsidized under the Housing Act 
challenged an eviction on the basis that the lease provisions applied in the case were inconsistent 
with the Housing Act and applicable regulations. Specifically, the evicted tenant challenged the 
propriety of a rent reduction provision in her lease as not being reflective of the content of HUD 
regulations. The court of appeals overturned a lower court finding against the housing authority, 
agreeing that the authority "had discretion to establish reasonable lease provisions" Id, at 720. 
Similarly, in Allegheny County Housing Authority v. Morrissey, etal, 651 A.2d 362 
(Cmnwith Ct. Penn. 1994), the public housing agency had a lease provision prohibiting ownership 
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and maintenance of pets on the premises. A tenant challenged the provision as not being 
reflective of provisions required by the United States Housing Act and applicable HUD 
regulations. The court rejected the argument and observed: 
42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(l)(2)... mandates that each public housing agency shall utilize 
leases which obligate the public housing agency to maintain the project in a decent, 
safe and sanitary condition. Given that mandate, the [housing authority] has the 
authority to carry out that purpose by issuing lease agreements with policies that 
meet that requirement unless they are contrary to federal regulations. 
Id. at 634-635. 
The Housing Authority in this action acknowledges that Paragraph 11 (I) prohibits more 
than the specific, narrow type of criminal conduct specifically described in at 24 C.F.R. 
§ 966.4(f)(12). The provision in question, however, is not prohibited under 24 C.F.R. § 966.6. 
Nor can it seriously be argued that the provision is not rationally related to maintenance of the 
housing project in a decent, safe and sanitary condition, and otherwise furthering the purposes of 
the United States Housing Act. The Plaintiff Housing Authority would, in fact, be remiss in its 
obligations under the Act were it not to proscribe criminal activity by its tenants on or near the 
leased premises. Thus, as in the cases discussed above, the Housing Authority in this case is 
entitled to discretion in establishing its reasonable lease provisions. The Housing Authority is 
obligated to carry out the mandates of the Housing Act and the policies underlying the Housing 
Act. The provisions challenged by the Defendant are reasonable and comport with the letter and 
spirit of the law. 
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The Defendant argues that, if literally interpreted, Paragraph 11(1) of the Lease Agreement 
would make minor criminal infractions near the housing project grounds for eviction. The 
Defendant himself, however, has no standing to raise such an objection — the conduct giving rise 
to his eviction was a criminal assault, consisting of harsh and violent verbal threats of immediate 
physical harm to Sherrie Rico. The Defendant's criminal act falls well within even the narrowest 
reading of the lease provision, as well as the mandatory language of 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(I). 
Moreover, it cannot seriously be argued that a Housing Authority managing federally-subsidized, 
low-income housing has no legitimate interest in prohibiting criminal activity, of whatever nature 
or severity, on or around the housing complex. Certainly, a public housing agency operating 
under the mandates of the Housing Act has a vested interest in summarily ejecting tenants who 
accost management employees with threats of imminent physical harm. The Defendant has not 
demonstrated that as a matter of law, he is entitled to judgment on this basis. Thus, the 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
BL DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITY JUSTIFYING EVICTION UNDER THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT. 
Defendant Snyder next argues that, as a matter of law, his conduct toward Sherrie Rico 
did not rise to the level of criminal activity justifying eviction under the terms of the Lease 
Agreement because she is an employee of the Housing Authority. Such a claim is preposterous 
and is simply not justified under the law. 
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The court is again referred to the events of February 23, 2000 giving rise to this action as 
set forth in the 3-Day Notice of Termination See Exhibit 2 and Housing Authority's Response to 
Statement of Facts, above. 
The Utah Legislature has defined Assault as follows: 
"Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat accompanied by a show immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another." 
UTAH CODE ANN.. § 76-5-102. If the court accepts as true Ms. Rico's account of Defendant's 
assault on her (which it must, under the standard governing summary judgment — See Winegar v. 
Froerer Corporation, 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991)), the Defendant's conduct fell squarely within 
the elements of assault as defined by Utah law. The Defendant knowingly and deliberately placed 
a Housing Authority employee in genuine and reasonable fear of immediate violent harm through 
overt threats punctuated with foul language. To argue that such conduct does not constitute 
"criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the PHA's 
public housing premises by ... employees of the PHA" simply flies in the face of reason. See 24 
C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12). 
Defendant argues that other cases involving evictions from public housing units 
administered under the Housing Act have involved "serious criminal conduct and intervention by 
law enforcement" (Defendant's Memorandum at 12). Housing employee Sherrie Rico takes 
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significant issue with the cavalier way in which Defendant dismisses the nature and severity of his 
assault upon her. Moreover, the fact that the police department has yet to pursue criminal 
charges against Defendant for his conduct does not render it non-criminal. The decision whether 
or not to pursue conviction for a criminal offense rests with the discretion of the prosecutorial 
government entity. The determination whether Defendant's conduct constituted the established 
elements of a criminal offense, and therefore grounds for eviction int his case, lies with this Court 
based upon the evidence to be produced at trial. Thus, the Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment should be denied. 
III. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PRE-LITIGATION 
GRIEVANCE HEARING. 
In an attempt to confuse the gravity of his own conduct with lesser criminal offenses 
which "might" fall within the language of Paragraph 11(1) of the Lease Agreement, Defendant 
argues that before this action was filed, he was entitled to an administrative grievance procedure 
under policies and procedures promulgated by the Housing Authority pursuant to federal 
regulation. Again, Defendant argues a position which he does not have standing to assert. 
The requirement of grievance procedures in the administration of federally-subsidized 
housing appears at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (k). This section calls upon HUD to implement regulations 
requiring public housing agencies receiving assistance under the Act to establish and implement 
administrative grievance procedures to be followed prior to the eviction of tenants. If further 
expressly provides as follows: 
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For any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy that involves 
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or employees of the public housing 
agency ... the agency may (A) establish and expedite a grievance procedure as the 
secretary shall provide by rule ..., or (B) exclude from its grievance procedure any 
such grievance, in any jurisdiction, which requires that prior to eviction, a tenant 
be given a hearing in court which the secretary determines provides the basic 
elements of due process .... 
Id 
HUD regulations implementing the foregoing provision are found at 24 C.F.R. § 966.50 
et seq. Thereunder, HUD has provided as follows: 
The term due process determination means a determination by HUD that the law 
of the jurisdiction requires that the tenant must be given the opportunity for a 
hearing in court which provides the basic elements of due process ... before 
eviction from the dwelling unit. If HUD has issued a due process determination, a 
PHA may exclude from the PHA administrative grievance procedure under this 
subpart any grievance concerning a termination of tenancy or eviction that involves 
... any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful 
enjoyment of the premises of other residents or employees of the PHA ... if HUD 
has issued the due process determination, the PHA may evict the occupants of the 
dwelling unit through the judicial eviction procedures which are the subject of the 
determination. In this case, the PHA is not required to provide an opportunity for 
a hearing under the PHA's administrative grievance procedure. 
24 C.F.R. § 966.50. 
By notice dated December 3, 1991, HUD has expressly determined that pre-eviction 
procedures available to tenants under Utah law satisfy these due process requirements and that 
grievance procedures may therefore be modified in accordance with the above-cited regulations. 
A copy of the Department of Housing and urban Developments Due Process Determination for 
Utah is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. 
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In accordance with HUD's due process determination for the state of Utah, the Housing 
Authority promulgated grievance procedures in to be used in conjunction with tenant evictions 
As set forth in the grievance procedure, "the provisions of this grievance procedure are not 
applicable to any grievance concerning any eviction or termination of tenancy based upon a 
tenant's creation or maintenance of the threat to the health or safety of other tenants or HA 
employees." A copy of the Grievance Procedure is attached hereto as Exhibit 5. 
Again, Defendant's conduct toward Sherrie Rico was, on its face, criminal activity 
threatening the safety and well-being of a Housing Authority employee. It fell within the larger 
scope of prohibition outlined by paragraph 11(1) of the Lease Agreement; it likewise falls within 
the narrower definition of conduct for which no administrative grievance procedure is required 
under the Housing Act and the applicable HUD regulations by reason of the due process 
determination for the State of Utah. 
IV. PLAINTIFF ASSERTS NO NEW GROUNDS FOR 
EVICTION. 
In pages 13-15 of his memorandum, the Defendant claims that the Housing Authority is 
changing the grounds for eviction from those plead in his Complaint. This is simply not the case. 
The grounds for seeking the termination of the Defendant's tenancy are those set forth in the 3-
Day Notice. Despite the Defendant's contentions to the contrary, the Housing Authority has not 
asserted new grounds for the Defendant's eviction. 
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By assaulting Sherrie Rico, the Defendant committed a criminal act in violation of Section 
11(1) of the Lease Agreement. Because that criminal act entailed a threat of violence toward a 
Housing Authority employee, no grievance procedure was warranted or allowed. Likewise, 
because Defendant's criminal conduct involved a threat of injury to a Housing Authority 
employee, a summary three-day eviction procedure was permitted. It was this conduct as 
identified in the Housing Authority's 3-Day Notice of Termination and in the Housing Authority's 
complaint for unlawful detainer which is the basis for the Defendant's eviction. There simply is 
no other reason. Thus, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
As the court can see from the parties' memoranda, Defendant John Snyder's residency at 
1965 South 200 East has been characterized by conflict with the Housing Authority. In February 
of this year, however, the Defendant elected to push that conflict to the point of criminal assault 
on a Housing Authority employee. The Housing Authority is not required, and cannot afford, to 
countenance such behavior from its tenants. The eviction procedure was therefore initiated. 
Defendant Snyder's myriad arguments over the scope of HUD regulations, the breadth of 
the language of his Lease Agreement, the severity of his conduct, and the like, do not change the 
simple facts. His assault on Sherrie Rico - which he apparently admits - clearly constitutes a 
violation under the provisions set forth in Utah's Criminal Code. The Lease Agreement, which 
Defendant Snyder voluntarily signed, makes such criminal conduct grounds for termination of the 
Lease. The Housing Authority is at liberty to include such provisions in its Lease Agreement so 
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long as they are rationally related to the underlying purposes of the Housing Act and are not 
prohibited by HUD regulations. Since the conduct involved a threat of injury to a Housing 
Authority employee, moreover, Defendant's conduct is exempted from pre-litigation 
administrative grievance procedures by reason of HUD's due process determination for the state 
of Utah and the consequent policies put in place by the Housing Authority. Therefore the Court 
should deny the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Defendant should be compelled 
to come to court for trial, answer for his conduct, and be evicted or not as the evidence and merits 
may dictate. 
Dated this 6 ^ day of May, 2000. 
Kimberly D.AVkshburn (USB #6681) 
Attorney for Housing Authority of 
the County of Salt Lake 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ day o f f e r W y , 2000, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Brian M. Bernard 
James L. Harris, Jr. 
Utah Legal Clinic 
214 East Fifth South Street 






CITY, UTAH 8411b" 
•14 0 0 TOO (801) 
LEASE 
1. PARTIES AND PREMISES. The Housing Authority of the County of Salt 
Lake ("Housing Authority") agrees to lease to SNYDER, JOHN THOMAS 
("Resident"), and Resident agrees to lease from Housing Authority the 
Premises located at 1966 SO 200 E A506, SLC, UTAH . 
Household or family members who will reside at the Premises are: 
NAME 8IRTHDATE RELATIONSHIP 
JOHN T. SNYDER 07/26/31 H 
2. TENANCY. This tenancy shall commence on AUGUST 7, 1998 , for a 
period of six (6) months and then shall be renewed automatically on a 
month to month basis until terminated pursuant to the provisions of 
paragraph 17 hereunder. 
3. PAYMENTS UNDER LEASE. Rental amounts paid by Reside 
upon family income and the number of household members, 
under this lease at this time is $ 186.00 per month and 
due on or before the first day of each month. The pro-r 
due before delivery of the Premises key to the Resident 
The amount of monthly rent is subject to upward or 
adjustments by Housing Authority. These adjustments,, if 
based on changes in family income, number of household m 
any other factor affecting Resident's continued eligibil 
determined by Housing Authority and will occur at least 
and at any other time Housing Authority deems necessary, 
must, upon Housing Authority's request, but at least on 
basis, fully and accurately complete forms provided by H 





is $ 136.00 
downwa rd 
any, are 
embers, o r 





Housing Authority will reimburse Resident for any overpayment 
received, after applying the overpayment to any payments due from 
Resident. If Housing Authority reevaluates rent amount or determines 
that Resident must change Premises, Resident^ may ask for an 
explanation of such determination; if Resident disagrees, Resident 
has the right to request a hearing under Housing Authority grievance 
procedures. 
Resident will be assessed a $10.00 late fee on the sixth day of 
month if full rent has not been paid that month. A second $10.00 
late charge will be assessed if the rent is not paid by the fifteenth 
day of the month. Housing Authority will charge Resident $10.00 on 
each returned check. Resident's checks will not be accepted if a 
second check is returned; payment of rent will only be accepted by 
money order or cashier check. Payments will be accepted at Housing 
Authority's main office or by mail. 
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thin thirty days after Premises are 
rding address is provided. 
Housing Authority will notify Resident of any rent adjustments. 
All rent adjustments which involve an increase will be effective 
beginning the first of the second month. All decreases in rent will 
be effective first of the next month. If Resident fails to report 
an increase, the rent increase shall become effective on the first day 
of the first month following such increase in income. 
Those Residents who do not show up for their re-determination of 
rent after being notified by Housing Authority will either pay the 
Published Fair Market Rent or 30% of their adjusted gross income 
whichever is greater. The Housing Authority may also evict the 
Resident as outlined in Section 5. 
6. UTItlTIES. At no cost beyond the monthly rent Housing Authority 
will provide the following utilties: water, sewer, other 
A. Management shall give written notice to Resident of any applicable 
allowance for Management-furnished utilities or Resident-furnished 
utilities. Resident understands and agrees that Management may revise 
said allowance from time to time during the course of this lease and 
that said revisions are binding upon Resident. 
B. Management's allowance for Management-furnished utilities shall 
be determined in accordance with HU0 regulations and requirements. 
C. Management's allowance for 
Resident-purchased utilities shall be determined in accordance with 
HUD regulations and requirements. 
2 
failure to pay utility bill(s), said shut-off constitutes u serious 
violation of this Agreement and nuj y be grounds Tor termination of tht 
Agreement pursuant to paragraph 17 hereunder. 
/. CHANGE OP PREMISES. If Housing Authority determines, for any 
reason, that the Premises provided for in this lease are no longer 
appropriate, Resident will be transferred to an appropriate 
alternative location after receipt of reasonable notice. 
3. RESIDENT'S RIGHT TO USE AND OCCUPY. Resident shall have 
exclusive use and occupancy of the premises including the right to 
care for foster children and live-in care of member of Resident's 
family, provided appropriate notice of such persons is given to 
Housing Authority in accordance with this lease. Resident and/or 
household members may engage in legal profit making activities If 
Housing Authority determines that such are incidental to the primary 
use of the Premises and do not violate any rule, law or ordinance. 
Resident may also have guests whose stay may not exceed five (5) days 
without Housing Authority's prior written approval. Repeated or 
extended accommodation of guests is grounds for redetermination of the 
rent or eviction. 
9. DAMAGE AND REPAIR. Resident is responsible for payment of repair 
charges not due to reasonable wear and tear. The Housing Authority 
will make repairs and bill Resident for those repairs due to non-
reasonable wear and tear. Such damage shall be presumed to be due to 
the negligence or intentional acts of Resident, household members, or 
other persons under the control of Resident. This presumption is 
rebuttable. Payment for repairs will be due on the first day of the 
second month. A late fee of $10.00 will be assessed for charges that 
are past due. Resident may be evicted for nonpayment of repair 
charges. Charges for repairs will be based upon a schedule of repair 
charges posted in Housing Authority's office. 
10. HOUSING AUTHORITY OBLIGATIONS. Housing Authority shall maintain 
the common areas in a decent, safe, and sanitary condition and will 
comply with applicable local building and housing codes and all HUD 
regulations affecting safety and health. Housing Authority will also 
make all necessary repairs and maintain electrical, plumbing, sanitary 
heating, ventilating and other facilities and appliances, including 
elevators, in good and safe working condition. Housing Authority will 
supply and maintain necessary waste receptacles for deposit of waste 
removed from Resident's premises, hot and cold running water, and 
reasonable amounts of heat unless not required by law. Housing 
Authority will also make reasonable accommodation for disabled 
persons. Contact Roy House, Section 504 Coordinator, 3595 S.Main St. 
SLC, UT 84115, telephone 284-4430, concerning any accomodations. 
11. RESIDENT'S OBLIGATIONS. 
A. Resident shall not assign or sublease the Premises nor provide 
accomodations for boarders whether for compensation or not. 
B. The Premises is for use as a private residence and may not be used 
for any other purpose. 
C. Resident will notify Housing Authority, in writing, of any 
absence from the premises of longer than one week (seven days). 
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F. Resident and all household member's and guests will use ail 
utilities, appliances, plumbing, and facilities in a reasonable 
ma nner and refrain from damaging or removing any p a rt of the Premises. 
G. Resident will pay for all repair of damages caused by Resident, 
household members, guests or visitors. 
H. Resident will be held directly responsible for the actions of 
Resident, household member's, guests and visitors. 
I. Resident and household members, guests and visitors will act in a 
manner so as not to disturb any neighbor's peaceful enjoyment of his/ 
her accomodations and refrain from all illegal or criminal activity on 
or near the Premises. Such illegal activity includes, but is not 
limited to, the use or sale of drugs by the Resident, household 
members, guests or visitors. 
J. Neither* Resident nor household members, guests or visitors shall 
commit any fraud in connection with any housing assistance program, or 
engage in any illegal or criminal activity. Such activity shall be 
cause for eviction. 
12. PETS. Only residents of elderly or handicapped housing 
developments are permitted to have pets. Violation of Management's 
pet policy, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" by 
Resident may be cause for removal of their pet on 2 4 hours written 
notice to Resident and shall be cause for eviction. 
13. RESIDENT MAINTENANCE RESPONS IB11ITIES. Resident will maintain 
the inside of the Premises in clean condition and repair any broken 
windows, screens, or doors. Resident is also responsible for the 
following : 
Mow and edge the lawn at least once a week. 
Water the lawn as often as necessary, at least two times weekly. 
Shovel snow from sidewalks immediately after each snowfall. 
Sweep sidewalks on regular basis. 
Keep litter and trash off the Premises at all times. 
Weed when required to keep property in good condition. 
Other . 
If Resident fails to perform the duties marked above, Housing 
Authority will perform them and charge Resident a reasonable fee. 
Refusal to perform these duties is grounds for eviction. Charges will 
be due the first day of the second month. Resident will be assessed a 
$10.00 late fee if not paid when due. If Resident is determined by 
Housing Authority to be unable to perform such duties, resident shall 
not be required to do so. 
14. HAZARDOUS DEFECTS. If the Premises are damaged enough to be 
hazardous to the life, health, or safety of an occupant* Resident 
shall immediately notify Housing Authority of the damage. 
A 
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made in a reasonable time and/or alternate accommodations are not 
provided. However, no abatement will occur 3i\d Resident will be 
charged for the repairs if Resident, Resident's household members, 
guests, or visitors cause the damage. Nor will there be any abate-
ment if Resident rejects offered alternative accommodations. 
15. INSPECTIONS. Housing Authority and Resident will inspect the 
Premises before Resident takes possession an6 furnish Resident with a 
written statement of the condition of the Premises and the appliances 
provided with the Premises. The statement will be signed by both 
Housing Authority a\Mi Resident before Resident takes possession. 
When Resident vacates the Premises, Housing Authority will once 
again inspect the Premises and appliances and furnish a statement to 
Resident of any charges to be assessed to Resident for damages. 
Resident may participate in this final inspection unless Resident 
vacates without notice. 
Housing Authority will be allowed by Resident to enter the 
Premises to make regular inspections, do routine maintenance, or to 
show the Premises for releasing. Housing Authority may enter the 
Premises during reasonable hours with reasonable notice to Resident 
or without notice if it is reasonable to believe an emergency exists. 
Housing Authority will provide a written statement specifying the 
purpose of entry at least 48 hours before entry. If there are no 
adults present when Housing Authority enters the Premises, it will 
leave a written statement specifying the date, time, and purpose of 
entry. 
16. NOTICE PROCEDURES. Except for notice prior to entering the 
Premises or notice prior to the sale of abandoned property, any notice 
given by Housing Authority shall be in writing and delivered to an 
adult member of Resident's household or sent by prepaid first class 
mail. If Resident is visually impaired, the notice shall be in an 
accessible format. 
Any notice given by Resident to Housing Authority must be written 
and hand delivered to its main office or sent by prepaid first class 
mail. 
17. LEASE TERMINATION. Resident may terminate this lease upon 
thirty days notice in compliance with Paragraph 16. Resident will 
leave the Premises in a clean and safe condition and return all keys 
to Housing Authority. 
Housing Authority will evict Resident for nonpayment of rent, 
nonpayment of other financial obligations due under the terms of the 
lease, making any false or misleading statements concerning 
information required by Housing Authority; criminal activity that 
threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment by other 
residents; drug related criminal activity at or near the Premises; 
repeated failure to comply with any other Resident's obligation under 
the lease; or for other good cause. 
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lor nonpayment o? . ent; and thirty day<> notice in all other CJ:G^: . 
The notice shall state the reasons for termination and inform 
Resident of the tight to a grievance h ^ <; t i n g in accordance with MUD 
regulations if applicable. 
Tenancy shall not terminate until the time for Resident to 
requect a grievance hearing has expired, if Resident is entitled to a 
grievance hearing. If Resident is entitled to a grievance hearing 
and requests such in a timely fdshion, tenancy shall not terminate 
until the grievance process is completed. 
If Resident is evicted for criminal activity, Housing Authority 
shall notify the Post Office to discontinue delivery ot Resident's 
mail to the Premises. 
18. COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES. Should Housing Authority 
incur court costs and/or attorney fees while attempting to resolve 
noncompliance with any term of this lease by Resident, Resident will 
be assessed those costs and/or fees if Housing Authority is 
successful . 
Resident shall compensate Housing Authority in full and hold it 
harmless with respect to any claims made against Housing Authority 
for damages caused by intentional acts of Resident and/or any of 
Resident's family members, household members, guests or visitors. 
19. ABANDONMENT AND DISPOSAt OF ABANDONED PROPERTY. Abandonment 
of the Premises is presumed if Resident has not notified Housing 
Authority of an absence from the Premises of more than seven (7) days, 
Resident fails to pay rent within fifteen (15) days after rent is due, 
and there is no reasonable evidence, other than the presence of 
Resident's personal property, that Resident is occupying the Premises. 
Abandonment is also presumed if Resident's personal property has been 
removed from the premises, if Resident has not notified Housing 
Authority of an absence from the premises, Resident fails to pay rent 
when due, and/or other facts exist which indicate abandonment of the 
P remis es. 
If Housing Authority determines that Premises are abandoned 
pursuant to the above criteria, Housing Authority will post notice of 
abandonment on the Premises for a period of seven (7) days. At the 
same time Housing Authority will also mail a copy of the abandonment 
notice to Resident, and a copy to the individual listed on Resident's 
application as the person to contact in the event of an emergency. At 
the end of the seven (7) day period, if there has been no contact from 
Resident, Housing Authority will take possession of the premises. 
Upon entry of the Premises after repossession, if Housing 
Authority discovers that personal property is left, Housing Authority 
will remove the property and store it at Resident's expense for thirty 
(30) days. Housing Authority will post notice of possession of the 
property and will mail a copy to Resident and a copy to the 
individual listed on Resident's application as the person to contact 
in the event of an emergency. 
6 
p r o p e r t y . If Reside.':! d o s s n o t ^:':empr to recovl-. »:.ie p r op o :• •: y ., ii. 
t h e e n d of the t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) d a y p e r i o d , H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y w i l l d i s p o s e 
o i i t a s it d e ••: in s p r o p e r . 
2 0. L E A S E M O D I F I C A T I O N S A l l m o d i f i c a t i o n s . o f the l e a s e m u s t be 
i c c o m p 1 i s h e d b y w r i t t e n r i d e r to lC3- e x e c u t b y b o 11 
2 1 . C E R T I F I C A T I O N BY R E S I D E N T . In e n t e r i n g i n t o t h i s a g r e e m e n t , 
R e s i d e n t c e r t i f i e s t h a t n e i t h e r R e s i d e n t n o r a n y h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r s 
h a v e c o m m i t t e d f r a u d w i t h a n y f e d e r a l h o u s i n g a s s i s t a n c e p r o g r a m s , 
u n l e s s t h a t f r a u d h a s b e e n f u l l y d i s c l o s e d to H o u s i n g A u t h o r i t y . 
R e s i d e n t a l s o c e r t i f i e s t h a t a l l i n f o r m a t i o n s u b m i t t e d by R e s i d e n t 
or h o u s e h o l d m e m b e r s is t r u e and c o m p l e t e . 
I N W I T N E S S W H E R E O F , t h e p a r t i e s h a v e e x e c u t e d t h i s l e a s e 
a g r e e m e n t on A U G U S T 7, 1 9 9 8 . a t S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h . 
R E S I D E N T ( S ) 
ResicK&ht U 
C o - R e s i d e n t 
H O U S I N G A U T H O R I T Y OF T H E 
C O U N T Y OF S A L T L A K E 
A u t h o r i z e d S i g n a t u r e 
T i t l e 
A l l p e r s o n s w i l l be t r e a t e d f a i r l y and e q u a l l y w i t h o u t regard to r a c e , 
c o l o r , r e l i g i o n , s e x , f a m i l i a l s t a t u s , h a n d i c a p , or n a t i o n a l o r i g i n 
in c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e F a i r H o u s i n g A c t . 
EXHIBIT 2 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
3 - DAY NOTICE OF 
TERMINATION OF LEASE AGREEMENT 
T o : John Thomas Snyder 
1966 South 200 East #A506 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
You must vacate the premises by midnight, 
W E D N E S D A Y , March 1, 2000 . (3 Days) 
This is notice to you to move out of your unit in 3 days, by midnight, Wednesday, March 1, 2000. You 
have been served this notice because you have caused, or allowed to be caused by household occupants, guests or 
visitors to make, serious violations of your Lease Agreement with Housing Authority, as follows: 
On or about February 23, 2000, during a meeting with the apartment manager, Sherrie Rico, and the 
assistant manager, Julie Cayou, you threatened the safety and well-being of Ms. Rico. Your threats and 
intimidation began as you started verbally assaulting Ms. Rico. You repeatedly called Ms. Rico "honey and a 
"fucking bitch." When Ms. Rico requested that you stop your verbal assault, you stood up from your chair an 
moved toward her in a threatening manner. You were yelling insults at Ms. Rico and pointing your finger at her 
as you moved toward her. Your demeanor was belligerent and hostile. When you reached Ms. Rico you moved so 
close to her that she had to pull backward to get away from the finger that you were thrusting in her face. You 
continued to call Ms. Rico a "fucking bitch" and told her that she had "better pull up her fucking pantyhose 
because you were going to go the rounds." Ms. Rico continued to ask you to desist from your threats, but you 
refused. You threatened Ms. Rico again telling her that you "were going to get her" because she cost you $120.00. 
At this point in time, Ms. Rico was nearly falling backward over her chair. You finally stepped backward, opened 
the door and again threatened Ms. Rico when you stated, "I don't have time for you right now, I have a doctor's 
appointment. You fucking bitch, you'd better pull up your fucking panty hose because I'm not done with you yet." 
These threats constitute criminal activity and Ms. Rico has filed a police report as a result of your assault, 
case #2000-35594 with the Salt Lake City police department 
'This assault is not the only time you have engaged in criminal activity in violation of your lease 
agreement You have repeatedly threatened and intimidated Ms. Rico, employees, and other tenants. The Housing 
Authority has previously asked you to stop such activity to no avail. 
Based on these actions by you, you have violated your lease agreement as follows: 
1. Section 11 - Resident's Obligation 
D. - Resident will comply with all terms of this lease, all rules and regulations posted by 
Housing. Authority in its main office, and all applicable provisions of building and housing codes 
affecting health and safety. 
2. Section 11 - Resident's Obligation 
R - Resident will be held directly responsible for the actions of Resident, household members, 
guests and visitors. 
3. Section 11 - Resident's Obligation 
I. - Resident and household members, guests and visitors will act in a manner so as not to disturb 
any neighbors peaceful enjoyment of his/her accommodation and refrain from all illegal or 
Criminal activity on or near the Premises. Such illegal activity includes, but is not limited to, the 
Use or sale of drugs by the Resident, household members, guests or visitors. 
The provisions of this grievance procedure arc not applicable to any grievance concerning an eviction or 
termination of tenancy based upon a tenant's creation or maintenance of the treat to the health or safety of other 
tenants or HA employees. The HA may immediately commence an eviction action in accordance with State Law 
based on any of the grounds stated in tliis section. 
Utah law gives you 3 days to vacate the premises. U.C.A> S78-36-3(l) and 24 C.F.R. S966.4(I)(5). If you do not 
vacate the premises, you will be breaking Utah law and a complaint to evict you will be filed with Third District 
Court, U.S.A. S78-36-1, et.seq. 
UTAH LAW 
Utah state law says if you are found by the court to be guilty of unlawful detainer, the judge can order you 
to pay Housing Authority for damages, which may include three times (1) the amount of rent for the time you 
remain in the unit after this notice expires; (2) the cost of repairs of tenant-caused damage to the unit; and (3) any 
damages caused by forcible entry, U.C.A. S78-36-10. If you do not win in court, your Lease Agreement with 
Housing Authority gives the judge authority to order you to pay Housing Authority for attorney's fees and court 
costs they have spent to evict you. Utah state law, U.C.A. S15-1-4, allows Housing Authority to charge you legal 
interest at the rate the Federal Post Judgment Rate plus 2% on the judgement amount. 
FEDERAL LAW 
Federal Housing Authority regulations give you the following rights: 
4. You have the right to make any reply you wish to this notice, 24 C.F.R. S966.4(l); 
5. You have the right to talk to and have an attorney represent you in any court proceeding, 24 
C.F.R. S966.53(c). If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be able to get one with Utah Legal 
Services, Inc. at 328-889 L 
6. You have the right to ask your Housing Authority Representative to show you all documents in 
your Housing Authority file wich relate to this eviction. If you ask, copies of these documents 
can be made for you for a charge. 24 C.F.R. S966.4(ra). 
Because you are being evicted for criminal and/or drug-related activity on or near the premises, 
the following shall apply to you, 24 CFR S966.4(l)(4): 
1. You are not entitled to a grievance proceeding concerning the issues of this notice, 
24 C.F.R. S966.4(l)(3)(v)(A). 
2. Under Utah state law, if you do not vacate the premises as requested, a lawsuit will be filed 
against you in Third District Court. You will have the opportunity for a hearing before the court. 
24 C.F.R. S966.4(l)(3)(v)(B). 
3. HUD has issued a determination which finds Utah judicial eviction proceedings meet the due 
process guidelines as defined in HUD regulations. 24 C.F.R. S966.4(l)(3)(v)(B). A copy of this 
determination may be obtained from counsel for Housing Authority upon request. 
4. When Housing Authority gets an order from the court to evict you, they will notify the post office 
that you no longer live on the premises. (24 C.F.R. S966.4(5)(ii). 
Dated: •a-3S--0O 
Authorized representative of Housing Authority of 
the County of Salt Lake 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused to be served, pursuant to 24 CFR S966.4(k), 24 CFR 
S247.4(b) and U.C.A. S78-36-5 (1987), the above Notice of Termination and Notice 
to Vacate, by the method^ctiecked beltow. Notice was ^ served on the J2L day _ 
/^fi , 2000, upon U^Anf T £ O > T 7 / M <Ty , ^d&C AT 3- 3 7 P."L 
(1) by sending a copy through registered or certified mail addressed to 
the tenant at his place of residence; and 
X (2) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally; or 
(3) if the tenant is absent from his place of residence or from his 
usual place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable 
age and discretion at either place and mailing a copy to the tenant 
at the address of his place of residence or place of business; or 
(4) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found at the 
place of residence, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place 
on the leased property. Service upon a subtenant may be made in the 
same manner. 
DATED this 2S - / day of AzT£ 2000. 
(OtAAJ^ 
Server's s ignature 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
:SS. 
ACKNOWLEDGED AND SWORN TO before me this 
2000. 
i^^Hv. day of Fe>b 
Notary Public 
Resides In:<^V?c 
My Commission Expires: 
"7-3=7 - r ^ . 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
H. K!M LADOO'JS 
• • • / »••"•" ' • • , t , r - • » ' " -> 
J u M 7 ?Q<:?. 
STATS OF UTAH 
Z P ZL-d 4 a a 4d^ 
US
 Postal^ . 
Rer • Serv,ce 
EXHIBIT 3 
loi . AJl'jl? GENERAL 0ITEN5E HARDCCPY GO Bh 2 0 0 0 - 3 5 5 9 4 
F i n , M a r . 24 2 00 0 1 3 9 9 - 0 ASLT-THREATS FREE TEX 
** END OP KAkiJOOPY REPORT ** 
Pa jo. 7 SALT LAKH POLICE DEPARTMENT 
F:.>i : AJ^SI?. GENERAL OFFENCE HARDCCPY GO SL 2000-35594 
Fri, KCJU. 24 2000 1399 - 0 A3LT-THREATS FREE TEX 
frolafcod teyt paqo(g) 
Document: INITIAL R/O PIELD 
Author; 25V - 3impaon, Bill 
Relauod da*-e/Liir«2: Feb-24-00 11^3 
MRS RICO WORKS TOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY HOUSING AUTHORITY, AND IS TiY£ 
RESIHEMT MANAGER OF A ^OW INCOME HOUSING APARTMFNT A? 19 £6 SO 2CO E. MRS 
RTCO CALLED TO REPORT THE THREATS MADE TO HER BY ONE OF THE RESIDENCE 
PERSONS, THE SUSPECT IS A JOHN TOM SNYDER, 7-26-31, WHO LIVES IN APT A SCS 
AT THE APARTMENT HOUSING. 
MRS RICO SAID TilAT MR SNYDER CAME INTO H£R OFFICE YESTERDAY MORNING 
AROUNN 10:30 AM, AND STARTED SWEARING AT HER CALLING HER A F—IHG BITCH, 
WERE MRS RrCO WORDS, AND STATING FOR HER TO PULL UP HER PANTY HOSE BECAUS3 
HK WASN'T THROUGH WI1H HER AND THAT HE WOULD GET HER AND CAUSE BODILY HARM. 
MRS RICO STATES THAT THIS MAN HAS HARASSED THE OTHER RESIDENTS AND HAS 
HEJSN A COMPLETE NUISANCE TO HER AND THE OTHER PEOPLE THAT RESIDE HERE. MRS 
RICO SAID THAT A MR FRANK NATION WHO LIVES AT THE APARTMENT HCSE HAS BEEN 
HARASSED KVERY DAY BY MR SNYDER, MRS RICO WOULD LIKE SOMETHING DONE ABOUT 
THIS PROBLEM, IF NEED BE SHE WOULD SIGH A COMFLAINT AGAINST HIM- MRS RICO 
SAYS THAT THERE MIGHT BE A MENTAL PROBLEM WITH THIS MAN. 
Continued .. . 
P a g - , 1 £ALT J,*\KE FC7.TCT OFPARTMENT 
F o r ; A » : * m 2 GENERAL OFFENSE HARDCOFY 0 0 SL 2000-355<M 
F r i , K ? r . 24 2 0 0 0 1399 - 0 A£LT-THREATS FREE TEX 
flannra^ O f f e n c e I i n f o r m a t i o n 
Operational status : OPEN 
Reported on Fob-24-2000 (Thu,) 1124 
Oouwrr t-d on Fab-23-2000 (Wed.) 1030 
Kuport submitted by 25V - Simpson, Bill 
Or-j unit : Telephonic 
Located at 1966 S 200 E 
Municipality : Salt Lake City Proper Oounty ; Cncl Diofc £ 
District : 1 Heat : 115 Grid : LIW 
OffJ?JIQUJ2 (Cotopleted/Abt*nvpted) _ 
Offense- ;~ #1 1399 - 0 ASLT-THREATS FREE TEXT - COMPLETED 
Location : Apartment 
Weapon typo : Poreonal Weapons / Physical 
ConQiral Offense Tnformafcion (cont'd) 
Diaa : None {no hiao) 
Varoily violence r NO 
IER. Clearance status ; Not Applicable 
£olafcad Porpon(jg) 
Cava Specific i Victim - 01 RICO, SHERKIK WIK 
CntiCAoian/Whi te FEMALE 
Boxn on Aug-08-19$6 
R*±Sidiu«J at 43 55 W LOSES DRIVE , WEST VALLEY 84120-
Phono Number G 
Home » (HOI) 969-0175 Business : (601)284-4422 
Reference Nastar Kama Index 
Rl-CO, SHERRIE UNK 
Caucasian/Whit* FEMALE Born on Aug-08-195G 
Linkage factors 
Resident status : Resident 
Cone mued 
CEASE AND DESIST 
DATE / / 
TO-
FROM... 
S JOJECT: Cease and Desist Re 
"""he Respondent o f this letter, , is hereby given notice that 
(Respondent] 
as cr _ / j , respondent's couroo of conduct tcwarc 
is causing _ , tho Author of this 
(Authors Name) (Author's Namej 
letter to suffor emotional distress. 
If above named Respondert continues tc n\sir,tST, a visual or physical proximity, o r 
conveys verbal or written communication to
 m it will be 
(Author's Name) 
considered stalking and Is ir. violation of Salt Lake City Cede 11 05 C60(Crimes of 
Staking). 
CcmmjniCcition regarding: property, custody, or divece, deemed accessary between 
tho parties must fas through respective attorney's Thers should be no otier 






U'V Oi::>AMT t^NI (.» h'-X r-'\'G AND 'JfKiAN OfVHOPM*' NT 
F>il .lUUJMC' 
P'.-.-t—iljvr 3, 19 91 
H o n o r a b l e Norman H. B a n g e r t e r 
'*';oveinnx• oL Utah 
:;.iM, h a k e C i t y , Utah el'llM 
J.war fy<:ivonif>r B-.wigei: t o r i 
I «"im happy to advice you of a new public housing "duo 
pi .oe^n octermination" for the State of Utah. 
Under i-'ederal law, if the Secretary of the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) determines that law of the 
•]{)i:ir,dicLion roquir.es a pie-eviction court hearing with i h'> 
ba«io "olt^onts of due process - (42 U.S.C. 1437d(k), as a^ndod 
in .ly9Q), a public housing agency (PUA) is not required to 
];j.viVM.!f.j an administrative grievance hearing before ovi.ct.iaq a 
piiV*.i>'; h«...isi rig tenant for: 
* . Any criminal activity that threatens tho health, 
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the promises; 
of other tenants or employees of tho PHA; or 
A. r-.riy drug-related criminal activity on or near sucih 
proiai i:\ca . 
in accordance with the law, HUD has recently issued a 
rtgr.latioA which revises HUD'a definition of due process 
elements at 24 CPR 966.53(c) (5G Federal Register 5.1560, 
October H , 1.991) . 
I'un^ .'irit to the revised regulation, HUD has determined that 
tho Utah low governing eviction by an action for unlawful 
detainer in tin* Utah district or circuit court requires that tho 
tenant h.iv». the opportunity for a pre-eviction hearing in court 
.ontainiiivi ho elements of due process or. defined in 24 CCK 
!*£6. 53(c) "C the KUO regulations. The bAsie of thi« 
determination >•' xplained in the legal analysis enclosed with 
t h ) ?.: l e t t e r . 
Jn a cco rdance with Hu*)';\ de t e rmina t ion , a PHA. o p e r a t i n g 
p u b l i c h o u s i n g in the S t a t e of Utah may exc lude from i t s 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g r i evance procedure any g r i evance concerning an 
e v i c t i o n o r torn>ination *.l tenancy which i nvo lve s any c r i m i n a l 
o o t i v l t y t h a t t h r e a t e n s t he h e a l t h , s a f e t y , o r r i g h t t o peaceful 
e n j o y n e n t of t h e premise*; of oth»r t e n a n t s o r employees of tho 
PHA, o r any d r u g - r e l a t e d er.ij«ina> a c t i v i t y on or near such 
proa* j r>eB • 
2 
When a PliA ovictfl *•;• ?nant pursuant to a Utah unlawful 
detainer action in tHv.h district oc circuit court for the 
rsasone; aet forth above, t.he r.HA 5.LS not required to afford tho 
tenant the opportunity for an nrtminJstrativc hearing on the 
ovvcrtion under 24 CFR Part 966/ and may evict a public housing 
Hunt pursuant to a decision in such judicial action. 
Very sincerely yourA, 
enclosure 
1HJD OUR PROCESS DETEkMI NATION 
for tho 
S'lATE OF UTAH 
OF CONTENTS 
I » Jurisdiction 
II. Elements of Due Process 
Jfl• Overview of Utah Eviction Procedures 
IV. htiiiyijis o£ Utah Eviction Procedures for 
I *^\i of the Regulatoiy Due Process Elements 
V . ' o.illusion 
ANALYSIS 
T. Jurisdiction; Utah 
X1. RiomfintS_of Due Process 
Section 6(k) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 
u»s.r, l437d(k), as amend* • I by section 503(a) of the National 
Affordable Housing Act OL 1990, Pub. L. 101-025, approved 
November 20, 1990), provider, Uiat: 
For any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of 
tenancy that involves any criminal activity that threatens 
Uie health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the 
premises of other tenants or employees of the public housing 
agency or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such 
promises, the agency way . « . exclude from its grievance 
procedure any such grievance, in any jurisdiction which 
requires that prior to eviction, a tenant be given a hearing 
in court which the Secretary determines provides the basic 
elements of due process . . • . 
The statutory phrase "elements of due process** is defined by 
l\)U at ?4 CFR S 966,53(c) is: 
. • * an evict-ion action or a termination of tenancy in a 
Sin to or local court in which the following procedural 
safoguards are required: 
(1) Adequate notice to the tenant of th^ grounds for 
laminating the trnar.cy and for eviction* 
(2) Hii/ht of the tenant to be ref rented by counsel; 
(3) Opportunity for the tenant to refute the evidence 
presented by the PRA including the right to confront 
and croGs-examine witnesses and to present any 
affirmative legal or equitable defense whicn the tenant 
may have; and 
(4) A decision on the merits. 
HUD's determination that a State's eviction pieced" res 
batisly this regulatory definition is called a "due precoma 
deter mi nation". 
The present due process determination is based upon HUD's 
analysis of the laws of the State of Utah to determine if 
eviction procedures for unlawful detainer under those laws 
require a hearing which comports with all of the regulatory 
•elements of due process", as defined in § 9f>6.53(c). 
HUD finds that the requirements of Utah law governing an 
action for eviction in district or circuit court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 70-36-1 to 12.6 (1989 and 1990 Supp.) include all of the 
elements of basic due process, as defined in 24 CFR § 966.53(c). 
This conclusion is based upon requirements contained in the Utrih 
code, case law and court rules.1 
ill- Overview of Utah Evict ion Procedures 
The eviction procedures for unlawful detainer in UUih are 
stated at Utah Code Title 78, Chapter 36 (sections 78-36-3 to 
70-36-12.6). An unlawful detainer action under this r.rtlfc may be 
bjought in district court or circuit court. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-4; S 78-4^7 (1989 and 1990 Supp.). Except as otherwise 
provided in the unlawful detainer statute, such cases aro 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. U.R.C.P. 1(a); 
U.R.C.P. 81(a). 
A tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer in the circumstances 
specified in Utah Code Ann. S 78-36-3 (1989), Unlawful detainer 
lies where the tenant holds over after expiration of the term. 
3This due process deteraii nation does not apply where 
plaintiff obtains possession by filing a possession bond pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8,5. HUD expresses no opinion as to 
whether the Utah law requires a pre-eviction hearing which meets 
thtt requirements of 24 CFR 966.53(c) if the plaintiff obtaino 
possession by filing a possession bond. 
2 
Utah Duo Process DetoriAi nation 
df.'iauittf in payment of rent, or commits a violation of the loase. 
JiJ-
An action for unlawful detainer is al^o governed by the Utah 
Constitution* Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
provides! MNo person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property/ without due process of law.* The Utah Supremo Court 
haa hold that because this clause is substantially similar to the 
tilth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
are highly persuasive as to its interpretation. Vail 
Convalescent and Care Institutifill v» Industrial Commission of. 
Vl*hi 6*49" P.2d 33 (Utah 1982). 
TV, Analysis of Utah Eviction Procedures for Each of the 
Hegulatory Due Process Elements 
The following discussion will consider separately each 
element of the regulatory due process definition and demonstrate 
that each element is satisfied in the action for unlawful 
detainer in Utah district and circuit court under Utah law. 
A
- Adequate notice to the tenant of tj;e_qrounds for 
terminating the tenancy and for eviction (24 CPR 
S 36~6.S3(cllU~~ 
The* plaintiff may ccrarence a civil action, including an 
action for unlawful detainer, either by service of the summons on 
the defendant or by filing the complaint with the court. 
U.R.CP. 3(a). 
Under Utah law, the suitimcns in a civil action for unlawful 
detainer notifies the defendant of the plaintiff's lawsuit and 
c3aim for possession and informs the defendant of the time by 
which the defendant is required to answer the complaint, 
U»R,C,P. 4(c) j Utah Code Ann. S 78-36-8 (1989), In an action for 
unlawful detainer, procedures for service of the summons are 
qencrally the same as "in othex [civil] cases," .Id. A summons 
must be served on the defendant by personal service, publication 
or mall. U*R*C,P. 4; Utah Code Ann, S 78-36-8 (1939), 
The summons may be served together with the complaint. 
Howeverr Utah does nor require that the ccmplaint be served with 
the amumona. U.R.C.P. 3(b); U.R«C.?. 4(c). If the summons is 
served before the complaint or by publication, the summons must 
state the relief demanded. Id. When service is by publication, 
the summons must describe the subject matter involved in the 
action. U,H,C,P. 4(c). In an unlawful detainer action, the 
3 
Utah Duo FroccuB Del emanation 
defendant muot appear and defend the action not less than three 
dayi3 (dnd not more than twenty days) from service of the summons • 
Utah Code Ann. 5 78-36-8 (1989). 
Tho complaint gives notice of the facts which arc grounds 
for termination and eviction. U.R.C.P. 8(a)(1); Utah Code Ann. 
5 78-36-8 (1989). Under tho general civil pleading rules, the 
complaint must contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief which [the plaintiff J deems 
hiiusolf entitled," U.R.C.P. 8(a). Furthermore, tho unlawful 
detainer statute provides that the complaint must set forth tho 
"J act a on which [the plaintiff] seeks to recover." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-8 (1909). 
Under Utah law, the defendant in an unlawful detainer action 
wust bo given notice of the complaint (and therefore of the 
qrounds for eviction stated in the complaint) either (i) by 
soivlcc of the complaint on the defendant (with or subsequent to 
tfervictf of tho summons), or (2) by opportunity to examine the 
complaint, on file with the court. The Utah rules provide that 
whon tho complaint is filed by the plaintiff, a copy is deposited 
with the court "lor the benefit of the defendants not otherwise 
carved with ouch copy At the timo of the service of the summons." 
M.R.CtV 3(b), If the complaint has not been tiled with the court 
or served on the defendant, the defendant may demand a copy of 
the complaint from the plaintiff. The time for the defendant to 
respond to the complaint (a minimum of three days in an unlawful. 
detainer) runs ftoiu the date a copy of tho complaint is served on 
the defendant- IKR.C.P. 3(b). 
In addition to the summons and complaint., the notice to quit 
also affords notice of the plaintiff's claim for repossession of 
tho premises. Except for an unlawful detainer after expiration 
of a • specified lease termr the plaintiff may not maintain the 
unlawful detainer action unless the plaintiff has served a notice 
to quit. Utah Code Ann. $ 78-36-3(1) (1989). Procedures for 
service of the notice to quit are specified in the Code. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-36-6 (1989). 
Tho Utah Supreme Court has also held that due process of law 
i\s provided for in the Utah Constitution requires that a party be 
served with process which is calculated to qive notice. Naisbitt 
v. Uerrick, 76 Utah 575, 290 P. 950 (1930)/ 
From the foregoing, HUD has determined that Utah law 
requires adequate notice to the tenant of the grounds for 
eviction. 
4 
Utah Due Piceecs DeterwmatLon 
B- Right to be represented by counsel (24 CFR 
While the right Lo be represented by nn attorney is nowhere 
ntntod explicitly,, the existence of thio right icay bo inferred 
frum references throughout the Utah Rules of Civil procedure, 
i'or example, U.R.C.P* 5(b)(1) requires that whenever service is 
jaade upon a party represented by an attorney, the service must be 
iiiada upon the attorney unless the court orders otherwise. 
The right to representation by counsel is also provided by 
the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const. 
ntl. T, fr 7. 
Thus, HUD concludes that Utah law gives a tenant in an 
unlawful detainer action the right to be ropiesented by counsel, 
C« Opportunity for the tenant to refute the evidence 
presented by the FHA including the_rioht to confront 
fr.nd cross-examine witnesses (24. C?R_ $ 966.53(c) (.¥)? 
In Utah courts " . . . [a]li evidence shall be admitted which 
is admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or otht^ r rules 
adopted by the [Utah] Supreme Court.* U.R.C-P. 43(A). 
Kxcept in limited circumstances specified in the Utah rules 
or statutes (such as the use of depositions and interrogatories 
At trial pursuant to U.R.C.P. 32 and 33), the testimony of 
witnesses must be taken orally in open court. U.R.C.P. 43(a), A 
deposition may only be used at trial, and only in specified 
narrow circumstances, against a person who bad opportunity to be 
represented at taking of the deposition. U.R.C.P. 32(a). 
Provisions which allow the use of a deposition at txial in 
"exceptional circumstancesM note "the importance of presenting 
the testimony of witnesses orally in open court." U.R.C.P, 
32(a)(3)(H). 
In general# a witness (other than an expert witness) must 
have personal knowledge of the matter on which the witness is 
called to testify. IKR.E. 602. Credibility of a witness may be 
attacked by any party, U.R.E. 607. Credibility of the witmiss 
may bo refuted by evidence concerning the witness's character or 
conduct. U«R.3. 608; U.R.fc. b09. Bias, prejudice or any motive 
to misrepresent mav » shown to impeach the witness, either by 
exainlnation of th *ess or by evidence otherwise adduced. 
U.R.E, 600(c). 
J 
Utah Duo Pjocesa Determination 
A party nay interrogate witnesses, including cross-
examination on matters affecting credibility cf the witness. 
U.R.E. 611(b). The evidence rules permit, a party to call a 
hostile witness, an adverse party or a witness identified with an 
adverse party, and interrogate the witness by leading questions. 
U.K.E. 611(c). A party may eross-exanine an adverse party upon 
ihe subject mattor of his examination in chief. U.R.E. 611(b), 
The court's control over the mode and order for interrogation of 
witnesses is Intended to "make the interrogation and presentation 
effective for the ascertainment of the truth." U.R.E. 611(a)(1). 
Thus the defendant in an unlawful detainer action, aa 3n or.hor 
civil actions, has the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, subject to the normal judicial control over conduct of 
the trial, 
The Utah statutes and civil rules do not restrict tho right 
of a defendant, including a defendant threatened with eviction in 
on action for unlawful detainer, to impeach or contradict tho 
plaintiff'HI evidence by argument, evidence or cross-examination, 
A tenant has the right to present evidence and witnesses to 
refute the case presented by the plaintiff, subject to reasonable 
judicial control over the "mode and order* for presentation of 
witnesses. See U.R.E. 611(a). Relevant evidence way only he 
excluded if its probative value is outweighed on grounds r>f 
prejudice, confusion or waste of time. U.K.K. 4C3- Tno tenant 
may use a subpoena to obtain the attendance of witnesses or 
production of documentary evidence at the trial- U.K.C.P. 45. 
Tho right to confront and cress-examine witnesses is also 
yuaranteed by the due process clause of the Utah Constitutjon, 
Utah Const, art. I, S 7, 
Thus, in Utah courts, tho tenant has the opportunity to 
refute the evidence presented by the PHA including the right to 
confront «nd cross-examine witnesses. 
D» Opportunity to present any affirmative J egal or 
equitable defense which the tenant may hayg. (JM CPR 
Li6j.53(c)(3)) 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide for one form of 
action, known as a •'civil action*" U«K»C*P. 2. The ruleo 
abolish the distinction between acx-ions at law and suits at 
equity. O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R. Co. , 38 U. 475, 114 
P. 127 (1911), Further, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 2, the defendant 
raay raise both legal and equitable defenses > Williamson v._ 
Wanle^r 545 P. 2d 1145 (1976)-
6 
Utah Due Process Determination 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8(b) and 8(c) require the 
deforciant to state his defenses to each claim asserted* In 
adult .ion, when responding to the complaint/ the defendant must 
set for/th all of his affinaative defenses, whether equitable or 
logal in nature* Utah law does not restrict the right of the 
defendant to raise any available defense to the plaintiff's claim 
to possession of the property, including any of the specific 
"affit-matJve defenses" specified in tho rules. 
From the above, HUD has concluded that Utah law provides the 
tenant with the opportunity to present any legal or equitable 
defense. 
E- A decision on tho merits (24 CFR,S 966.53{$11 111 
Tho Utah unlawful detainer statute specifically provides 
that except upon default a judgment must be entered "upon the 
merits." Utah Code Ann. S 78-36-10(1) (1939)• 
The structure and procedural incidents of a trial under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules of Evidence arc 
designed to the end that a trial shall lead to a decision on the 
liierits, btUted on the evidence presented bearing on tho legal and 
factual issues fraised by tho complaint and defenses presented. A 
final judgment muut grant ''the relief to which t.he party in whose 
favor it is rendered is entitled." U,R.C.P. 54(c)(1). The Utah 
Civil RUIOB are construed "to secure the just . . . determination 
ox every action.- U.R.C*P. 1(a). Similarly, the Utah Rules of 
Evidence are construed "to the end that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined*" U.R.E. 102. 
The judgment is entered upon the verdict of the jury or 
decision of the court. U.R.CP. 58A; See U.R.C*P. 47 to S2. In 
a jury trial, the jurors are sworn to "try the matter in issue" 
and to render a true verdict "according to the evidence and the 
iiu> trueLiotiu of the court." U.R.C.P« 47(h). At the request of 
any party, the court is required to instruct the juxy a& to the 
applicable law* U.R.C.P. 51. In a bench trial, the court timet, 
make findings of fact and conclusions of law. U.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, whether the 
decision Is by the judge or the jury, the decision must be made 
on the merjtu of the law and facte as presented to the court. A 
decision on the merits is also guaranteed by the due process 
clauso of the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. 1, § 7, 
7 
Utah Due Process Determina t ion 
V. Con^luai.pn 
Utah law governing the eviction procedures for unlawful 
detainer in UK> district or circuit court requires that the 
tenant have the opportunity for a pro-eviction hearing in court 
vhich provides the basic oicments of due proceu3 AS defined in 24 
CFR S 966.53(c) ot the mm regulations. 
By virtue of this due process determination under section 
6(k) of r.ho U.S. Housing Act of 1937, a PHA in lUah nay evict a 
public housing tenant pursuant to a district or circuit court 
decision in an eviction proceeding for any grievance involving 
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right 
xo peaceful enjoyment of the premises of other tenants or 
ejKpjoyeoc of the public housing agency or any drug-related 
criminal activity on or near such premises, and is not required 
to first afford the tenant the opportunity for an administrative 
hearing on the eviction. 
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EXHIBIT 5 
unauthorized changes or additions have been made. 
U. Waterbeds are permitted on ground floor bedrooms only. 
V. Residents shall not install or change locks without the 
written permission of Management. 
W. Resident is responsible for the repair of all breakage of 
window glass, doors and screens on the premises. 
X. Resident shall not drive or park on lawn or sidewalks for any 
purpose. 
Y. No major repairs requiring that a vehicle remain in an 
inoperable condition for longer than 24 hours shall be 
permitted within the complex. The discharge of vehicle fluids 
including hydraulic fluids or anti-freeze within the complex 
shall be prohibited. 
Z. Maintenance should immediately be notified of inoperable smoke 
detectors." Removal of batteries from smoke detectors is 




A. "Grievance" shall mean any dispute which a tenant may 
have with respect to the Housing Authority of the County 
of Salt Lake (hereinafter referred to as the HA) action 
or failure to act in accordance with the individual tenant's 
lease of HA regulations which adversely affect the individual 
tenant's rights, duties, welfare, or status. 
B. "Complainant" shall mean any tenant whose grievance is 
presented to the HA or in accordance with this procedure. 
C. "Hearing Officer" shall mean a person appointed in accordance 
with Section C (2) of this Procedure to hear grievances and 
render a decision with respect thereto. 
D. "Tenant" shall mean any lessee or the remaining head of 
the household of any tenant family residing in housing 
accommodations covered by this Procedure. 
DISCUSSION OF GRIEVANCE 
A. Any grievance shall be personally presented, either 
orally or in writing, to the Area Manager or the Director 
of Housing so that the grievance may be discussed 
informally and settled without an informal hearing. 
B. The grievance must be presented by the complainant or his 
representative within a reasonable time, not in excess of 
10 days of the HA action or failure to act which is the 
basis of the grievance. 
C. The HA shall schedule the informal discussion as promptly 
as possible; time and place reasonably convenient to the 
complainant, and shall inform the complainant thereof. 
D. A summary of the discussion, dated and signed by the 
Director Of Housing shall be prepared within a reasonable 
time, not in excess of five working days of the informal 
discussion. One copy shall be given to the tenant and one 
retained in the HA's tenant file. The summary shall 
specify the nature of the complaint and the specific 
reasons therefore/ and shall specify the right of the 
complainant to an informal hearing before the Executive 
Director and the procedure by which such a hearing may be 
obtained in such case as the complainant is not satisfied 
with the disposition of the matter by the HA. 
PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN A FORMAL HEARING 
Request a Hearing 
If the complainant is dissatisfied with the proposed 
disposition of his complaint, as stated in the Director of 
Housing or other HA official's statement, he may submit a 
written request for a hearing to the HA within a reasonable 
time, not in excess of 10 days of the date of the Director of 
Housing's summary. The written request shall specify: 
1. The reasons for the grievance; and 
2. The action of relief sought. 
B. Hearing Officer 
A hearing officer, as approved by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development shall be appointed to preside over the 
formal hearing proceedings. 
C. Failure to Request a Formal Hearing 
If the complainant does not request a formal hearing in 
writing and within ten days of the Director of Housing's 
summary, then the HA's disposition of grievance as summarized 
by the Director of Housing shall become final. Failure to 
request a hearing shall not constitute a waiver by the 
complainant of his rights to contest the HA's action in an 
appropriate judicial proceeding. 
D. Hearing Prerequisite 
All grievances shall be personally presented either orally or 
in writing pursuant tot he informal procedure prescribed in 
section B as a condition precedent to a formal hearing. 
E, Escrow Deposit 
Before a hearing or an informal discussion is scheduled in any 
grievance involving the amount of rent which the HA claims is 
due, the complainant shall pay to the HA an amount equal to 
the amount of the rent due and payable as of the first of the 
month preceding the month in which the act or failure to act 
took place. The complainant shall thereafter deposit the same 
amount of the monthly rent in an escrow account monthly until 
the complaint is resolved by decision of the hearing officer. 
These requirements may be waived by the HA in extenuating 
circumstances. Unless so waived, the failure to make such 
payments shall result in a termination of the grievance 
procedure. 
Scheduling of Hearings 
A hearing shall be scheduled by the hearing officer or hearing 
panel promptly for a time and place reasonably convenient to 
both complainant and the HA. A written notification specifying 
the time, place and the procedures governing the hearing shall 
be delivered to the complainant and the appropriate HA 
official. 
PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE FORMAL HEARING 
The hearing shall be held before a hearing officer. 
The complainant shall be afforded a fair hearing providing the 
basic safeguards of due process which shall include: 
1. The opportunity to examine before the hearing and, 
at the expense of the complainant, to copy all 
documents, records and regulations of the HA that 
are relevant to the hearing. Any document not so 
made available after request therefore by the 
complainant may not be relied on the HA at the 
hearing. 
2. The right to be represented by counsel or other 
person chosen as his or her representative; 
3. The right to a private hearing unless the 
complainant requests a public hearing, but this 
shall not be construed to limit the attendance of 
persons with a valid interest in the proceedings. 
4. The right to present evidence and arguments in 
support of his or her complaint, or controvert 
evidence relied on the PHA, and to confront and 
cross-examine all witnesses on whose testimony or 
information the PHA relies; and 
5. A decision based solely and exclusively upon the 
facts presented at the hearing. 
If the complainant or the HA fails to appear at scheduled 
hearing, the hearing officer may make a determination that the 
party has waived his right to a hearing. Both the complainant 
and the PHA shall be notified of the determination by the 
hearing officer or hearing panel. 
D. The hearing shall be conducted by the hearing officer and oral 
or documentary evidence pertinent to the facts and issues 
raised by the complaint may be received without regard to 
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to 
judicial proceedings. The hearing officer shall require the 
HA# the complainant, counsel and other participants or 
spectators to conduct themselves in an orderly fashion. 
Failure to comply with the directions of the hearing officer 
to obtain order may result in exclusion from the proceedings. 
E. The complainant or the PHA may arrange, in advance and at the 
expense of the party making the arrangement, for a transcript 
of the hearing. Any interested party may purchase a copy of 
such transcript. 
5. DECISION OF THE HEARING OFFICER 
A. The decision of the hearing officer shall be based solely 
and exclusively upon evidence presented at the hearing 
and upon applicable HA and HUD regulations and State and 
Federal Law. 
B. If both parties agree to prepare a proposed decision to 
the hearing panel, each party shall submit same to the 
hearing panel for its consideration. 
C. The hearing officer shall prepare a written decision, 
together with the reasons therefore, within a reasonable 
time after the hearing. A copy of the decision shall be 
sent to the complainant and the HA. The HA shall retain 
a copy of the decision in the tenant's folder. A copy of 
such decision, with all names and identifying references 
deleted, shall also be maintained on file by the HA and 
made available for inspection by a prospective 
complainant, his representative, or hearing officer. 
D. The decision of the hearing officer shall be binding on 
the Ha and the complainant. The HA shall take all actions 
necessary to carry out the decision unless the HA Board 
of Commissioners determines within a reasonable time (not 
in excess of 3 0 days of the date of the hearing officer's 
decision) and promptly notifies the complainant of its 
determination that: 
1. The grievance does not concern HA action or 
failure to act in accordance with or involving 
the complainant's lease on PHA regulations, 
which adversely affect the complainant's 
rights, duties, welfare or status; or 
2. The decision of the hearing officer is 
contrary to applicable Federal, State, or 
local law, HUD regulations or requirements of 
the annual contributions contract between HUD 
and the PHA. 
6. PHA EVICTION ACTIONS 
If a tenant has requested a formal hearing in accordance with 
Section C on a complaint involving HA notice of termination of the 
tenancy and the hearing officer upholds the HA's action to 
terminate the tenancy, the HA shall not commence an eviction action 
in a State or local court until it has served a notice to vacate on 
the tenant, and in no event shall the notice to vacate be issued 
prior to the decision of the hearing officer having been mailed or 
delivered to the complainant. Such notice to vacate must be in 
writing and specify that if the tenant fails to quit the premises 
within the applicable statutory period, or on the termination date 
stated in the notice of termination, whichever is later, 
appropriate action will be brought against him and he may be 
required to pay court costs and attorney fees. 
7* INAPPLICABILITY OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 
The provisions of this grievance procedure are not applicable to 
any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy 
based upon a tenant's creation or maintenance of the threat to the 
health or safety of other tenants or HA employees. The HA may 
immediately commence an eviction action in accordance with State 
Law based on any of the grounds stated in this section. 
SUCTION XIV 
LOCALLY OWNED HOUSING PROGRAM 
All preceeding policies, rules and regulations as stated in Section 
I - XIV of the Admission and Continued Occupancy Schedule shall be 
applicable to applicants and residents of locally owned housing 
with the following exceptions: 
TENANT RENT 
Tenant Rent will be determined as the greater of 3 0% of 
Monthly Adjusted Income as defined in Section I or the minimum 
rent which will be established from time to time by the 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




JOHN THOMAS SNYDER, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 000201956 
BEFORE: 
Trial 
Electronically Recorded on 
May 8, 2000 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: Kiroberly D. Washburn 
D'ELIA & LEHMER 
7620 Royal St. E 
Box 626 
Park City, UT 84060 
Telephone: (435)645-7470 
For the Defendant: James Harris 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East Fifth South Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-3204 
Telephone: (801)328-9531 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 
-5-
1 and say, "Here's the problem and here's what we need to do"? 
2 MR. HARRIS: Well, your Honor— 
3 THE COURT: I mean I'm a little confused why the 
4 Supreme Court wants to look over ray shoulder on a scheduling of 
5 an unlawful detainer. Maybe I'm just not as sensitive to the 
6 great movements of the law as I should be. 
7 MR. HARRIS: No, I'm not suggesting that, your Honor. 
8 Your Honor though, however, dismissed sua sponte a motion to 
9 dismiss on behalf of my client. 
10 THE COURT: Right. 
11 MR. HARRIS: And prior to that being fully briefed and 
12 prior to that being submitted to your Honor, and it was — it 
13 was clear to us that opposing counsel wasn't going to work with 
14 us on this issue. It's clear to us that something needed to be 
15 done in order to get this trial stayed so that we could resolve 
16 these matters. 
17 THE COURT: All right, so the Supreme Court said no. 
18 Why should I say yes? 
19 MR. HARRIS: In the interest of due process, your 
20 Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Well, why didn't the Supreme Court not see 
22 it that way? 
23 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, they didn't offer any type of 
24 reasoning behind their decision to dismiss it, so I can't tell 
25 you— 
- 3 -
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on May 8, 2000) 
3 THE COURT: Let's call the Housing Authority against 
4 John Snyder. Ms. Washburn, you get to start. 
5 MS. WASHBURN: Good afternoon, your Honor, Kimberly 
6 Washburn here for the Housing Authority of Salt Lake County, 
7 and with me I've got Ms. Sherri Rico and Mr. Roy House of the 
8 Housing Authority of Salt Lake County are also present. 
9 THE COURT: Do you want to call a witness and start 
10 off? 
11 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I think there were several 
12 motions pending prior to this trial. I don't believe this 
13 matter is ready for trial yet, and I request your Honor to rule 
14 on some of those motions prior to starting to— 
15 THE COURT: Isn't it set for trial? 
16 MR. HARRIS: It was set for trial, your Honor— 
17 THE COURT: Is there any request for a decision on any 
18 of what you would call pending motions? 
19 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, they have not been fully 
20 briefed. I've received responses— 
21 THE COURT: Let me go back to my question, if I could. 
22 Is there any request for a decision on any of the motions which 
23 you (inaudible)? 
24 MR. HARRIS: There has been no request because the 
25 briefings aren't complete yet, your Honor, and the briefing 
-7-
1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, I, of course, would ask the 
3 Court deny the defendant's motion for a continuance in this 
4 matter, and primarily, your Honor, the basis for that is I, 
5 too, am befuddled at the approach that was taken in this case. 
6 Things went along fine, the defendant filed a motion to 
7 dismiss, but the Court denied that because it had not been 
8 properly submitted pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
9 Judicial Administration. I kind of perceived that as maybe 
10 the clerk had sent the file back to you too soon. We filed a 
11 response to that. No reply has been filed by the defendant, 
12 your Honor, and it has not been submitted for a decision as of 
13 this date, and it was ready for that almost a month ago, your 
14 Honor. 
15 Second, with regard to the papering, the numerous 
16 motions that the defendant and defendant's counsel have filed 
17 in the past, a week to 10 days, the housing authority has 
18 worked diligently to respond in an effort to make sure this 
19 proceeding can move forward. We perceive it as an attempt to 
20 circumvent an already established trial date for which, your 
21 Honor, until today — well, actually until Friday at 4:30, I'm 
22 assuming that Mr. Barnard, the defendant's counsel, filed the 
23 motion for continuance with the Court on the eve of trial. I 
24 received it via fax. 
25 Until that time they had never come to this Court and 
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1 Certainly there was no reason for it to not do so in this case, 
2 Your Honor, finally with regard to the due process, I 
3 guess his argument with that was that all the motions that he 
4 had filed. Again, we have done our best to respond to those, 
5 your Honor. He has been provided with our responses. He may 
6 be upset that they were received Friday and this morning, but 
7 given the time that he — from the point in time that he filed 
8 those motions, your Honor, we did our very best to get them to 
9 the Court. Back to the responses, if we were going to stick to 
10 the traditional timeline, shouldn't have been due until today, 
11 and the response to the motion for summary judgment shouldn't 
12 be — according to the rules, be due until next Monday, your 
13 Honor. 
14 But this is an expedited process, the matter has been 
15 set for trial. The defendant and his counsel are trying to 
16 circumvent that trial setting. They are doing everything that 
17 they can to undermine that trial setting. Your Honor, I think 
18 that this case needs to move forward. I don't think there can 
19 be any claim counsel is not prepared to proceed. If counsel 
20 can file all the documents that he has filed, counsel is very 
21 resourceful and good at what they do. 
22 Your Honor, I don't think that that be a justification 
23 under the circumstances. They've had adequate time and that's 
24 evident by everything that they've done in numerous courts in 
25 this jurisdiction. So the housing authority would ask your 
-7-
1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, I, of course, would ask the 
3 Court deny the defendant's motion for a continuance in this 
4 matter, and primarily, your Honor, the basis for that is I, 
5 too, am befuddled at the approach that was taken in this case. 
6 Things went along fine, the defendant filed a motion to 
7 dismiss, but the Court denied that because it had not been 
8 properly submitted pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
9 Judicial Administration. I kind of perceived that as maybe 
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14 Honor. 
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19 proceeding can move forward. We perceive it as an attempt to 
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22 assuming that Mr. Barnard, the defendant's counsel, filed the 
23 motion for continuance with the Court on the eve of trial. I 
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1 like to have the witnesses removed from the courtroom, 
2 THE COURT: I'm just going to let everybody make their 
3 motions and I'll rule on them, I'm not going to try and 
4 anticipate anything. If you want to call a witness I'd 
5 appreciate it. 
6 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, the housing authority would 
7 call Sherri Rico to the stand. 
8 THE COURT: Ms. Rico, if you'll come stand in the 
9 middle here and raise your right hand. 
10 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
11 you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court 
12 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
13 so help you God? 
14 THE WITNESS: I do. 
15 SHERRI RICO 
16 having been first duly sworn, 
17 testifies as follows: 
18 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MS. WASHBURN: 
20 Q. Ms. Rico, could you please state your name and spell 
21 your last name for the record? 
22 A. My name is Sherri Rico. My last name is R-i-c-o. 
23 Q« Ms. Rico, can you please tell us where you are 
24 employed? 
25 A. With the Housing Authority of Salt Lake County. 
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1 Certainly there was no reason for it to not do so in this case. 
2 Your Honor, finally with regard to the due process, I 
3 guess his argument with that was that all the motions that he 
4 had filed. Again, we have done our best to respond to those, 
5 your Honor. He has been provided with our responses. He may 
6 be upset that they were received Friday and this morning, but 
7 given the time that he — from the point in time that he filed 
8 those motions, your Honor, we did our very best to get them to 
9 the Court. Back to the responses, if we were going to stick to 
10 the traditional timeline, shouldn't have been due until today, 
11 and the response to the motion for summary judgment shouldn't 
12 be — according to the rules, be due until next Monday, your 
13 Honor. 
14 But this is an expedited process, the matter has been 
15 set for trial. The defendant and his counsel are trying to 
16 circumvent that trial setting. They are doing everything that 
17 they can to undermine that trial setting. Your Honor, I think 
18 that this case needs to move forward. I don't think there can 
19 be any claim counsel is not prepared to proceed. If counsel 
20 can file all the documents that he has filed, counsel is very 
21 resourceful and good at what they do. 
22 Your Honor, I don't think that that be a justification 
23 under the circumstances. They've had adequate time and that's 
24 evident by everything that they've done in numerous courts in 
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time that you're ready. 
MS. WASHBURN: May the record reflect that I'm handing 
you a document captioned, "Lease Agreement," marked as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. I'm also handing counsel for 
defendant a copy. May I 
Q. 
THE COURT: Any 
BY MS. WASHBURN 
approach the witness, your Honor? 
time. 
: Ms. Rico, if you would, please, take 






look familiar to 
Yes, it does. 
Can you tell us 
you? 
what that document is? 
This is the lease with Mr. Snyder that we signed. I 
sign on August the 7th, 1998 with the housing 
authority. 









Do you see your 
Yes. 
the last page, that would be page 7 of 
signature on that page? 
That is your signature as the authorized signature? 
Yes. 
Were you present when the other signature appeared on 
this document? 
A. Yes, I was. 
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1 like to have the witnesses removed from the courtroom. 
2 THE COURT: I'm just going to let everybody make their 
3 motions and I'll rule on them, I'm not going to try and 
4 anticipate anything. If you want to call a witness I'd 
5 appreciate it. 
6 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, the housing authority would 
7 call Sherri Rico to the stand. 
8 THE COURT: Ms. Rico, if you'll come stand in the 
9 middle here and raise your right hand. 
10 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
11 you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court 
12 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
13 so help you God? 
14 THE WITNESS: I do. 
15 SHERRI RICO 
16 having been first duly sworn, 
17 testifies as follows: 
18 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MS. WASHBURN: 
20 Q. Ms. Rico, could you please state your name and spell 
21 your last name for the record? 
22 My name is Sherri Rico. My last name is R-i-c-o. 
23 Ms. Ricor can you please lejj us whe.r<j you are 
24 employed? 
25 A. With the Housing Authority of Salt Lake County. 
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1 hospital for a heart attack, and her family — she's from Texas 
2 and her family came from Texas and felt that it was necessary 
3 that she move back home with her family. 
4 Q. Did she leave to go back to Texas? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Do you know the date that she left to go back to 
7 Texas? 
8 A. Let's see, it was last Tuesday, I'm not sure of that 
9 date. 
10 Q. April 25th; would that be right? 
11 A. Yeah, if that was Tuesday she left. 
12 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor— 
13 THE COURT: I'll sustain it (inaudible). 
14 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Today is May 8th, so was it last 
15 Tuesday or the Tuesday — if you can, Sherri, tell us— 
16 MR. HARRIS: We'll stipulate that she's left and gone 
17 to Texas. 
18 THE COURT: Is there any more we need to know? I mean 
19 is the date important for (inaudible)? 
20 MS. WASHBURN: Actually, your Honor, the date is kind 
21 of important. 
22 THE COURT: Why is that? 
23 MS. WASHBURN: For a motion (inaudible) by defendant 
24 trying to prevent the use of Ms. Keyou's testimony in 
25 deposition that was taken because she was leaving. So it is 
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1 marked? 
2 THE COURT: Any time that you're ready. 
3 MS. WASHBURN: May the record reflect that I'm handing 
4 you a document captioned, "Lease Agreement," marked as 
5 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. I'm also handing counsel for 
6 defendant a copy. May I approach the witness, your Honor? 
7 THE COURT: Any time. 
8 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Ms. Rico, if you would, please, take 
9 a look at that document that I have just handed to you, and 
10 does it look familiar to you? 
11 A. Yes, it does. 
12 Q. Can you tell us what that document is? 
13 A. This is the lease with M:i :. Snyder that we signed. I 
14 had him sign on August the 7th, 1998 with the housing 
15 authority. 
16 Q. Can you turn to the last page, that would be page 7 of 
17 that document? 
18 P. Yes. 
19 Q. Do you see your signature on that page? 
20 A, Yes. 
21 Q. That is your signature as the authorized signature? 
22 ,.fi Yes. 
23 Q Were you present when the other signature appeared on 
24 this document? 
25 A. Yes, I was. 
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1 THE WITNESS: It was — 
2 THE COURT: I'm sorry, I'm just going to sustain the 
3 objection and in my mind it's (inaudible). 
4 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Sherri, how is it that you know Ms. 
5 Keyou called Mr. Snyder? 
6 A. I was there. As a matter of fact, she put it on the 
7 speaker phone when we called, and that's how I heard what he 
8 had said. 
9 Q. And how is that you know that was Mr. Snyder 
10 responding on the speaker phone? 
11 A. I recognized his voice. 
12 Q. Can you tell me what he said? 
13 A. He said, "You're God-damn right, I'll be down in a 
14 minute." 
15 Q. Ms. Rico, did he come down to see you? 
16 A. Uh-huh, right away he came down. 
17 Q. Can you please tell the Court what happened when he 
18 arrived at your office? 
19 A. He came into the office and walked in and closed the 
20 door, so I asked him to have a seat. He had his — and Julie 
21 was there in the office and Julie was sitting in the desk 
22 chair, and I sat down in the chair by the side of her, and he 
23 sat over in the far right-hand corner of the— 
24 Q. He sat across from the desk? 
25 A. Uh-huh, there's two chairs there and he sat over by 
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hospital for a heart attack, and her family — she's from Texas 
and her family came from Texas and felt that it was necessary 
that she move back home with her family. 
Q. Did she leave to go back to Texas? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know the date that she left to go back to 
Texas? 
A Let's see, it was last Tuesday, I'm not sure of that 
date. 
Q. April 25th; would that be right? 
ft Yeah, if that was Tuesday she left. 
MR. HARRIS: Your Honor— 
THE COURT: I'll sustain it (inaudible). 
Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Today is May 8th, so was it last 
Tuesday or the Tuesday — if you can, Sherri, tell u s — 
MR. HARRIS: We'll stipulate that she's left and gone 
to Texas. 
THE COURT: Is there any more we need to know? I mean 
is the date important for (inaudible)? 
MS. WASHBURN: Actually, your Honor, lhe date is kind 
of important. 
THE COURT: Why is that? 
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trying to prevent the use of Ms. Keyou's testimony in 
deposition that was taken because she was leaving. So it is 
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1 "You cost me a hundred and twenty dollars you fucking bitch." 
2 Q. Ms. Rico, when he came around the desk can you please 
3 describe Mr. Snyder's demeanor? 
4 A. He had his finger right up in my face and he just kept 
5 coming right around the corner of the desk, and Julie sighed a 
6 couple of times because she was pretty scared to the side of 
7 me. 
8 MR. HARRIS: Objection, calls for (inaudible) state of 
9 mind. 
10 THE COURT: I think she's going to — I'm going to 
11 take it for "she sighed," if I understood right, but beyond 
12 that I don't know why. 
13 THE WITNESS: And I just motioned to her it was okay, 
14 and then that's when my radio went off. 
15 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: What do you mean your radio went 
16 off? 
17 A. My radio beeped and that meant that somebody was on 
18 the line for me, and I stood up and I was getting pretty 
19 nervous because he was getting right in my face and just kept 
20 calling me a fucking bitch, and so I just pushed in ray radio — 
21 it's a two-way radio with maintenance and with anybody in 
22 housing authority that has access to radio, and I just pushed 
23 it in and held it to the side of me when he was in my face. 
24 Q. Why did you push that button in? 
25 A. Because I was getting pretty nervous, he was getting 
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3 objection and in ray mind it's (inaudible), 
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13 A. He said, "You're God-damn right, I'll be down in a 
14 minute." 
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1 MR. HARRIS: Objection hearsay. 
2 THE COURT: I'll sustain it on that ground (inaudible) 
3 someone who is not a party. 
4 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Ms. Rico, you indicated that Ms. 
5 Poulton came into the room. 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. You indicated that she did speak to you. 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Did you see Ms. Poulton at any time prior to her 
10 walking in within like five minutes prior to her walking in? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Following this incident did you report it to anybody? 
13 A. Well, as a matter of fact right after — I told Daphne 
14 that I was fine and to go on about her business. I stayed in 
15 the office, and then the phone started ringing, my cell phone 
16 started ringing and the radio phone started ringing. My 
17 director, Roy House, had called me to ask me if I was okay. 
18 The dispatcher— 
19 MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor, this is all along 
20 the same lines. 
21 THE COURT: Yeah, I think the question that was 
22 asked — I can't remember what it was but it seemed like a yes 
23 or no and now we're going through a long discourse, so I think 
24 (inaudible). 
25 Q. BY MS. RICO: Ms. Rico, who did you contact regarding 
-19-
"You cost me a hundred and twenty dollars you fucking bitch." 
Q. Ms. Rico, when he came around the desk can you please 
describe Mr. Snyder's demeanor? 
A. He had his finger right up in my face and he just kept 
coming right around the corner of the desk, and Julie sighed a 
couple of times because she was pretty scared to the side of 
me. 
MR. HARRIS: Objection, calls for (inaudible) state of 
mind. 
THE COURT: I think she's going to — I'm going to 
take it for "she sighed," if I understood right, but beyond 
that I don't know why. 
THE WITNESS: And I just motioned to her it was okay, 
and then that's when ray radio went off. 
Qm B Y MS# WASHBURN: What do you mean your radio went 
off? 
A My radio beeped and that meant that somebody was on 
the line for me, and I stood up and I was getting pretty 
nervous because he was getting right in my iace and just kept 
calling me a fucking bitch, and so I just pushed in my radio — 
it's a two-way radio with maintenance and with anybody in 
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Yes, I do. 
Senior Highrise, do you have other job 
the housing authority? 
Do those responsibilities include doing evictions, 
preparing paperwork 




I work with the evictions and manage other 
Do you also have occasion or have an understanding of 








Yes, I do. 
Can you please tell us how that grievance procedure 
It depends on which eviction that we serve a client. 
For example, if you are evicting a tenant for a 











Yes, it is. 
100 percent policy of the housing 
No exceptions are ever made? 
No. 
If you are evicting somebody for nonpayment of rent— 
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1 MR. HARRIS: Objection hearsay. 
2 THE COURT: I'll sustain it on that ground (inaudible) 
3 someone who is not a party. 
4 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Ms. Rico, you indicated that Ms. 
5 Poulton came into the room. 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. You indicated that she did speak to you. 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Did you see Ms. Poulton at any time prior to her 
10 walking in within like five minutes prior to her walking in? 
11 A. No, 
12 Q. Following this incident did you report it to anybody? 
13 A Well, a- => a matter of fac: it right after — I told Daphne 
14 that I was fine and to go on about her business. I stayed in 
15 the office, and then the phone started ringing, my cell phone 
16 started ringing and the nadio phone started ringing. My 
17 director, Roy House, had called me to ask me if I was okay. 
18 The dispatcher— 
19 HARRIS: Objection, your Honor, this is all along 
20 the same lines. 
21 THE COURT: Yeah, I think the question that was 
22 asked — I can't remember what it was but it seemed like a yes 
23 or no and now we're going through a long discourse, so I think 
24 (inaudible). 
25 Q BY MS. RICO: Ms. Rico, who did you contact regarding 
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1 Q. Who makes the decision whether or not to grant or deny 
2 a grievance hearing? 
3 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I still don't think that she 
4 has found sufficient foundation (inaudible) that she is 
5 qualified to testify as to the grievance process and who's 
6 entitled (inaudible). 
7 THE COURT: Well, I think there's foundation, so I'll 
8 overrule that. 
9 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Ms. Rico, can you please tell the 
10 Court who it is that makes a decision — who makes the decision 
11 regarding whether or not somebody who asks for a grievance 
12 hearing gets one? 
13 A. Well, we always give a grievance hearing if it's not a 
14 criminal activity. Eviction that's been served, if it's the 
15 three day eviction, they have a right to an informal hearing 
16 and they have a right to a formal, so I don't get to make that 
17 decision, but if it's criminal activity it's a three day with 
18 no hearing at all. 
19 Q. Do you, in your responsibilities at the housing 
20 authority, prepare notices to terminate the tenancy of 
21 defendants — pardon me, tenants? 
22 A. Yes, I do all the time. 
23 Q. In your preparation of those notices do you include a 
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1 Q. That letter threatened eviction; is that correct? 
2 A, I stated to him that it is at no — at any time that 
3 it was — that it was not, but if it kept continuing in the 
4 future, that yes, he could be evicted. 
5 Q. So your answer would be yes, there was a threat of 
6 eviction? 
7 A. It's not a threat. 
8 Q. But you told him that you would evict him if he 
9 continued calling people that name, correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 MR. HARRIS: I have nothing further of this witness, 
12 your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Washburn? 
14 MS. WASHBURN: No, thank you, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Rico, you can step down and 
16 take your seat. 
17 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, at the present time I'd 
18 like to call Daphne Poulton. 
19 MR. HARRIS: Can I object to this witness as not 
20 having any relevant information? 
21 THE COURT: I can hardly answer that. Come, Ms. 
22 Poulton, to the stand here. I don't think I can give you a 
23 ruling when I've not heard a word from her. 
24 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
25 you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court 
-25-
1 Q. Who makes the decision whether or not to grant or deny 
2 a grievance hearing? 
3 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I still don't think that she 
4 has found sufficient foundation (inaudible) that she is 
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1 Q. Can you please tell the Court what happened that day, 
2 to the best of your recollection? 
3 A. I got off the elevator and when I was coming — you 
4 could hear him screaming obscenities right from the get-go. 
5 MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor. We don't know 
6 whether she can see him— 
7 THE COURT: I think that's something you can cross 
8 examine her in the trial, whether or not she knows him, how she 
9 knows it's him. I think the statement she has made in response 
10 to the answer is an appropriate response to the question, and 
11 so you are open to cross examination on that. 
12 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Ms. Poulton, how is it that you knew 
13 that it was Mr. Snyder? Did you know at that point in time? 
14 A. I did not. I heard them yelling and "fucking bitch" 
15 is what I kept hearing and things like this, and I thought, 
16 "Julie is in there alone." I had no idea that Sherri was 
17 there. 
18 Q. How close is the elevator to the— 
19 A. Quite a ways. 
20 Q. Pardon me? 
21 A. Quite a ways. From the front door almost to the front 
22 door to the very back door, the elevator is right by the very 
23 back door, so I don't know in terms of feet how that would be, 
24 but it's quite a ways, and when you can hear, it would be from 
25 here to the back. I would be getting out coming in that way 
-27-
1 Q. That letter threatened eviction; is that correct? 
2 A. I stated to him that it is at no — at any time that 
3 it was — that it was not, but if it kept continuing in the 
4 future, that yes, he could be evicted. 
5 Q. So your answer would be yes, there was a threat of 
6 eviction? 
7 A. It's not a threat. 
8 Q. But you told him that you would evict him if he 
9 continued calling people that name, correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 MR. HARRIS: I have nothing further of this witness, 
12 your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Washburn? 
14 MS. WASHBURN: No, thank you, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Rico, you can step down and 
16 take your seat. 
17 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, at the present time I'd 
18 like to call Daphne Poulton. 
19 MR. HARRIS: Can I object to this witness as not 
20 having any relevant information? 
21 THE COURT: I can hardly answer that. Come, Ms. 
22 Poulton, to the stand here. I don't think I can give you a 
23 ruling when I've not heard a word from her. 
24 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
25 you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court 
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1 by the door there coming out. He's on the other side of the 
2 desk and he's coming out. He said — let's see, I'm trying to 
3 exactly remember exactly what he said. He said, "You fucking 
4 bitch," and something about pulling about your socks or 
5 stockings or something — pantyhose, I guess, is the word they 
6 said he used. I didn't remember exactly except that, "I'm not 
7 through with you yet," and it sounded very threatening to me. 
8 I looked over and they both looked very frightened. 
9 He didn't see me there when I was standing there. He did see 
10 me — he bumped practically into me when he came out the door, 
11 and I was standing there. I asked them if they were all right. 
12 Sherri said, "Everything is fine, just do what you have to do." 
13 Q. Now when you— 
14 MR. HARRIS: Objection, hearsay, on that, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: On Sherri's statement (inaudible). 
16 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Earlier you indicated, "Tom." Who 
17 is Tom? 
18 A. Tom is the defendant here. 
19 Q. Mr. Snyder? 
20 A. Yes. I didn't know his last name. I've never really 
21 paid much attention to last names there. 
22 Q. So you just know him as Tom? 
23 A. Tom, uh-huh. 
24 Q. You indicated that you had looked in and looked around 
25 and you saw the two of them, they were both frightened. Who 
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14 A. I did not. I heard them yelling and "fucking bitch" 
15 is what I kept hearing and things like this, and I thought, 
16 "Julie is in there alone." I had no idea that Sherri was 
17 there. 
18 Q. How close is the elevator to the— 
19 A. Quite a ways. 
20 Q. Pardon me? 
21 A. Quite a ways. From the front door almost to the front 
22 door to the very back door, the elevator is right by the very 
23 back door, so I don't know in terms of feet how that would be, 
24 but it's quite a ways, and when you can hear, it would be from 
25 here to the back. I would be getting out coming in that way 
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1 was closed. Was there a window that allowed you to see inside? 
2 A. No, I didn't say that, I said when the door opened I 
3 looked inside the room. He opened the door while I was 
4 standing there. 
5 Q. So you never saw him in the room interacting with— 
6 A. Not before — I heard him, but I did not see him until 
7 he opened the door. 
8 Q. So you heard him swearing— 
9 A. Swearing, yes, profusely. 
10 Q. You didn't see him — you didn't see him interacting. 
11 A. No, only when he was screaming at them as he opened 
12 the door. 
13 Q. So he opened the door leaving at that point? 
14 A. He was still standing there, and then he left. He 
15 didn't just walk out the door the minute he opened the door. 
16 Q. But you didn't see him— 
17 A. He had a few things to say. 
18 Q. But you didn't see him doing anything threatening— 
19 A. No, I heard the threatening— 
20 Q. (Inaudible) did you see him moving towards Sherri 
21 Rico? 
22 A. He was already right on the edge of the desk. No, 
23 there wasn't any further — he was ready to go, but he was 
24 still making his final exit. 
25 MR. HARRIS: Thank you, I have nothing further, your 
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10 me — he bumped practically into me when he came out the door, 
11 and I was standing there. I asked them if they were all right. 
12 Sherri said, "Everything is fine, just do what you have to do." 
13 Q. Now when you— 
14 MR. HARRIS: Objection, hearsay, on that, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: On Sherri's statement (inaudible). 
16 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Earlier you indicated, "Tom." Who 
17 is Tom? 
18 A. Tom is the defendant here. 
19 Q. Mr. Snyder? 
20 A. Yes. I didn't know his last name. I've never really 
21 paid much attention to last names there. 
22 Q. So you just know him as Tom? 
23 A. Tom, uh-huh. 
24 Q. You indicated that you had looked in and looked around 
25 and you saw the two of them, they were both frightened. Who 
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1 MR- HARRIS: Thank you. I apologize. 
2 THE COURT: No, no. 
3 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
4 you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court 
5 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
6 so help you God? 
7 THE WITNESS: I do. 
8 CALVIN TROWBRIDGE 
9 having been first duly sworn, 
10 testifies as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MS. WASHBURN: 
13 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Trowbridge. Can you please state 
14 your name and spell your last name for the record? 
15 A. Calvin Trowbridge, T-r-o-w-b-r-i-d-g-e. 
16 Q. Mr. Trowbridge, can you tell the Court where you are 
17 employed? 
18 A. I work for Salt Lake County Housing Authority. 
19 Q. What do you do for that authority? 
20 A. I'm facilities specialist. 
21 Q. What does that mean? 
22 I A. It's a maintenance man. 
23 Q. Do you have occasion to do that kind of work at the 
24 Senior Highrise? 
25 A. That's one of my buildings. 
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1 was closed. Was there a window that allowed you to see inside? 
2 A. No, I didn't say that, I said when the door opened I 
3 looked inside the room. He opened the door while I was 
4 standing there. 
5 Q. So you never saw him in the room interacting with— 
6 A. Not before — I heard him, but I did not see him until 
7 he opened the door. 
8 Q. So you heard him swearing— 
9 A. Swearing, yes, profusely. 
10 Q. You didn't see him — you didn't see him interacting. 
11 A. No, only when he was screaming at them as he opened 
12 the door. 
13 Q. So he opened the door leaving at that point? 
14 A. He was still standing there, and then he left. He 
15 didn't just walk out the door the minute he opened the door. 
16 Q. But you didn't see him— 
17 A. He had a few things to say. 
18 Q. But you didn't see him doing anything threatening— 
19 A. No, I heard the threatening— 
20 Q. (Inaudible) did you see him moving towards Sherri 
21 Rico? 
22 A. He was already right on the edge of the desk. No, 
23 there wasn't any further — he was ready to go, but he was 
24 still making his final exit. 
25 MR. HARRIS: Thank you, I have nothing further, your 
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1 Q. So you heard two voices coming across the radio; is 
2 that it? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. What did you hear? 
5 A, I heard a lot of yelling and a lot of name calling. 
6 Tom Snyder was pretty irritated or upset. 
7 THE COURT: Well, I think that's speculative. What we 
8 want to hear is what you heard. Like I heard somebody say, and 
9 I have to conclude whether he was upset or not. 
10 THE WITNESS: All right. I heard him say — I heard 
11 him call her a bitch a few times — well, a fucking bitch. I 
12 heard him say that — I heard him call her missy and honey a 
13 few times, and when he called her that she asked him to call 
14 her Sherri. I heard him say — well, tell her to fuck off. 
15 His voice started getting louder. I became concerned for 
16 Sherri so I went to try to find some help to see if I could get 
17 somebody over there. 
18 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: You just indicated that you became 
19 concerned for Sherri. Can you tell us what facts led you to 
20 the conclusion that you should be concerned for her? 
21 A. This conversation was being over the radio, and I 
22 could hear him like he was standing right next to me, and it 
23* was loud. He was yelling. 
24 Q. So his voice was loud? 
25 A. Right. 
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1 MR. HARRIS: Thank you. I apologize. 
2 THE COURT: No, no. 
3 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
4 you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court 
5 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
6 so help you God? 
7 THE WITNESS: I do. 
8 CALVIN TROWBRIDGE 
9 having been first duly sworn, 
10 testifies as follows: 
11 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
12 BY MS. WASHBURN: 
13 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Trowbridge. Can you please state 
14 your name and spell your last name for the record? 
15 A. Calvin Trowbridge, T-r-o-w-b-r-i-d-g-e. 
16 Q. Mr. Trowbridge, can you tell the Court where you are 
17 employed? 
18 A. I work for Salt Lake County Housing Authority. 
19 Q. What do you do for that authority? 
20 A. I'm facilities specialist. 
21 Q. What does that mean? 
22 I A. It's a maintenance man. 
23 Q. Do you have occasion to do that kind of work at the 
24 Senior Highrise? 
25 A. That's one of my buildings. 
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1 form? 
2 A. No, I didn't see anything. 
3 Q. All you heard on the radio was him calling her names; 
4 is that correct? 
5 A. Right. 
6 MR. HARRIS: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Washburn? 
8 MS. WASHBURN: No, thank you, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Trowbridge, you may step 
10 down. 
11 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, at this time the housing 
12 authority would move to admit the deposition of Julie Keyou as 
13 testimony. As indicated earlier counsel for defendant did 
14 stipulate that Ms. Keyou is not available at the time of trial. 
15 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I only received this 
16 motion — I'm sorry, I only received this response this 
17 morning. I haven't had a chance to look it over very well. 
18 THE COURT: You mean the deposition? 
19 MR. HARRIS: The deposition, that's correct. The 
20 information that I did look at it I think is highly suspect. I 
21 think there is — I mean the whole point I'm having (inaudible) 
22 your Honor, is to cross examine to see— 
23 THE COURT: Sure enough, what do you think about that? 
24 Who was present when the deposition was taking place? 
25 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, I was, Ms. Keyou was 
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Q. So you heard two voices coming across the radio; is 
that it? 
A. Right. 
Q. What did you hear? 
A. I heard a lot of yelling and a lot of name calling, 
Tom Snyder was pretty irritated or upset. 
THE COURT: Well, I think that's speculative. What we 
want to hear is what you heard. Like I heard somebody say, and 
I have to conclude whether he was upset or not. 
THE WITNESS: All right. I heard him say — I heard 
him call her a bitch a few times — well, a fucking bitch. I 
heard him say that — I heard him call her missy and honey a 
few times, and when he called her that she asked him to call 
her Sherri. I heard him say — well, tell her to fuck off. 
His voice started getting louder. I became concerned for 
Sherri so I went to try to find some help to see if I could get 
somebody over there. 
Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: You just indicated that you became 
concerned for Sherri. Can you tell us what facts led you to 
the conclusion that you should be concerned for her? 
A. This conversation was being over the radio, and I 
could hear him like he was standing right next to me, and it 
was loud. He was yelling. 
Q. So his voice was loud? 
A. Right. 
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1 were involved and that we needed to be part of this deposition 
2 in order to ensure that the testimony that you would receive 
3 would be valid testimony. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I think the problem is, clearly, the 
5 lack of adversarial context, so I think I'm going to sustain 
6 the objection and not allow it in. 
7 MR. HARRIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Washburn, any (inaudible). 
9 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, I would call Detective Jim 
10 Alcock. 
11 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
12 you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court 
13 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
14 so help you God? 
15 THE WITNESS: I do. 
16 JIM ALCOCK 
17 having been first duly sworn, 
18 testifies as follows: 
19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MS. WASHBURN: 
21 Q. Good afternoon, Officer. 
22 A. Good afternoon. 
23 Q. Could you please state your name for the record and 
24 spell your last name? 
25 A. James Michael Alcock, A-1-c-o-c-k. 
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1 form? 
2 A. No, I didn't see anything. 
3 Q. All you heard on the radio was him calling her names; 
4 is that correct? 
5 A. Right. 
6 MR. HARRIS: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Washburn? 
8 MS. WASHBURN: No, thank you, your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Trowbridge, you may step 
10 down. 
11 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, at this time the housing 
12 authority would move to admit the deposition of Julie Keyou as 
13 testimony. As indicated earlier counsel for defendant did 
14 stipulate that Ms. Keyou is not available at the time of trial. 
15 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I only received this 
16 motion — I'm sorry, I only received this response this 
17 morning. I haven't had a chance to look it over very well. 
18 THE COURT: You mean the deposition? 
19 MR. HARRIS: The deposition, that's correct. The 
20 information that I did look at it I think is highly suspect. I 
21 think there is — I mean the whole point I'm having (inaudible) 
22 your Honor, is to cross examine to see— 
23 THE COURT: Sure enough, what do you think about that? 
24 Who was present when the deposition was taking place? 
25 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, I was, Ms. Keyou was 
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1 Q. You heard Ms. Rico testify that she was basically — 
2 Mr. Snyder said to her quote, "you better pull up your fucking 
3 pantyhose, you fucking bitch, we're going to go the rounds," 
4 end quote. In your mind based on your experience, did that 
5 constitute an assault under Utah law? 
6 A. Yes, ma'am. 
7 MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor, I think this is 
8 hearsay and I— 
9 THE COURT: I don't think it's hearsay. I think if 
10 one can be an expert on what a crime is, Detective Alcock 
11 probably is such an expert, and so you can offer the opinion. 
12 I think you're certainly entitled to pursue how he gets to 
13 those opinions on cross examination if you want, but I see no 
14 foundational or evidentiary prohibitions (inaudible). 
15 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Also, Mr. Alcock, Ms. Rico testified 
16 that Mr. Snyder said to her something along the lines, quote, 
17 "I've got to leave now, I'm not through with you, or we're not 
18 finished yet," end quote, in addition to some other swearing. 
19 Would that also constitute an assault under Utah criminal law? 
20 A. Yes, ma'am. 
21 Q. It's my understanding that the decision whether or not 
22 to pursue a case is not left to the police officer or the 
23 police department; is that accurate? 
24 A. It depends on what type of case you're referring to. 
25 With respect to misdemeanor cases that do not occur in the 
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1 were involved and that we needed to be part of this deposition 
2 in order to ensure that the testimony that you would receive 
3 would be valid testimony. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I think the problem is, clearly, the 
5 lack of adversarial context, so I think I'm going to sustain 
6 the objection and not allow it in. 
7 MR. HARRIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Washburn, any (inaudible). 
9 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, I would call Detective Jim 
10 Alcock. 
11 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
12 you are about to give in this case now pending before the Court 
13 will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
14 so help you God? 
15 THE WITNESS: I do, 
16 JIM ALCOCK 
17 having been first duly sworn, 
18 testifies as follows: 
19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 BY MS. WASHBURN: 
21 Q. Good afternoon, Officer. 
22 A. Good afternoon. 
23 Q. Could you please state your name for the record and 
24 spell your last name? 
25 A. James Michael Alcock, A-1-c-o-c-k, 
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1 A. No, I did not. 
2 Q. Is it your routine practice to interview an alleged 
3 perpetrator in a crime? 
4 A. At the stage that we were in with respect to this 
5 case, at that stage we try and resolve these issues at the 
6 lowest possible level before applying great amounts of 
7 resources into investigations. This was discussed with Ms. 
8 Rico at that time on the 24th, and I faxed her a copy of what 
9 we entitled a cease and desist letter wherein it is outlined by 
10 Ms. Rico that she wished to have absolutely no contact, verbal, 
11 written, physical or any other type of contact with Mr. Snyder. 
12 We let it go at that point in time. 
13 Up until we have what I would call general intent. If 
14 there is a violation of a cease and desist order by the victim, 
15 then— 
16 Q. You served that cease and desist order on— 
17 A. That is either served by certified mail, and in this 
18 case with Ms. Rico, I would assume it was served by herself or 
19 another employee at the facility. 
20 Q. So you don't know whether or not that gets from the 
21 alleged victim to the alleged perpetrator? 
22 A. No, at that point with this investigation it was her 
23 responsibility to serve that paper or to see that it was 
24 served, and then maintain a copy and/or if she was to send it 
25 by certified mail, to maintain the receipt in a file with 
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1 Q. You heard Ms. Rico testify that she was basically — 
2 Mr. Snyder said to her quote, "you better pull up your fucking 
3 pantyhose, you fucking bitch, we're going to go the rounds," 
4 end quote. In your mind based on your experience, did that 
5 constitute an assault under Utah law? 
6 A. Yes, ma'am. 
7 MR. HARRIS: Objection, your Honor, I think this is 
8 hearsay and I— 
9 THE COURT: I don't think it's hearsay. I think if 
10 one can be an expert on what a crime is, Detective Alcock 
11 probably is such an expert, and so you can offer the opinion. 
12 I think you're certainly entitled to pursue how he gets to 
13 those opinions on cross examination if you want, but I see no 
14 foundational or evidentiary prohibitions (inaudible). 
15 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Also, Mr. Alcock, Ms. Rico testified 
16 that Mr. Snyder said to her something along the lines, quote, 
17 "I've got to leave now, I'm not through with you, or we're not 
18 finished yet," end quote, in addition to some other swearing. 
19 Would that also constitute an assault under Utah criminal law? 
20 A. Yes, ma'am. 
21 Q. It's my understanding that the decision whether or not 
22 to pursue a case is not left to the police officer or the 
23 police department; is that accurate? 
24 A. It depends on what type of case you're referring to. 
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was March 
A. No, that's the date that I became aware of the report. 
I was not in a position at that point in time on February 23rd 
to be assigning cases 




I am now and I wasn't even 
Rico contacted me. 
: That's all, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Harris? 
MR. HARRIS: 




are about to give 
No, your Honor. 
rhank you, Detective. 
: Your Honor, the plaintiffs 
aware of 
would call 
You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
in this case now pending before the Court 
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 




THE WITNESS: Yes. 
ROY HOUSE 
having been first duly sworn, 
, the truth, 
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1 A. No, I did not. 
2 Q. Is it your routine practice to interview an alleged 
3 perpetrator in a crime? 
4 A. At the stage that we were in with respect to this 
5 case, at that stage we try and resolve these issues at the 
6 lowest possible level before applying great amounts of 
7 resources into investigations. This was discussed with Ms. 
8 Rico at that time on the 24th, and I faxed her a copy of what 
9 we entitled a cease and desist letter wherein it is outlined by 
10 Ms. Rico that she wished to have absolutely no contact, verbal, 
11 written, physical or any other type of contact with Mr. Snyder. 
12 We let it go at that point in time. 
13 Up until we have what I would call general intent. If 
14 there is a violation of a cease and desist order by the victim, 
15 then— 
16 Q. You served that cease and desist order on— 
17 A. That is either served by certified mail, and in this 
18 case with Ms. Rico, I would assume it was served by herself or 
19 another employee at the facility. 
20 Q. So you don't know whether or not that gets from the 
21 alleged victim to the alleged perpetrator? 
22 A. No, at that point with this investigation it was her 
23 responsibility to serve that paper or to see that it was 
24 served, and then maintain a copy and/or if she was to send it 
25 by certified mail, to maintain the receipt in a file with 
1 A. At 1966 South 200 East, yes. 
2 Q. Is the housing authority also the landlord of that 
3 building? 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. Who is the manager of that particular building? 
6 A. Ms. Sherri Rico. 
7 Q. Is there still a document in front of you marked as 
8 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1? 
9 A. Yes, it is, a lease agreement. 
10 Q. Yes, can you take a look at that? 
11 A. Sure. 
12 Q. Does that document look familiar to you? 
13 A. It really does. 
14 Q. Why is that? 
15 A. Well, just part of the policies of the housing 
16 authority. 
17 Q. Is this a similar standard lease agreement that the 
18 housing authority uses? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. And is it the general practice and procedure of the 
21 housing authority for the manager to sign on behalf of the 
22 housing authority (inaudible)? 
23 A. That's also correct. 
24 Q. Mr. House, is it your understanding that this 
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1 Rico, I was contacted later by Ms, Rico, yes. 
2 Q. Did she fill you in on the details of that incident? 
3 I A. Yes, she did. 
4 Q. In your position over the housing authority, do you 
5 make decisions concerning whether or not an eviction procedure 
6 should be started? 
7 A. I really don't make those — I think the lease 
8 agreement really speaks for itself, but the staff — we do talk 
9 about different crimes and problems. 
10 Q. So for example, in this case, it's obvious that a 
11 decision was made to pursue an eviction against Mr. Snyder. 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. How is that that decision was made? 
14 A. Because we felt that the staff was in danger based on 
15 what she told me, and we made that decision to maybe do through 
16 an eviction procedure with Mr. Snyder. 
17 Q. Mr. House, you said "we," who are we? 
18 A. We are myself and Ms. Rico. 
19 Q. Did anybody else participate in your decision whether 
20 or not to pursue this? 
21 A. I talked to my director and some other sources within 
22 the housing authority, yes. 
23 <}• Did you contact counsel as well? 
24 I A. As well, yes, we did. 
25 Q. You made a determination to proceed with the eviction, 
1 A. At 1966 South 200 East, yes. 
2 Q. Is the housing authority also the landlord of that 
3 building? 
4 A. That's correct. 
5 Q. Who is the manager of that particular building? 
6 A. Ms. Sherri Rico. 
7 Q. Is there still a document in front of you marked as 
8 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1? 
9 A. Yes, it is, a lease agreement. 
10 Q. Yes, can you take a look at that? 
11 A. Sure. 
12 Q. Does that document look familiar to you? 
13 A. It really does. 
14 Q. Why is that? 
15 A. Well, just part of the policies of the housing 
16 authority. 
17 Q. Is this a similar standard lease agreement that the 
18 housing authority uses? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. And is it the general practice and procedure of the 
21 housing authority for the manager to sign on behalf of the 
22 housing authority (inaudible)? 
23 A. That's also correct. 
24 Q. Mr. House, is it your understanding that this 
25 particular document used as a form document by the housing 
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1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. R. House is for Roy House? 
3 A. Uh-huh. 
4 Q. Prior to signing it did you review the (inaudible) 
5 termination of this agreement? 
6 I A. Yes, I did. 
7 J Q. Based on your experience, 23 and a half years 
8 experience and knowledge of the procedures of the housing 
9 authority, does this notice purport what you understand to be 
10 required? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. Will you please turn to the third page attached to 
13 that document. What is that— 
14 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, we'll stipulate that this is 
15 the three day notice that was served upon Mr. Snyder. I don't 
16 know if she wants — if she's still trying to (inaudible) 
17 foundation. 
18 THE COURT: You stipulate that that notice got served 
19 on him about when? 
20 MR. HARRIS: Yes. 
21 THE WITNESS: It was— 
22 THE COURT: (Inaudible) if you're going to stipulate 
23 (inaudible). 
24 MR. HARRIS: The return of service says that it was 
25 2/25/00. 
-51-
1 Rico, I was contacted later by Ms. Rico, yes. 
2 Q. Did she fill you in on the details of that incident? 
3 A. Yes, she did. 
4 Q. In your position over the housing authority, do you 
5 make decisions concerning whether or not an eviction procedure 
6 should be started? 
7 A. I really don't make those — I think the lease 
8 agreement really speaks for itself, but the staff — we do talk 
9 about different crimes and problems. 
10 Q. So for example, in this case, it's obvious that a 
11 decision was made to pursue an eviction against Mr. Snyder. 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. How is that that decision was made? 
14 A. Because we felt that the staff was in danger based on 
15 what she told me, and we made that decision to maybe do through 
16 an eviction procedure with Mr. Snyder. 
17 Q. Mr. House, you said "we," who are we? 
18 A. We are myself and Ms. Rico. 
19 Q. Did anybody else participate in your decision whether 
20 or not to pursue this? 
21 A. I talked to my director and some other sources within 
22 the housing authority, yes. 
23 Q. Did you contact counsel as well? 
24 I A. As well, yes, we did. 
25 Q. You made a determination to proceed with the eviction, 
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1 federal (inaudible) as well as state? 
2 A. That's for sure. 
3 Q. So as a matter of right, if I understand you 
4 correctly, if they get served with a 30 day notice, a tenant 
5 does, then they can request a grievance? 
6 A. A grievance, right. 
7 Q. If hypothetically an individual tenant were to be 
8 evicted for non-payment of rent, are they also allowed to 
9 request a grievance hearing? 
10 A. Yes, they are, but there again, we serve a 14 day 
11 notice. If in the event the rent is not paid by the 5th or 6th 
12 day of the month, then we'll serve another notice to a 
13 resident. 
14 Q. And that's a 14 day notice? 
15 A. That's a 14 day and that's federal law. 
16 Q. That's federal law. 
17 A. Yes. The state law is three day notice. 
18 Q. Now is it the housing authority's normal procedure on 
19 something that's alleged to be criminal, what kind of notice 
20 does the housing authority serve? 
21 A. If it's a threat to health, safety of staff and also 
22 residents we serve a three day notice, for drug activities and 
23 that type of thing, yes. 
24 Q. So any kind of criminal activity, significant in your 
25 mind, would (inaudible). 
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1 A. That's correct. 
2 Q. R. House is for Roy House? 
3 A. Uh-huh. 
4 Q. Prior to signing it did you review the (inaudible) 
5 termination of this agreement? 
6 A. Yes, I did. 
7 Q. Based on your experience, 23 and a half years 
8 experience and knowledge of the procedures of the housing 
9 authority, does this notice purport what you understand to be 
10 required? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. Will you please turn to the third page attached to 
13 that document. What is that— 
14 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, we'll stipulate that this is 
15 the three day notice that was served upon Mr. Snyder. I don't 
16 know if she wants — if she's still trying to (inaudible) 
17 foundation. 
18 THE COURT: You stipulate that that notice got served 
19 on him about when? 
20 MR. HARRIS: Yes. 
21 THE WITNESS: It was— 
22 THE COURT: (Inaudible) if you're going to stipulate 
23 (inaudible). 
24 MR. HARRIS: The return of service says that it was 
25 2/25/00. 
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1 THE WITNESS: You said the bottom of page 5, and that 
2 says 6, 5 and 6. 
3 Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Correct. Mr. House, can you please 
4 read paragraph 17? 
5 A. "The lease termination. A resident may terminate this 
6 lease upon the 30 day notice in compliance with paragraph 16," 
7 is that what you're talking about? 
8 Q. Correct. 
9 A. Okay. "A resident will leave the premises in a clean 
10 and safe condition and return all keys to the housing 
11 authority." Keep reading? 
12 Q. Yes. 
13 A. "Housing authority will evict residents from non-
14 payment of rent, non-payment of other financial obligation due 
15 and a (inaudible) of the lease, making any false and misleading 
16 statements concerning information required by the housing 
17 authority, criminal activities that threaten the health, safety 
18 or the rights of people (inaudible) residents, by other 
19 residents (inaudible) criminal activities at or near the 
20 premises, repeated failure to comply with any resident 
21 obligation (inaudible) or for other good cause." 
22 Q. Mr. House, is it your understanding — you testified 
23 earlier that (inaudible). 
24 A. Uh-huh. 
25 Q. Right? 
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federal (inaudible) as well as state? 
A. That's for sure. 
Q. So as a matter of right, if I understand you 
correctly, if they get served with a 30 day notice, a tenant 
does, then they can request a grievance? 
A. A grievance, right. 
Q. If hypothetically an individual tenant were to be 
evicted for non-payment of rent, are they also allowed to 
request a grievance hearing? 
A. Yes, they are, but there again, we serve a 14 day 
notice. If in the event the rent is not paid by the 5th or 6th 
day of the month, then we'll serve another notice to a 
resident. 
Q. And that's a 14 day notice? 
A. That's a 14 day and that's federal law. 
Q. That's federal law. 
A. Yes. The state law is three day notice. 
Q. Now is it the housing authority's normal procedure on 
something that's alleged to be criminal, what kind of notice 
does the housing authority serve? 
A. If it's a threat to health, safety of staff and also 
residents we serve a three day notice, for drug activities and 
that type of thing, yes. 
Q. So any kind of criminal activity, significant in your 
mind, would (inaudible). 
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1 Q. Are you familiar with that regulation? 
2 A. Well, I don't (inaudible) federal regulation from me, 
3 but if I had to call regulation I could tell you about those. 
4 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I again am not prepared to 
5 cover a trial. I have a copy of our motion for summary 
6 judgment that sets forth that code and I would like to present 
7 that perhaps to refresh his memory and have him read that and 
8 not present it as evidence, although it is part of the record. 
9 We're dealing with that particular section. May I do so? 
10 MS. WASHBURN: Well, is it 966.41? 
11 MR. HARRIS: That's correct (inaudible). 
12 MS. WASHBURN: Maybe I have a copy. 
13 MR. HARRIS: I'd like to present — may I approach the 
14 witness, your Honor? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 Q. BY MR. HARRIS: I'm presenting you with a copy that 
17 your attorney has provided me of the code. We're looking at 
18 part 966. Turn on this — at the bottom it says page 453. Do 
19 you see that page? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q* There's a subsection (f) that's called "tenant's 
22 obligation," Do you see that? It's on the second column about 
23 maybe three-quarters of the way down on that page, 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. If you'll turn to the next page, then, No. 11. Could 
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THE WITNESS: You said the bottom of page 5, and that 
says 6, 5 and 6. 
Q. BY MS. WASHBURN: Correct. Mr. House, can you please 
read paragraph 17? 
A. "The lease termination. A resident may terminate this 
lease upon the 30 day notice in compliance with paragraph 16," 
is that what you're talking about? 
Q. Correct. 
A. Okay. "A resident will leave the premises in a clean 
and safe condition and return all keys to the housing 
authority." Keep reading? 
Q. Yes. 
A. "Housing authority will evict residents from non-
payment of rent, non-payment of other financial obligation due 
and a (inaudible) of the lease, making any false and misleading 
statements concerning information required by the housing 
authority, criminal activities that threaten the health, safety 
or the rights of people (inaudible) residents, by other 
residents (inaudible) criminal activities at or near the 
premises, repeated failure to comply with any resident 
obligation (inaudible) or for other good cause." 
Q. Mr. House, is it your understanding — you testified 




MR. HARRIS: We believe that the lease that he was 
trying to comply with says in fact that — the lease prohibits 
more behavior than the — as he's testified it required to do 
by HUD regulations. So I want to establish this is what HUD is 
able to do and this is what is not. 
THE COURT: Okay, I mean so we're reading — this is 
the code right now. What more do you want out of that, that's 
what I'm trying to get, what (inaudible) to read? 
MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I want to read what the 
federal regulations require, and then I want to read what the 
actual lease states. 
THE COURT: Okay. So do you want him to read it out 
loud? 
MR. HARRIS: Yes, please. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: Number 11, "To act and cause household 
members or guests to act in a meaning which will not disturb 
other residents' personal enjoyment of their accommodation. 
(Inaudible) will be conducive to (inaudible) the project will 
be so safe and in sanitary condition.H 
Q. BY MR. HARRIS: And can I get you to read 12.1(a) and 
(b)? 
A. "To ensure that the tenants," is that 12.1? 
Q. That's correct. 
A. Okay, "To ensure that the tenants, the tenant, any 
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Q. Are you familiar with that regulation? 
A. Well, I don't (inaudible) federal regulation from me, 
but if I had to call regulation I could tell you about those. 
MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I again am not prepared to 
cover a trial. I have a copy of our motion for summary 
judgment that sets forth that code and I would like to present 
that perhaps to refresh his memory and have him read that and 
not present it as evidence, although it is part of the record. 
We're dealing with that particular section. May I do so? 
MS. WASHBURN: Well, is it 966.41? 
MR. HARRIS: That's correct (inaudible). 
MS. WASHBURN: Maybe I have a copy. 
MR. HARRIS: I'd like to present — may I approach the 
witness, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q. BY MR. HARRIS: I'm presenting you with a copy that 
your attorney has provided me of the code. We're looking at 
part 966. Turn on this — at the bottom it says page 453. Do 
you see that page? 
A. Yes* 
Q. There's a subsection (f) that's called "tenant's 
obligation." Do you see that? It's on the second column about 
maybe three-quarters of the way down on that page. 
A. Yes. 
Q. If you'll turn to the next page, then, No. 11. Could 
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1 will act in a manner so that not to disturb any neighbor's 
2 peaceful enjoyment or his or her accommodation and refraining 
3 from all illegal and criminal activities on or near the 
4 premises. Such illegal activities includes but is not limited 
5 up to the use of sale of drugs by the residence, household 
6 members or guests or visitors," 
7 Q. Is there anywhere in there where it prohibits the 
8 right of peaceful enjoyment of accommodations by the employees 
9 in that particular section as you read it? 
10 A. It did not state the employees, I guess. 
11 Q. Would you agree that it was the Salt Lake County 
12 Housing Authority's right to have included that language in 
13 this lease agreement? 
14 A. Well, (inaudible) is an employee. She's an employee 
15 plus a resident. 
16 Q. Okay, I asked the question as to whether or not does 
17 the county housing authority have the right to incorporate that 
18 language in their lease agreement? 
19 A. Yeah/ I guess we could put it in the lease agreement, 
20 yes. 
21 Q. But it is not in this lease agreement Mr. Snyder 
22 signed; is that correct? 
23 A. That's correct/ he did sign it. 
24 Q. And is that contained as well in the paragraph you 
25 read earlier on page 5? 
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1 MR. HARRIS: We believe that the lease that he was 
2 trying to comply with says in fact that — the lease prohibits 
3 more behavior than the — as he's testified it required to do 
4 by HUD regulations. So I want to establish this is what HUD is 
5 able to do and this is what is not. 
6 THE COURT: Okay, I mean so we're reading — this is 
7 the code right now. What more do you want out of that, that's 
8 what I'm trying to get, what (inaudible) to read? 
9 MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, I want to read what the 
10 federal regulations require, and then I want to read what the 
11 actual lease states. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. So do you want him to read it out 
13 loud? 
14 MR. HARRIS: Yes, please. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 THE WITNESS: Number 11, "To act and cause household 
17 members or guests to act in a meaning which will not disturb 
18 other residents' personal enjoyment of their accommodation. 
19 (Inaudible) will be conducive to (inaudible) the project will 
20 be so safe and in sanitary condition." 
21 Q. BY MR. HARRIS: And can I get you to read 12.1(a) and 
22 (b)? 
23 A. "To ensure that the tenants," is that 12.1? 
24 Q. That's correct. 
25 A. Okay, "To ensure that the tenants, the tenant, any 
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1 THE COURT: Well, we had him qualified a minute ago, 
2 so I'll overrule that one. 
3 Q. BY MR. HARRIS: Could you answer the question, please? 
4 A. Repeat the question again. 
5 MR. HARRIS: One moment, your Honor. I lost ray train 
6 of thought, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: You were trying to have him compare 
8 whether the (inaudible) of the agreement (inaudible) were more 
9 expansive than the federal regulations. 
10 Q. BY MR. HARRIS: Yes, thank you, your Honor. Would it 
11 be your opinion that the lease agreement that Mr. Snyder signed 
12 is more expansive and prohibits more activity, more activity 
13 than does the code of federal regulations? 
14 A. We use the federal regulation CFR's as a guideline in 
15 coming up with our lease agreement. 
16 Q. So you're not required to follow the code of federal 
17 regulations? 
18 A. We're required to follow all of the code of 
19 regulations, but we use it as a guideline to put together our 
20 lease agreements. 
21 Q. So if you were to put something in that was prohibited 
22 by the code of federal regulations would that be enforceable? 
23 A. Well, these regulations are approved by the feds, or 
24 by HUD, so I'm quite sure if they had any problem with those 
25 they would have contacted us. 
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will act in a manner so that not to disturb any neighbor's 
peaceful enjoyment or his or her accommodation and refraining 
from all illegal and criminal activities on or near the 
premises. Such illegal activities includes but is not limited 
up to the use of sale of drugs by the residence, household 
members or guests or visitors." 
Q. Is there anywhere in there where it prohibits the 
right of peaceful enjoyment of accommodations by the employees 
in that particular section as you read it? 
A, It did not state the employees, I guess. 
Q. Would you agree that it was the Salt Lake County 
Housing Authority's right to have included that language in 
this lease agreement? 
A. Well, (inaudible) is an employee. She's an employee 
plus a resident. 
Q. Okay, I asked the question as to whether or not does 
the county housing authority have the right to incorporate that 
language in their lease agreement? 
A. Yeah, I guess we could put it in the lease agreement, 
yes. 
Q. But it is not in this lease agreement Mr. Snyder 
signed; is that correct? 
A. That's correct, he did sign it. 
Q. And is that contained as well in the paragraph you 
read earlier on page 5? 
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1 MS, WASHBURN: May I approach the witness, your Honor? 
2 THE COURT: Yes. 
3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MS. WASHBURN: 
5 Q. The record can reflect that I'm also handing a copy of 
6 this document to opposing counsel. Mr. House, did the 
7 Department of Housing and Urban Development approve your lease? 
8 I A. That's correct. 
9 Q. Is it your understanding that the Department of 
10 Housing and Urban Development is the entity which (inaudible) 
11 the regulations which were developed? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. Mr. House, if you would, please, turn to page 4 of the 
14 lease agreement. 
15 A. Okay. 
16 Q. The very top — and I don't know if I've stapled on 
17 paragraph 11 subparagraph (e). Can you read that? Is it clear 
18 on your copy? 
19 A. Is it (e), is that 11(d)? 
20 Q. It's the one at the very top of the page. 
21 A. I can't. "Residents will comply with all terms," is 
22 that the one you're talking about? 
23 Q. Yes. 
24 A. "Residents will comply with all terms of the lease, 
25 all rules and regulations posted by the housing authority in 
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1 THE COURT: Well, we had him qualified a minute ago, 
2 so I'll overrule that one. 
3 Q. BY MR. HARRIS: Could you answer the question, please? 
4 A. Repeat the question again. 
5 MR. HARRIS: One moment, your Honor. I lost my train 
6 of thought, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: You were trying to have him compare 
8 whether the (inaudible) of the agreement (inaudible) were more 
9 expansive than the federal regulations. 
10 Q. BY MR. HARRIS: Yes, thank you, your Honor. Would it 
11 be your opinion that the lease agreement that Mr. Snyder signed 
12 is more expansive and prohibits more activity, more activity 
13 than does the code of federal regulations? 
14 A. We use the federal regulation CFR's as a guideline in 
15 coming up with our lease agreement. 
16 Q. So you're not required to follow the code of federal 
17 regulations? 
18 A. We're required to follow all of the code of 
19 regulations, but we use it as a guideline to put together our 
20 lease agreements. 
21 I Q. So if you were to put something in that was prohibited 
22 by the code of federal regulations would that be enforceable? 
23 A. Well, these regulations are approved by the feds, or 
24 by HUD, so I'm quite sure if they had any problem with those 
25 they would have contacted us. 
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1 in general that this part of the lease agreement— 
2 A. This is part of the lease agreement, yes. 
3 Q. Why is it that the housing authority doesn't give a 
4 copy of this document with the lease agreement with everybody 
5 that signs? 
6 A. Well, we would have to give out some, I don't know, 
7 2800 copies of this, and it is — I don't know, maybe — it's 
8 like 35 pages long. It's a lot of trees. 
9 Q. Earlier counsel asked you about your interpretation of 
10 the lease provisions regarding criminal activity. Would you 
11 consider Ms. Rico to be a person? 
12 A. Sure. 
13 Q. Would you consider an assault against her to be 
14 criminal activity? 
15 A. Sure. 
16 Q. If that assault were to take place at the Senior 
17 Highrise, do you think that's at or on or near the premises of 
18 the housing authority? 
19 A. I think so. 
20 Q. Should it make any difference, in your opinion, when 
21 you're (inaudible) to evict that somebody commits a crime and 
22 goes to a fellow tenant, a maintenance person or another 
23 housing authority employee, do you think there should be some 
24 kind of distinction? 
25 A. I don't think I gave up my right to — civil rights to 
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1 MS. WASHBURN: May I approach the witness, your Honor? 
2 THE COURT: Yes. 
3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
4 BY MS. WASHBURN: 
5 Q. The record can reflect that I'm also handing a copy of 
6 this document to opposing counsel. Mr. House, did the 
7 Department of Housing and Urban Development approve your lease? 
8 A. That's correct. 
9 Q. Is it your understanding that the Department of 
10 Housing and Urban Development is the entity which (inaudible) 
11 the regulations which were developed? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. Mr. House, if you would, please, turn to page 4 of the 
14 lease agreement. 
15 A. Okay. 
16 Q. The very top — and I don't know if I've stapled on 
17 paragraph 11 subparagraph (e). Can you read that? Is it clear 
18 on your copy? 
19 A. Is it (e), is that 11(d)? 
20 Q. It's the one at the very top of the page. 
21 A. I can't. "Residents will comply with all terms," is 
22 that the one you're talking about? 
23 Q. Yes. 
24 A. "Residents will comply with all terms of the lease, 
25 all rules and regulations posted by the housing authority in 
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1 MR, HARRIS: One moment, your Honor. Just a couple of 
2 questions. 
3 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. HARRIS:. 
5 Q. I want to (inaudible) what type of criminal activity 
6 you could evict someone for under the lease agreement. Could 
7 you evict someone for jaywalking, under a strict reading of the 
8 lease agreement? 
9 A. I'm not a police officer. What I normally do, what 
10 takes place on the housing authority properties, that's what 
11 really I'm concerned about. 
12 Q. And you determined that this altercation with Ms. Rico 
13 was criminal assault and decided to evict Tom on that basis? 
14 What was your basis for determining that? 
15 MS. WASHBURN: Objection, asked and answered. 
16 THE COURT: I'm not real sure it has been. Go ahead. 
17 THE WITNESS: I think that the officer testified 
18 earlier as far as what a— 
19 THE COURT: He's trying to focus you in on a portion 
20 of the agreement on which you relied to make your decision that 
21 Mr. Snyder has to go. 
22 THE WITNESS: Okay. I feel that the — excuse me, 
23 your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: I mean what part of the agreement do you 
25 look to to say I've got authority to get him out of here? 
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1 in general that this part of the lease agreement— 
2 A. This is part of the lease agreement, yes. 
3 Q. Why is it that the housing authority doesn't give a 
4 copy of this document with the lease agreement with everybody 
5 that signs? 
6 A. Well, we would have to give out some, I don't know, 
7 2800 copies of this, and it is — I don't know, maybe — it's 
8 like 35 pages long. It's a lot of trees. 
9 Q. Earlier counsel asked you about your interpretation of 
10 the lease provisions regarding criminal activity. Would you 
11 consider Ms. Rico to be a person? 
12 A. Sure. 
13 Q. Would you consider an assault against her to be 
14 criminal activity? 
15 A. Sure. 
16 Q. If that assault were to take place at the Senior 
17 Highrise, do you think that's at or on or near the premises of 
18 the housing authority? 
19 A. I think so. 
20 Q. Should it make any difference, in your opinion, when 
21 you're (inaudible) to evict that somebody commits a crime and 
22 goes to a fellow tenant, a maintenance person or another 
23 housing authority employee, do you think there should be some 
24 kind of distinction? 
25 A. I don't think I gave up my right to — civil rights to 
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1 criminal activity. Jaywalking is clearly illegal. 
2 THE COURT: I'm not sure it is in Salt Lake City. 
3 That's ray point. It's some kind of civil matter where they 
4 take you to small claims. Salt Lake is unlike a lot of the 
5 cities on these things. They're real (inaudible). 
6 MR. HARRIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
7 Q. BY MR. HARRIS: If anybody engages in any type of 
8 illegal or criminal activity, no matter the severity, you would 
9 have authority to evict them under this provision; is that 
10 correct? 
11 A. Anybody. Now what's anybody? 
12 Q. Any tenant who has signed this lease. 
13 A. I see. 
14 Q. Then you would have the authority to evict them for 
15 any illegal or criminal activity no matter the severity under 
16 this agreement; is that correct? 
17 A. If they have violated the lease, yes, under this lease 
18 agreement. 
19 Q. I'm not asking about the lease, I'm asking about this 
20 paragraph here, No. 11(i) where it says all illegal or criminal 
21 activity. 
22 A. If they have signed the lease agreement, yes. 
23 MR. HARRIS: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Thanks. You're done, Mr. House. We'll 
25 take a recess. 
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1 MR. HARRIS: One moment, your Honor. Just a couple of 
2 questions. 
3 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
4 BY MR. HARRIS: 
5 Q. I want to (inaudible) what type of criminal activity 
6 you could evict someone for under the lease agreement. Could 
7 you evict someone for jaywalking, under a strict reading of the 
8 lease agreement? 
9 A. I'm not a police officer. What I normally do, what 
10 takes place on the housing authority properties, that's what 
11 really I'm concerned about. 
12 Q. And you determined that this altercation with Ms. Rico 
13 was criminal assault and decided to evict Tom on that basis? 
14 What was your basis for determining that? 
15 MS. WASHBURN: Objection, asked and answered. 
16 THE COURT: I'm not real sure it has been. Go ahead. 
17 THE WITNESS: I think that the officer testified 
18 earlier as far as what a— 
19 THE COURT: He's trying to focus you in on a portion 
20 of the agreement on which you relied to make your decision that 
21 Mr. Snyder has to go. 
22 THE WITNESS: Okay. I feel that the — excuse me, 
23 your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: I mean what part of the agreement do you 



























A. Kimberly Washburn, I received some mail from you. 
Q. Okay. There is a document that's in front of you 
that's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No, 1. Is it still 
there in front of you? 
A. Oh, hell, yeah. I couldn't see it. 
Q. If you wouldn't mind, sir, could you please turn to 
the last page of that document— 
A. You'll have to speak up, honey, I'm hard of hearing. 
Q. I apologize. If you could please turn to the last 
page of that document, page 7• 
A. Page 7, yes, ma'am. 
Q. At the bottom of that page there is a signature, it 
says, "John D. Snyder." Is that your signature? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Did you sign that document? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Will you take a look at the document and make sure it 
is what you recall signing? 
A. I didn't understand that. 
Q. If you could please, take a look at the document, make 
sure that it is what you recall signing. 
A. I'm not getting that last part, what I would call 
what? 
Q. Is that document that's marked as No. 1, is that the 
actual lease agreement that you signed with the housing 
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1 criminal activity. Jaywalking is clearly illegal. 
2 THE COURT: I'm not sure it is in Salt Lake City. 
3 That's my point. It's some kind of civil matter where they 
4 take you to small claims. Salt Lake is unlike a lot of the 
5 cities on these things. They're real (inaudible). 
6 MR. HARRIS: Thank you, your Honor. 
7 Q. BY MR. HARRIS: If anybody engages in any type of 
8 illegal or criminal activity, no matter the severity, you would 
9 have authority to evict them under this provision; is that 
10 correct? 
11 A. Anybody. Now what's anybody? 
12 Q. Any tenant who has signed this lease. 
13 A. I see. 
14 Q. Then you would have the authority to evict them for 
15 any illegal or criminal activity no matter the severity under 
16 this agreement; is that correct? 
17 A. If they have violated the lease, yes, under this lease 
18 agreement. 
19 Q. I'm not asking about the lease, I'm asking about this 
20 paragraph here, No. ll(i) where it says all illegal or criminal 
21 activity. 
22 A. If they have signed the lease agreement, yes. 
23 MR. HARRIS: I have nothing further, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Thanks. You're done, Mr. House. We'll 
25 take a recess. 
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1 occurred between you and Ms. Rico. Why don't you explain in 
2 your words what happened on that day, starting with the first 
3 contact you had with the office then. 
4 A. Well, ray recollection, she called me somewhere after 9 
5 o'clock, give or take a little bit, and told me that she had 
6 heard I wanted to see her. 
7 Q. What did you want to see her about? 
8 A. Well, I had written a letter to her boss, Scott 
9 Lancelot, and — but I wanted her to have a copy of it, and she 
10 leaves early. She seldom is there, really. She spends her 
11 time over with the big boys and has someone representing her. 
12 Q. So she called and said to come down and meet her. 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. What happened then? 
15 A. She said, "I'm in my office, come down." I said, 
16 "I'll be right there." So I walked down and I had the letter 
17 in my hand. When I walked in I tried to give it to Ms. Rico, 
18 and she acted like it was a weapon or something. She backed 
19 off and said, "I've already read it." She said, "I don't want 
20 to see it." So I just turned and sat down. 
21 Q. And then what happened? 
22 A. She sounded almost hysterical. She said, "If you 
23 don't like it here why don't you move," or "why don't you 
24 leave," something to that effect. I said, "I love it here." I 
25 said, "This is the best deal I've found." But I said, "If you 
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A. Kimberly Washburn, I received some mail from you. 
Q. Okay. There is a document that's in front of you 
that's been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1. Is it still 
there in front of you? 
A. Oh, hell, yeah. I couldn't see it. 
Q. If you wouldn't mind, sir, could you please turn to 
the last page of that document— 
A. You'll have to speak up, honey, I'm hard of hearing. 
Q. I apologize. If you could please turn to the last 
page of that document, page 7. 
A. Page 7, yes, ma'am. 
Q. At the bottom of that page there is a signature, it 
says, "John D. Snyder." Is that your signature? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Did you sign that document? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Will you take a look at the document and make sure it 
is what you recall signing? 
A. I didn't understand that. 
Q. If you could please, take a look at the document, make 
sure that it is what you recall signing. 
A. I'm not getting that last part, what I would call 
what? 
Q. Is that document that's marked as No. 1, is that the 
actual lease agreement that you signed with the housing 
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1 left. 
2 Q. You pointed your finger at her at some point during 
3 this. 
4 A. I may have, but I was always sitting down. I read 
5 her— 
6 Q. Go ahead, I'm sorry. 
7 A. I read her story and where she said I was pushing it 
8 in her face, she's talking to the wall. 
9 Q. How close do you think you got to her? 
10 A. Oh, I don't think my finger was anywhere within two 
11 feet of her. I'd say three feet more likely, but I do have a 
12 nasty habit of pointing. 
13 Q. Do you have a nasty habit of swearing every now and 
14 then? 
15 A. I worked in the oil fields a little, and I've heard 
16 some choice words. 
17 Q. Did you use some of those this day? 
18 A. I didn't understand it. 
19 Q. Did you use some of those words during this 
20 altercation? 
21 A. I probably did. It's in my vocabulary. 
22 Q. What did you mean when you said to her — you heard 
23 testimony that they said you said, "I'm going to get you, or 
24 we're not finished yet." What did you mean by that? 
25 A. Well, I think that — I think I said, "You better have 
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1 occurred between you and Ms. Rico. Why don't you explain in 
2 your words what happened on that day, starting with the first 
3 contact you had with the office then. 
4 A. Well, my recollection, she called me somewhere after 9 
5 o'clock, give or take a little bit, and told me that she had 
6 heard I wanted to see her. 
7 Q. What did you want to see her about? 
8 A. Well, I had written a letter to her boss, Scott 
9 Lancelot, and — but I wanted her to have a copy of it, and she 
10 leaves early. She seldom is there, really. She spends her 
11 time over with the big boys and has someone representing her. 
12 Q. So she called and said to come down and meet her. 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. What happened then? 
15 A. She said, "I'm in my office, come down." I said, 
16 "I'll be right there." So I walked down and I had the letter 
17 in my hand. When I walked in I tried to give it to Ms. Rico, 
18 and she acted like it was a weapon or something. She backed 
19 off and said, "I've already read it." She said, "I don't want 
20 to see it." So I just turned and sat down. 
21 Q. And then what happened? 
22 A. She sounded almost hysterical. She said, "If you 
23 don't like it here why don't you move," or "why don't you 
24 leave," something to that effect. I said, "I love it here." I 
25 said, "This is the best deal I've found." But I said, "If you 
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1 I made an appointment with Mr. House to talk to him about it, 
2 and when I went over there Ms. Rico was all business and she 
3 came in and sat down right there. 
4 Mr. House explained the ground rules, there couldn't 
5 be any name calling or anything, and the next words out of his 
6 mouth — now this is the first time I had ever laid eyes on the 
7 man. He laid these ground rules down there couldn't be any 
8 name calling or anything, and I said, "Fine." He said, "And we 
9 know about your drinking problem." Ms. Rico was sitting within 
10 three or four feet of me, and I said, "Where did you get that 
11 information," and pointed at her, and she just sat there with 
12 her head down, she never said a word, and Roy House didn't 
13 mention my drinking problem. 
14 I have drank for 50 years, I suppose, but I don't 
15 think I have a drinking problem. I've never been arrested for 
16 it. I have — my driver's license is clean. I haven't even 
17 had a conviction in 25 or 30 years of a traffic ticket. 
18 Q. Regarding the incident, then, with Ms. Rico, did you 
19 ever speak with any law enforcement officers regarding that 
20 incident? 
21 A. No, sir, I did not. 
22 Q. Was it your — did you go down there and threaten her? 
23 A. No, I went down to deliver a letter to her. 
24 Q. Do you feel that you threatened her in any way? 
25 A. Did I what? 
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1 whole argument. 
2 MR. HARRIS: Thank you. I rest, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Ms. Washburn, anything more? 
4 MS. WASHBURN: No rebuttal witnesses, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: You get to lead out. 
6 MS. WASHBURN: Your Honor, we're here today on a 
7 proceeding in unlawful detainer for a lease violation by the 
8 defendant, Mr. John Thomas Snyder. The evidence has clearly 
9 shown as required under the forcible entry and detainer statute 
10 that the housing authority is the owner and the landlord of the 
11 premises where Mr- Snyder resides, specifically 1966 South 200 
12 East, Apartment A-506. That's located here in Salt Lake City, 
13 your Honor. 
14 In addition, the evidence has shown, your Honor, that 
15 this tenancy of Mr. Snyder at the subject premises was pursuant 
16 to a lease agreement entered into by the parties, signed by 
17 both parties. That lease agreement, your Honor, makes specific 
18 reference to the applicability of regulations, policy manuals, 
19 et cetera. They are all incorporated into that lease 
20 agreement. That lease agreement is a valid lease agreement. 
21 Your Honor, counsel for defendant has tried to 
22 persuade this Court to find a ruling that that lease is 
23 invalid. I don't know that the Court has enough evidence in 
24 front of it to do so, and certainly that is the exact basis for 
25 his federal class action lawsuit filed recently. So I don't 
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1 THE COURT: Where does it say that? 
2 MS. WASHBURN: Paragraph 11 sub (d). 
3 THE COURT: D? 
4 MS. WASHBURN: Yes. In addition, reference is made to 
5 those in the policy statement admitted as Exhibit 3, your 
6 Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Well, I appreciate you saying the words. 
8 Where is 11(d)? 
9 MS. WASHBURN: Yes, that would be, your Honor, at the 
10 top of page 4 wherein it says, "Resident will comply with all 
11 terms of this lease, all rules and regulations posted by 
12 housing authority in its main office, and all applicable 
13 provisions of building and housing codes affecting health and 
14 safety." 
15 THE COURT: Where exactly does it talk about the code 
16 of federal regulations? 
17 MS, WASHBURN: Your Honor, there's no specific 
18 reference to the CFR's; however, the CFR's are governing law 
19 and they — I would argue certainly that this lease 
20 contemplates that inclusion. 
21 THE COURT: I appreciate your contemplation. Where do 
22 we get the language that it contemplates such inclusion? I 
23 can't pretend to have read it and digest it as you may have. 
24 Where does it contemplate this? 
25 MS. WASHBURN: Specifically paragraph 11(d). 
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1 part of the lease agreement admitted as Exhibit No. 3. 
2 THE COURT: I haven't seen 3. Is it available 
3 somewhere? 
4 MS. WASHBURN: It is, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Everything else, I guess, was — but maybe 
6 it's in here and I just can't find it. 
7 MS. WASHBURN: There, your Honor, and here's No. 2 as 
8 well. 
9 THE COURT: Where in here does it say— 
10 MS. WASHBURN: And I can't— 
11 THE COURT: I mean do you want to make the CFR part of 
12 (inaudible) and/or policy statement? I'm just trying to figure 
13 out why anybody talks about a CFR like it means something. You 
14 might need a basis for what folks do here, and I don't know 
15 that — it's not like some all encompassing overriding 
16 (inaudible) I don't think. 
17 MS. WASHBURN: The purpose — we've been talking about 
18 the code of regulations is that the housing authority receives 
19 federal money— 
20 THE COURT: Well, I'm following that, but I don't see 
21 how they become part of the agreements under which tenants have 
22 to live. Where does it say, "By the way, the CFR is part of 
23 your agreement, tooM? That's what I'm not getting. 
24 MS. WASHBURN: I guess in that effect, I mean if 
25 you're going to be that specific there is no particular 
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1 THE COURT: Well, I don't mean to — I mean if you 
2 want to talk about that, that's fine, what does that have to do 
3 with us? That's what I'm not — this is kind of like the CFR, 
4 so what? 
5 MS. WASHBURN: I agree. 
6 THE COURT: So I'm not getting why it matters. I mean 
7 you want to talk about it, and I just need to understand why I 
8 should pay attention to what you're saying. 
9 MS. WASHBURN: Well, I don't particularly care to talk 
10 about it. My position is this is a valid lease, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: It strikes me that that's what we're 
12 operating under here. Everyone wants me to go to the CFR and I 
13 don't know why. 
14 MS. WASHBURN: I think your Honor is perfectly capable 
15 of evaluating the law and determining how that works. Our 
16 position is we have a valid lease signed by both parties, has 
17 been approved by HUD, complies with all the requirements set 
18 forth on the housing authority, your Honor, and that Mr. 
19 Snyder, the defendant herein, is bound by the terms of that 
20 lease agreement. 
21 We have testimony, as I (inaudible) forward, your 
22 Honor, that Mr. Snyder committed what technically under Utah 
23 law is an assault on a housing authority employee, Ms. Sherri 
24 Rico. 
25 Ms. Rico testified she was fearful, we heard other 
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paragraph 17 at the bottom of page 5 through page 6. The lease 
will be terminated for certain things, including non-payment of 
rent. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MS. WASHBURN: If you don't provide information as 
you're required to in order to meet the funding that is 
provided— 
THE COURT: None of that is alleged. 
MS. WASHBURN: Okay, criminal activities that threaten 
the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment by other 
residents in addition or for other good cause. 
THE COURT: So what do you think applies in this case? 
MS. WASHBURN: I think that the criminal activity, 
your Honor, does as well as other— 
THE COURT: So Ms. Rico — I mean we haven't heard 
testimony Ms. Rico is a resident. 
MS. WASHBURN: No, you haven't. 
THE COURT: So how could that apply? I don't like to 
argue about it, but I'm just trying to figure out what your 
thinking is, because the language says other residents. If it 
meant something else I guess you could have said that. So you 
think this criminal activity (inaudible) applies in paragraph 
17? 
MS. WASHBURN: I do, your Honor. I think that any 
criminal activity, I think that that can be broad enough to 
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1 still present in the premises pursuant to the terms of the 
2 lease agreement. We are entitled to our damages, including 
3 attorney's fees and costs, your Honor, and under the law we are 
4 entitled to treble damages because of his unlawful detainer. 
5 THE COURT: Well, I've read your contract law, but 
6 where does it say (inaudible) fees? 
7 MS. WASHBURN: Paragraph 18. 
8 THE COURT: Pardon me? 
9 MS. WASHBURN: I'm sorry, what's your question? 
10 THE COURT: What (inaudible) number? 
11 MS. WASHBURN: Paragraph 18 of the lease. 
12 THE COURT: Go ahead, thanks. 
13 MS. WASHBURN: Okay. Your Honor, I would proffer in 
14 the course of the time final documents would be submitted that 
15 the damages in this matter, your Honor, treble damages are 
16 presently through today in the amount of $1,128, that's $18.80 
17 per day. We have a total of 68 days that he's been in unlawful 
18 detainer. The total attorney's fees in this case to date with 
19 an estimate for today is $7,118.05, and the costs— 
20 THE COURT: Wait, I thought you said $7,000. 
21 MS. WASHBURN: I did say that, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Seven thousand to prosecute this event? 
23 MS. WASHBURN: Yes, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: I would probably need an affidavit. 
25 MS. WASHBURN: Okay, as a result of documentation 
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1 So the first argument, your Honor, is that this is an 
2 invalid lease provision, that it prohibits more behavior, it 
3 allows them to evict him for even minor infractions, minor 
4 behavior that is illegal or criminal, whereas all the cases 
5 that have cited and that have dealt with this particular 
6 regulation point to serious criminal behavior, drug related 
7 activities, selling drugs out of the house, selling drugs to an 
8 informant, not something as belligerent as swearing or calling 
9 names to other housing authorities. 
10 Which thing gets me, your Honor, to the second defense 
11 that Mr. Snyder asserts, and that's that his conduct, while 
12 clearly offensive, is not criminal in nature. I think calling 
13 other persons names, being belligerent in hostile, being 
14 threatening and intimidating, while clearly offensive, don't 
15 rise to the level of being criminal behavior. Pointing towards 
16 somebody, telling someone, "We're not done with this yet,M you 
17 know, telling someone to, "Pull up your pantyhose," while again 
18 offensive, your Honor, is not criminal assault that allows them 
19 to terminate the lease and evict him. 
20 That is his defense, number one, your Honor, that this 
21 lease provision is invalid, and that number two, that the 
22 behavior that they assert occurred does not rise to the level 
23 of being criminal and is not allowed under the lease to be 
24 evictable. Thank you. 
25 THE COURT: One question. If it's invalid according 
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1 terms of this agreement, and if it's not in there I don't know 
2 how I can say it exists. That's where you folks have left me 
3 when you go to the CFR. I think there may be a claim for some 
4 problem, but I don't think it's a landlord/tenant problem. 
5 MR. HARRIS: On page 2 of this again, your Honor, 
6 again— 
7 THE COURT: Page 2 where? 
8 MR. HARRIS: Page 2 of Exhibit 2, and then we're 
9 looking down— 
10 THE COURT: Well, this is his notice, right? 
11 MR. HARRIS: This is the notice, yes. They are saying 
12 here, "You are not entitled to a grievance proceeding 
13 contending the issue of the notice." The reason that he's not 
14 entitled to a grievance procedure is because they're saying 
15 that this is — you are being evicted from criminal and/or drug 
16 related activity on our given premises, whereas if they're 
17 trying to evict him for what they call good cause, then he is 
18 clearly entitled to go through the grievance. 
19 THE COURT: You keep saying he's entitled. Where in 
20 the agreement does it say, "You've got a grievance right"? 
21 That's — I keep coming back to this question. 
22 MR. HARRIS: I can find it if you'll give me a moment, 
23 your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: It seems to me I'm governed by the 
25 agreement that Mr. Snyder signed with these folks. 
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1 THE COURT: The HUD regulation is another word for 
2 CFR? Is there another— 
3 MR. HARRIS: Well, I assume that those are the 
4 policies and procedures that they — that hundred page document 
5 that they pointed to. 
6 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
7 Ms. Washburn, any last comment? 
8 MS. WASHBURN: I guess, your Honor, I would maintain 
9 that that specific argument with regard to the grievance 
10 proceeding was raised in a motion to dismiss which has not been 
11 submitted to this Court for decision. So to that end — I mean 
12 there has been considerable briefing done on these issues and 
13 were that to have been submitted, I'm confident that the Court 
14 would find that the housing authority's actions in this regard 
15 were appropriate. The law provides for what they did. There 
16 has been no evidence indicating or entered today regarding what 
17 HUD's determination is with regard to that grievance procedure, 
18 so I don't know that it is all at all relevant. 
19 The housing authority made a determination, I think, 
20 well (inaudible). They started speaking with counsel, 
21 discussing the issue with the people involved in making those 
22 decisions to reach the conclusion that what happened was 
23 inappropriate and constituted grounds for eviction under the 
24 lease agreement, your Honor. 
25 Counsel for defendant maintains that, "Gee, it allows 
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1 by its terms and he began his tenancy 7 August of 1998. 
2 I also find that he failed to abide by the terms of 
3 this lease in that he engaged in criminal activity. I guess 
4 for the purposes of this hearing I think there is other good 
5 cause to have him removed. I think that it all revolves around 
6 this event, but we have Ms. Rico's testimony that essentially 
7 he came into the room, he started pointing his finger and 
8 coming around the desk and essentially, I guess, the phrase 
9 that we use now days, "getting in her face." So I think he 
10 made a clear threat. 
11 He was loud, he was upset, he was angry, his choice of 
12 words was intimidating, it's clear it did intimidate her 
13 because as I noted from the demeanor of both witnesses today, 
14 it's pretty clear to me Mr. Snyder could, if he had done what 
15 was described, intimidated and threatened in a manner that 
16 would make a person believe there is a show of immediate force 
17 to carry out some kind of bodily injury. 
18 Supporting that, of course, is Ms. Poulton's version. 
19 She heard this from 30 or 40 feet away. When she got there she 
20 listened some more, heard only the male voice, and when the 
21 door opened the only male in the room was Mr. Snyder, and she 
22 cooberated essentially everything Ms. Rico said. And then, of 
23 course, Mr. Trowbridge heard the same sorts of things over the 
24 radio — didn't see any of it. He heard the tone, heard the 
25 words. 
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1 And I guess that, of course, is Mr. Snyder's somewhat 
2 ambivalent statement, "Well, I'm not sure I said those things," 
3 or "I do know a little bit of oil field talk." I think it's 
4 pretty clear that the plaintiff has carried their burden by a 
5 preponderance to show that he committed the criminal act of 
6 assault or for other good cause. 
7 So I think pursuant to the agreement, which provisions 
8 I think are appropriate, paragraph 11 sub (i), because criminal 
9 activity in that subsection applies to anybody who is the 
10 recipient of the activity, so any time a resident engages in 
11 criminal activity, it needn't be limited just against other 
12 residents, as Section 17 for some reason does. Paragraph 11 
13 sub (i), he violated that, and paragraph 17, I think there is 
14 other good cause here, his conduct towards one of the employees 
15 of the plaintiff. 
16 So my conclusion is he has violated the terms of the 
17 lease, stipulated, then, that after that occurred he was served 
18 a three day notice to pay or quit. He did not pay — excuse 
19 me, I use that phrase too often. He (inaudible) a three day 
20 notice to quit because he violated the lease. He did not quit, 
21 he's there for — been an unlawful detainer for the plaintiff 
22 (inaudible) 68 days, which is within the amount that I 
23 (inaudible) unlawful detainer, and they are then entitled to 
24 their treble damages. 
25 I reserve the issue of attorney's fees pending receipt 
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1 of an affidavit to examine what costs were incurred in the 
2 defense and/or prosecution of this action, along with the 
3 attorney's fees and costs on that issue. I think I have to 
4 conclude, then, that Mr. Snyder has failed to oblige by the 
5 agreement, he's breached the agreement, he's not entitled to 
6 remain in unit A-506, and he is been in unlawful detainer since 
7 25 February. 
8 Ms. Washburn, anything more specific I need to make in 
9 way of findings? 
10 MS. WASHBURN: No, your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: In response to just a couple of your 
12 arguments, Mr. Harris, in that answer — I mean I think you're 
13 right, if he were simply offensive there wouldn't be a problem, 
14 but I think he has committed a crime. I think that's 
15 assaultive behavior to place his finger in the face of someone 
16 in the manner he did, given the context in which it was done, 
17 arising, moving around the table, getting closer to, made 
18 physical proximity with the tone of voice, and the language 
19 that he was using that day. 
20 And then you made another argument, which I think is a 
21 fair argument, but it doesn't apply to this case, what would 
22 happen if there were minor criminal events. Well, that's an 
23 argument, but it's not this case. This case is what I consider 
24 to be a serious criminal offense, that of assault. 
25 Then as I've intimated, I don't think these — the CFR 
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residing in Utah County 
unauthorized changes or additions have been made. 
U. Waterbeds are permitted on ground floor bedrooms only. 
V. Residents shall not install or change locks without the 
written permission of Management. 
W. Resident is responsible for the repair of all breakage of 
window glass, doors and screens on the premises. 
X. Resident shall not drive or park on lawn or sidewalks for any 
purpose. 
Y. No major repairs requiring that a vehicle remain in an 
inoperable condition for longer than 24 hours shall be 
permitted within the complex. The discharge of vehicle fluids 
including hydraulic fluids or anti-freeze within the complex 
shall be prohibited. 
Z. Maintenance should immediately be notified of inoperable smoke 
detectors. Removal of batteries from smoke detectors is 




A. "Grievance" shall mean any dispute which a tenant may 
have with respect to the Housing Authority of the County 
of Salt Lake (hereinafter referred to as the HA) action 
or failure to act in accordance with the individual tenant's 
lease of HA regulations which adversely affect the individual 
tenant's rights, duties, welfare, or status. 
B. "Complainant" shall mean any tenant whose grievance is 
presented to the HA or in accordance with this procedure. 
C. "Hearing Officer" shall mean a person appointed in accordance 
with Section C (2) of this Procedure to hear grievances and 
render a decision with respect thereto. 
D. "Tenant" shall mean any lessee or the remaining head of 
the household of any tenant family residing in housing 
accommodations covered by this Procedure. 
DISCUSSION OF GRIEVANCE 
A. Any grievance shall be personally presented, either 
orally or in writing, to the Area Manager or the Director 
of Housing so that the grievance may be discussed 
informally and settled without an informal hearing. 
B. The grievance must be presented by the complainant or his 
representative within a reasonable time, not in excess of 
10 days of the HA action or failure to act which is the 
basis of the grievance. 
C. The HA shall schedule the informal discussion as promptly 
as possible; time and place reasonably convenient to the 
complainant, and shall inform the complainant thereof. 
D. A summary of the discussion, dated and signed by the 
Director Of Housing shall be prepared within a reasonable 
time, not in excess of five working days of the informal 
discussion. One copy shall be given to the tenant and one 
retained in the HA's tenant file. The summary shall 
specify the nature of the complaint and the specific 
reasons therefore, and shall specify the right of the 
complainant to an informal hearing before the Executive 
Director and the procedure by which such a hearing may be 
obtained in such case as the complainant is not satisfied 
with the disposition of the matter by the HA. 
PROCEDURE TO OBTAIN A FORMAL HEARING 
Request a Hearing 
If the complainant is dissatisfied with the proposed 
disposition of his complaint, as stated in the Director of 
Housing or other HA official's statement, he may submit a 
written request for a hearing to the HA within a reasonable 
time, not in excess of 10 days of the date of the Director of 
Housing's summary. The written request shall specify: 
1. The reasons for the grievance; and 
2. The action of relief sought. 
Hearing Officer 
A hearing officer, as approved by the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development shall be appointed to preside over the 
formal hearing proceedings. 
Failure to Request a Formal Hearing 
If the complainant does not request a formal hearing in 
writing and within ten days of the Director of Housing1 s 
summary, then the HA's disposition of grievance as summarized 
by the Director of Housing shall become final. Failure to 
request a hearing shall not constitute a waiver by the 
complainant of his rights to contest the HA's action in an 
appropriate judicial proceeding. 
Hearing Prerequisite 
All grievances shall be personally presented either orally or 
in writing pursuant tot he informal procedure prescribed in 
section B as a condition precedent to a formal hearing. 
Escrow Deposit 
Before a hearing or an informal discussion is scheduled in any 
grievance involving the amount of rent which the HA claims is 
due, the complainant shall pay to the HA an amount equal to 
the amount of the rent due and payable as of the first of the 
month preceding the month in which the act or failure to act 
took place. The complainant shall thereafter deposit the same 
amount of the monthly rent in an escrow account monthly until 
the complaint is resolved by decision of the hearing officer. 
These requirements may be waived by the HA in extenuating 
circumstances. Unless so waived, the failure to make such 
payments shall result in a termination of the grievance 
procedure. 
F. Scheduling of Hearings 
A hearing shall be scheduled by the hearing officer or hearing 
panel promptly for a time and place reasonably convenient to 
both complainant and the HA. A written notification specifying 
the time, place and the procedures governing the hearing shall 
be delivered to the complainant and the appropriate HA 
official. 
4. PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE FORMAL HEARING 
A. The hearing shall be held before a hearing officer. 
B. The complainant shall be afforded a fair hearing providing the 
basic safeguards of due process which shall include: 
1. The opportunity to examine before the hearing and, 
at the expense of the complain.ant, to copy all 
documents, records and regulations of the HA that 
are relevant to the hearing. Any document not so 
made available after request therefore by the 
complainant may not be relied on the HA at the 
hearing. 
2. The right to be represented by counsel or other 
person chosen as his or her representative; 
3. The right to a private hearing unless the 
complainant requests a public hearing, but this 
shall not be construed to limit the attendance of 
persons with a valid interest in the proceedings. 
4. The right to present evidence and arguments in 
support of his or her complaint, or controvert 
evidence relied on the PHA, and to confront and 
cross-examine all witnesses on whose testimony or 
information the PHA relies; and 
5. A decision based solely and exclusively upon the 
facts presented at the hearing. 
C. If the complainant or the HA fails to appear at scheduled 
hearing, the hearing officer may make a determination that the 
party has waived his right to a hearing. Both the complainant 
and the PHA shall be notified of the determination by the 
hearing officer or hearing panel. 
The hearing shall be conducted by the hearing officer and oral 
or documentary evidence pertinent to the facts and issues 
raised by the complaint may be received without regard to 
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable to 
judicial proceedings. The hearing officer shall require the 
HA, the complainant, counsel and other participants or 
spectators to conduct themselves in an orderly fashion. 
Failure to comply with the directions of the hearing officer 
to obtain order may result in exclusion from the proceedings. 
The complainant or the PHA may arrange, in advance and at the 
expense of the party making the arrangement, for a transcript 
of the hearing. Any interested party may purchase a copy of 
such transcript. 
DECISION OF THE HEARING OFFICER 
A. The decision of the hearing officer shall be based solely 
and exclusively upon evidence presented at the hearing 
and upon applicable HA and HUD regulations and State and 
Federal Law. 
B. If both parties agree to prepare a proposed decision to 
the hearing panel, each party shall submit same to the 
hearing panel for its consideration. 
C. The hearing officer shall prepare a written decision, 
together with the reasons therefore, within a reasonable 
time after the hearing. A copy of the decision shall be 
sent to the complainant and the HA. The HA shall retain 
a copy of the decision in the tenant's folder. A copy of 
such decision, with all names and identifying references 
deleted, shall also be maintained on file by the HA and 
made available for inspection by a prospective 
complainant, his representative, or hearing officer. 
D. The decision of the hearing officer shall be binding on 
the Ha and the complainant. The HA shall take all actions 
necessary to carry out the decision unless the HA Board 
of Commissioners determines within a reasonable time (not 
in excess of 3 0 days of the date of the hearing officer's 
decision) and promptly notifies the complainant of its 
determination that: 
1. The grievance does not concern HA action or 
failure to act in accordance with or involving 
the complainant's lease on PHA regulations, 
which adversely affect the complainant's 
rights, duties, welfare or status; or 
2. The decision of the hearing officer is 
contrary to applicable Federal, State, or 
local law, HUD regulations or requirements of 
the annual contributions contract between HUD 
and the PHA. 
6. PHA EVICTION ACTIONS 
If a tenant has requested a formal hearing in accordance with 
Section C on a complaint involving HA notice of termination of the 
tenancy and the hearing officer upholds the HA's action to 
terminate the tenancy, the HA shall not commence an eviction action 
in a State or local court until it has served a notice to vacate on 
the tenant, and in no event shall the notice to vacate be issued 
prior to the decision of the hearing officer having been mailed or 
delivered to the complainant. Such notice to vacate must be in 
writing and specify that if the tenant fails to quit the premises 
within the applicable statutory period, or on the termination date 
stated in the notice of termination, whichever is later, 
appropriate action will be brought against him and he may be 
required to pay court costs and attorney fees. 
1. INAPPLICABILITY OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES 
The provisions of this grievance procedure are not applicable to 
any grievance concerning an eviction or termination of tenancy 
based upon a tenant fs creation or maintenance of the threat to the 
health or safety of other tenants or HA employees. The H A may 
immediately commence an eviction action in accordance with State 
Law based on any of the grounds stated in this section. 
SECTION XIV 
LOCALLY OWNED HOUSING PROGRAM 
All preceeding policies, rules and regulations as stated in Section 
I - XIV of the Admission and Continued Occupancy Schedule shall be 
applicable to applicants and residents of locally owned housing 
with the following exceptions: 
TENANT RENT 
Tenant Rent will be determined as the greater of 3 0% of 
Monthly Adjusted Income as defined in Section I or the minimum 
rent which will be established from time to time by the 
Housing Authority to ensure the financial solvency of the 
program. 
